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The reader should not ... be misled by the title, Magnificent Fail-
ure. The Maryland constitution [of 1967-1968] failed at the polls
but that failure was only partial f it teaches.1
On May 14, 1968, Maryland voters rejected a proposed new state
constitution.2 In the immediate aftermath, John P. Wheeler, Jr. and
Melissa Kinsey analyzed this proposed constitution and described its
defeat as a "magnificent failure"; this phrase captures both the ex-
traordinary efforts and visionary proposals of the framers, and the fail-
ure of the electorate to approve it.' Thirty years later, it is appropriate
to reassess the proposals, analyze the continuing effects of their rejec-
tion, and examine Maryland's subsequent constitutional develop-
ments. This Article assesses the success or failure of the Maryland
Constitutional Convention in light of the later adoption-by constitu-
tional amendment, statute, or regulation-of many of the important
innovations proposed in the 1967-1968 constitution.
I. MAGNIFICENT FAILURE
The original version of the constitution currently in force in
Maryland was drafted in 1867.' Then, as now, the constitution re-
quires that Maryland's citizens have the opportunity to hold a consti-
tutional convention every twenty years.5 In 1930, and again in 1950,
1. JOHN P. WHEELER, JR. & MEISSA KINSEY, MAGNIFICENT FAILURE: THE MAm'tAND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1967-1968, at 215-16 (1970) [hereinafter MAGNIFICENT
FAILURE].
2. Id. at 1-2.
3. Id. at 215-16.
4. MD. CONST. of 1867, preamble, reprinted in The Constitution of 1867, CONSTrUTIONAL
CONVENTION COMMISSION OF MARYLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION STUDY DOCUMENTS 511(1968) [hereinafter STUDY DOCUMENTS] (noting that the constitutional convention was
convened on May 8, 1867 and adjourned on August 17, 1867); id. at 511 n.1 (noting that
the proposed constitution was ratified by the people on September 18, 1867). This consti-
tution went into effect on October 5, 1867. Id. at 553. There have been more than onehundred amendments in the intervening 130 years. See Amendments to the Constitution of1867, in STUDY DOCUMENTS, supra, at 583, 592-95 (listing the voting results of proposed
amendments to the Maryland Constitution from 1867-1967).
5. MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. XIV, § 2 (1981). The Bluebook demands that reference
to the Maryland Constitution and Declaration of Rights be cited in the form "MD. CODE
ANN., CONST. art. _, § _" and "MD. CODE ANN., DECL. OF RTS. art. The editors of
the Mayland Law Review have complied with this citation form and it is used throughout
this Article. It is, however, misleading as it suggests that these fundamental documents are
merely a portion of the compilation of statutory law. They are not.
There is no recorded debate from the Constitutional Convention of 1867 indicating
why this procedure was adopted or why the twenty-year period was selected. See DEBATES OF
THE MARYLAND CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1867, at 271-72, 380, 449 (Philip B. Per-
man ed., 1923); see alsoJanice C. May, Constitutional Amendment and Revision Revisited, PUB-
LIUS, Winter 1987, at 153, 156 n.15 (noting that, of the fourteen states with constitutions
requiring periodic votes on the question of whether to call for a constitutional convention,
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the Maryland electorate voted for a constitutional convention.6 Both
times, however, the General Assembly ignored the demands of the
citizens and refused to call a convention.
7
II. THE PATH TO THE CONVENTION
In 1964, the United States Supreme Court held that the appor-
tionment of representation in the Maryland General Assembly vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.'
Maryland Governor J. Millard Tawes requested that the 1965 session
of the General Assembly call for a constitutional convention both to
correct the improper distribution of legislative districts and to correct
eight set twenty years as the appropriate interval: Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland, Mis-
souri, Montana, NewYork, Ohio, and Oklahoma). This may reflect ThomasJefferson's oft-
repeated maxim that governments and constitutions need to be changed every twenty
years. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in 15
THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 42 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds.,
1903).
Under the 1864 Maryland Constitution, a constitutional convention could be con-
vened only upon the recommendation of two-thirds of each branch of the General Assem-
bly and with the approval of the voters. MD. CONST. of 1864, art. XI, § 2. The 1851
Constitution required that the General Assembly ascertain the "sense of the people" about
whether a constitutional convention was necessary in the "first session immediately suc-
ceeding the returns of every census of the United States." MD. CONST. of 1851, art. XI, § 1.
6. MAGNIFICENT FAILURE, supra note 1, at 13. In 1930, the Maryland General Assembly
refused to call a constitutional convention even though a majority of those who voted on
the referendum favored a constitutional convention. See Address Before the Senate Committee
on Amendments to the Constitution and the House Committee on Ways and Means by Mr. Philip B.
Perlman on the Requirement that the General Assembly Call a Constitutional Convention [hereinaf-
ter Perlman Address], in CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE CONSTI-
TUTIONAL CONVNTION COMMISSION, app. at 425, 425 (1967) [hereinafter REPORT]. The
1867 constitutional provision provides that "if a majority of voters at such election ... shall vote
for a Convention, the General Assembly, at its next session, shall provide by Law for the
assembling of such convention, and for the election of Delegates thereto." MD. CODE
ANN., CONST. art. XIV, § 2 (1981) (emphasis added). Although a slim majority of.those
who actually voted on the issue supported calling a convention, the legislature reasoned
that this was "less than a majority of the voters who voted at the general election on all
candidates and propositions" and, consequently, refused to call a convention. See Perlman
Address, supra, at 425.
7. In 1937, frustrated by the General Assembly's failure to authorize a revision of the
Maryland Constitution, H.L. Mencken published a proposal for a new constitution in the
Baltimore Sun. See H.L. Mencken, A New Constitution for Maryland, partially reprinted in H.L.
MENCKEN, A SECOND MENCKEN CHRESTOMATHY 327, 327 (Terry Teachout ed., 1994). In the
introduction to this partial reprint, Mencken wrote, "It got some attention among judges
and lawyers through the country, and I received some interesting commentaries on it, but
in Maryland it went almost unnoticed and none of its innovations has been adopted since,
or even discussed." Id. Mencken's cantankerous proposals included a right to privacy;
limitations on public debt; old-age pensions for the indigent; a strong executive with a ten-
year term of office; a fifteen-member unicameral "legislative counsel"; and a unified and
coordinated court system. Id. at 329-39.
8. Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656, 674 (1964).
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other perceived weaknesses in the existing constitution.9 The legisla-
ture again refused to call a constitutional convention.' ° Faced with
the General Assembly's intransigence, Governor Tawes appointed a
Constitutional Convention Commission anyway, and charged that
body with conducting:
an inquiry into the necessity for, and extent and nature of,
any amendment, modification or revision of the Constitution
of Maryland, with particular respect to whether a Constitu-
tional Convention should be held, the procedures for calling
such a Convention, the basis for representation at the Con-
vention and the procedures for the election of the Delegates
thereto.1
The twenty-seven-member commission,' 2 popularly known as the
Eney Commission,'" met regularly from July 21, 1965 through June
14, 1967.14 Within its first two meetings, the Commission determined
that a "complete revision of the Constitution of Maryland [was] ur-
gently desirable and necessary" and that this could "best be accom-
plished by means of a constitutional convention."'" The Eney
9. At a later occasion, Governor Tawes stated:
During my eight years as Governor, I found this document very restrictive to the
successful operation of an efficient state government and entirely too clumsy and
ineffective as a document of basic law. Moreover, many lawyers, judges, legislators
and students of political science expressed to me the opinion that our Constitu-
tion was too lengthy and too detailed to serve satisfactorily as the basic law of our
State.
J. Millard Tawes, Preface, in REPORT, supra note 6, at vii, vii.
10. REPORT, supra note 6, at 1.
11. Statement by GovernorJ. Millard Tawes on the Appointment of the Constitutional Cornven-
tion Commission, in REPORT, supra note 6, app. at 419, 419.
12. A total of 32 members served on the Constitutional Convention Commission over
its two year tenure: William Preston Lane, Jr. (Honorary Chairman); H. Vernon Eney(Chairman); Robert E. Martineau (secretary); E. Dale Adkins, Jr.; William Prescott Allen;
Harry Bard; Calhoun Bond; Elsbeth Levy Bothe; Franklin L. Burdette; Richard W. Case;
Hal C.B. Clagett; Ernest N. Cory, Jr.; Charles Della; Leah S. Freedlander; James O'C. Gen-
try; Walter R Haile; John R. Hargrove, Sr.; Stanford Hoff; Martin D. Jenkins; William J.
McWilliams; Ridgely P. Melvin, Jr.; Clarence W. Miles; Edward T. Miller; Charles Mindel;
John W. Mitchell; George L. Russell, Jr.; E. Phillip Sayre; Alfred L. Scanlan; L. Mercer
Smith; MelvinJ. Sykes; Furman L. Templeton; and William C. Walsh. REPORT, supra note 6,
at iii.
13. The commission was formally known as the Constitutional Convention Commis-
sion, but popularly known as the Eney Commission in honor of its chairperson, Baltimore
lawyer H. Vernon Eney. Mr. Eney subsequently was elected as a delegate to the constitu-
tional convention from Baltimore County and served as the convention president. See
MAGNIFICENT FAILURE, supra note 1, at 16, 39.
14. Id. at 19.
15. REPORT, supra note 6, at 3 n.6. The Eney Commission's quick determination that
the old constitution could not be the basis of constitutional revision, and that an entirely
new constitution should be drafted, led to early criticism of the draft constitution. See SAvE
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Commission eventually produced a draft constitution for Maryland,16
and compiled a series of source materials for use by the convention
delegates.
1 7
Members of the 1966 session of the General Assembly finally
passed a bill providing for a special referendum to determine the
sense of the people on the need for constitutional revision." The
referendum was held on September 13, 1966, and the citizens indi-
cated their support for the constitutional convention.19 A special,
nonpartisan election of constitutional convention delegates was held
on June 13, 1967.20 The qualifications, backgrounds, and political
views of the delegates have been carefully studied and reported."
OUR STATE COMMITTEE, PROPOSED CONSTITUTION 1 (1967) (criticizing the proposed consti-
tution as "quite unrelated to the present Maryland Constitution and departing radically
from its provisions").
16. Draft Constitution, in REPORT, supra note 6, at 69, 71-93.
17. See STUDY DOCUMENTS, supra note 4, at ix (discussing the purpose of the compila-
tion). This Article relies heavily on the work of the Eney Commission. Although the Com-
mission was not directly responsible for drafting the proposed constitution that was
rejected by the voters, some of the Eney Commission's original proposals have become
part of the Constitution of Maryland. See infra notes 67-75 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the subsequent piecemeal enactment of the rejected constitution). See generally Robert
F. Williams, Are State Constitutional Conventions Things of the Past? The Increasing Role of the
Constitutional Commission in State Constitutional Change, 1 HorsTRA L. & POL'Y Symp. 1, 5-6
(1996) (stating that the debates and reports of state constitutional commissions should be
considered constitutional history because they often "form the origins of important state
constitutional changes").
18. See Act of May 6, 1966, ch. 500, 1966 Md. Laws 817, 818-19 (calling for a constitu-
tional convention, setting the dates therefor, and apportioning representation); Act of May
6, 1966, ch. 501, 1966 Md. Laws 818, 818-19 (setting the dates and procedures for the
convention).
19. The Eney Commission reported 160,280 votes for the constitutional convention,
31,680 against. See Returns for Statewide Referendum, in REPORT, supra note 6, app. at 468,
468. The Commission cautioned, however, that these returns "differ[ed] somewhat" from
those reported by the Governor. REPORT, supra note 6, at 14 n.10. The Baltimore Sun re-
ported that the vote was 160,617 for and 31,702 opposed. See The Convention Opens, BALT.
SUN, Sept. 12, 1967, at A12.
20. REPORT, supra note 6, at 17; see also WAYNE R. SwANSON ET AL., POLITICS AND CoNsmI-
TUTIONAL REFORM: THE MARYLAND EXPERIENCE 1967-1968, at 30 (1970) (arguing that
"[t]he nonpartisan election of delegates to the [1967] Constitutional Convention re-
dounded to the advantage of those individuals in high socio economic positions and ...
reduced the extent to which the convention body reproduced the characteristics of the
voting age population").
21. See, e.g., SWANSON ET AL., supra note 20, at 28-111; Marianne Ellis Alexander, The
Issues and Politics of the Maryland Constitutional Convention, 1967-1968, at 12-13 (1972)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Maryland) (on file with author) (classifying
the delegates into four distinct "voting blocs" based on their backgrounds); Wayne R.
Swanson, The Politics of Constitutional Revision: The Maryland Constitutional Conven-
tion, 1967-1968, at 40-62 (1969) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Brown University) (on
file with author) (surveying the "social and political backgrounds" of those elected
delegates).
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The delegates were well-educated, reform-minded, and largely
apolitical.22
Before the convention, a special, preliminary session was held on
July 11, 1967, at which H. Vernon Eney was elected convention presi-
dent.2" The constitutional convention proper convened in Annapolis
on September 12, 1967.24 The convention-enabling legislation pro-
vided that the convention should conclude no later than December
12, 1967, although a majority of the elected delegates could extend
that date to January 12, 1968.25 The work of the convention required
nearly all of the allotted time: the constitution was approved in its
final form on January 6 and 8,26 and the formal signing and closing
ceremonies were held onJanuary 10, only two days before the January
12, 1968 deadline.27 All but three of the convention delegates voted
in favor of the constitution.28 The substance of the constitution that
the convention produced is the subject of Part IV of this Article.
22. See SWANSON ET AL., supra note 20, at 2843. The delegates were largely apolitical in
the sense that many had never previously sought or held public office, and many were not
particularly affiliated with either major political party. Id. at 35. The election to the consti-
tutional convention was "apolitical" in that the political affiliations of the candidates were
not indicated. Id. at 28.
23. SeeJOuRNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF MARYLAND OF 1967-1968, at 17
(1968) [hereinafter JOURNAL OF THE CONVENTION] (reporting the vote by acclamation by
which Eney was elected).
24. Id. at 21. In his keynote address, President Eney told the convention:
And so, we, the citizens of what we proudly call the great free State of Maryland,
have, along with our fellow citizens of other states, become cringing, favor-seek-
ing vassals, fawning at the feet of Uncle Sam, grateful for the few crumbs of our
own money tossed to us. But that great big, sprawling, bureaucratic colossus sit-
ting astride the Potomac is too big, too far removed from the people, too imper-
sonal to make more than uncertain, feeble, ineffective and ofttimes inept
attempts to solve these problems which ought to be solved by state and local
governments.
The challenge is clear for us to see; it is written in large bold letters on the
walls of this historic State House. We have almost complete freedom in drafting a
constitution to submit to our people. So long as it provides for a republican form
of government, so long as it does not transgress the rights and liberties of the
individual citizen guaranteed and protected by the Constitution of the United
States, we, the people of the State of Maryland, can have almost any kind of con-
stitution we choose.
Id. at 24.
25. Report on Enabling Acts For the Constitutional Convention, in REPORT, supra note 6, app.
at 471, 473.
26. SeeJouRNAL OF THE CONVENTION, supra note 23, at 527-59.
27. Id. at 570-71.
28. Id. at 558 (indicating that Albert F. Baumann, Philip H. Dorsey, and Joseph P.
Murphy were the only delegates who voted against the constitution). But see MAGNIFICENT
FAILURE, supra note 1, at 166 (reporting that only Baumann and Dorsey voted against the
constitution).
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After its drafting, the proposed constitution was:
[s]upported strongly by all but a handful of convention dele-
gates, ... endorsed by all living governors, the highest
judges, the legislative leaders, party luminaries, the captains
of industry, the leaders of labor, the mass media of Baltimore
and Washington, unlimited numbers of do-gooders, and vari-
ous itinerant experts from out of state. Opposition came
from a rag-tag band of the pitiful elite-courthouse gangs
whose jobs had been excised from constitutional status, the
know-nothings of the radical right, a few opportunistic politi-
cians, selective puritans who took an instant dislike to a sin-
gle provision-and a majority of the voters who turned out
on May 14[, 1968].29
The final vote was 284,033 in favor of adoption of the proposed
constitution and 367,101 opposed.3 ° The proposed constitution won
a majority of votes only in Prince George's and Montgomery counties,
the two Washington, D.C. suburban counties."
III. WHY THE PROPOSED CONsTrrrION WAS REJECTED
Many explanations have been offered to account for the defeat of
the proposed Maryland Constitution of 1967-1968. Some commenta-
tors have blamed the content of the proposed constitution, suggesting
that it was "too liberal" for Maryland.12 Some have argued that the
convention delegates themselves were too intellectual or too liberal to
represent the Maryland electorate.A Some political scientists point to
the fact that the entire constitution was submitted to the voters for a
single vote, as a "single package deal," and suggest convincingly that
this contributed to the defeat.3 4 Still others blame the convention del-
egates and those responsible for the ratification campaign for their
lack of political skill.35 But all commentators agree that the propo-
29. MAGNIFICENT FAILURE, supra note 1, at 4 (quoting Royce Hanson, Analysis: In Mary-
land, the Courthouse Gangs and the Little Guys Join Forces to Defeat a Reform Constitution, CITY,
July-Aug. 1969, at 38).
30. Id. at 5.
31. Id. at 4.
32. Robert D. Loevy, Vote Analysis Made of Maryland Defeat, 52 NAT'L Crvic Rav. 519, 522
(1968) (suggesting that a majority vote in favor of the proposed constitution could only
have been secured by making it "less liberal, less progressive, and less intellectual in tone").
33. See SWANSON ET AL., supra note 20, at 125-26 (concluding that the delegates "were
far out of step with the mainstream of Maryland political thought").
34. See Swanson, supra note 21, at 177-78 (noting that voters rejected the proposed
constitution as a whole out of opposition to individual provisions).
35. See SWANSON ET AL., supra note 20, at 125-26 (contrasting the statesman-like atmos-
phere of the convention with the partisan nature of the campaign to defeat its ratification).
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nents of the constitution failed to persuade the electorate of the ne-
cessity of constitutional revision.3 6
Robert D. Loevy blames the content of the constitution itself for
its failure at the polls: "[A] winning majority [for the constitution]
could have been fashioned only by watering down the reforms which
were included, making it less liberal, less progressive, and less intellec-
tual in tone. It also would have had to be considerably more palatable
to the rural areas .... ,,a A pamphlet published by the League of
Women Voters also places a large measure of blame on the substance
of the constitution.3 ' For example, the constitution would have elimi-
nated the constitutional status of the offices of many minor political
functionaries, although probably not the offices themselves.3 9 The
League of Women Voters' pamphlet points out how these changes
tended to galvanize opposition to the constitution among the holders
of these minor offices and their political organizations.40
The criticisms of the substance of the constitution are largely
spurious. Loevy's contention that the proposed constitution was "too
intellectual in tone" is puzzling. The proposed constitution was easier
to read, more direct, simpler in its use of language, and clearer than
the existing Maryland Constitution; it was designed so that the citizens
of Maryland could understand it.4 The existing constitution, by its
length, language, and density, must remain the private reserve of the
elite: lawyers, politicians, and political scientists.42 The problem was
36. See MAGNIFICENT FAILURE, supra note 1, at 214 (discussing lessons learned from the
failure of the ratification campaign); Alexander, supra note 21, at 411-16 (attributing dem-
ographic and political reasons for the failure); Swanson, supra note 21, at 184 (discussing
the convention's failure to proceed incrementally and with sensitivity to the "conservative
values inherent in Maryland political culture" as reasons for the constitution's failure).
37. Loevy, supra note 32, at 522.
38. LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF MD., THE MARYLAND VOTER, Summer 1968, at 1.
39. See MAGNIFICENT FAILURE, supra note 1, at 89-90 (discussing how the positions that
would lose their constitutional status likely would be retained by statute).
40. LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF MD., supra note 38. Categorizing the convention's
elimination of these offices from the constitution as a political failure, rather than as a
substantive choice, is misleading. The delegates to the constitutional convention knew that
the holders of these offices would be dissatisfied by their deletion, and that this dissatisfac-
tion could have political implications, but the delegates chose to delete the offices anyway.
MAGNIFICENT FAILURE, supra note 1, at 211-12 (giving specific, well-publicized examples of
the grievances and threats voiced by holders of offices slated to lose their constitutional
status).
41. See REPORT, supra note 6, at 6 (summarizing and drafting principles of the constitu-
tion to ensure "that its meaning would be easily understood by an informed citizen of
average intelligence and literacy").
42. See MAGNIFICENT FAILURE, supra note 1, at 67 (noting that Maryland's constitution is
the ninth longest among the states, and that this length is indicative of archaic and tedious
restrictions).
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not the substance of the proposed constitution, but the fact that the
voting public was persuaded by opponents of the constitution that it
was too liberal or too intellectual.4"
There was also criticism that the delegates themselves were not
representative of the Maryland electorate. One set of commentators
has argued that the delegates to the constitutional convention "were
far out of step with the mainstream of Maryland political thought" and
"more interested in implementing constitutional reform than in fash-
ioning a document which would be acceptable to the voters of Mary-
land."44 The convention delegates were, however, democratically
elected representatives chosen from a broad array of candidates.
Wheeler and Kinsey report that 739 candidates ran for 142 seats in the
constitutional convention, and that one district alone had 63 candi-
dates.45 Faced with many choices, the electorate selected those candi-
dates whom they believed would best represent them.46
The "all-or-nothing" nature of the vote on the proposed constitu-
tion does provide a compelling, although incomplete, explanation for
the electoral defeat. The all-or-nothing vote created a two-fold prob-
lem, one rhetorical and one mathematical. Wheeler and Kinsey iden-
tified this rhetorical disadvantage:
No delegate was completely happy with everything the
convention did, and it is hardly surprising that few citizens
were. Everyone could find something to disagree with.
[Proponents of the Constitution would state]:
"There are things in this document that I disagree with and I
hope they will be changed later, but these are minor com-
pared to the progressive steps taken in this document."47
The all-or-nothing vote caused proponents to couch their sup-
port as qualified or limited, thus allowing opponents the rhetorical
advantage. Wheeler and Kinsey noted: "Some ... [opponents] were
43. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text (discussing political rather than sub-
stantive reasons for the failure of the constitution).
44. SWANSON ET AL., supra note 20, at 125-26.
45. MAGNIFICENT FAILURE, supra note 1, at 29.
46. One piece of information that was minimized in voting for convention delegates
was party affiliation. See id. at 30 (characterizing the "civic" and "non-political air" that
permeated the special election). While party affiliation information may have helped se-
lect more "representative" delegates, it would have undermined efforts to create a nonpar-
tisan convention atmosphere. See Peter J. Galie & Christopher Bopst, Changing State
Constitutions: Dual Constitutionalism and the Amending Process, 1 HOFSTRA L. & POL'Y SYMP.
27, 37 (1996) (indicating that a "convention's success or failure depends on a number of
variables," including a low level of partisanship).
47. MAGNIFICENT FAILURE, supra note 1, at 209-10.
[VOL. 58:528536
MA GNIFIcENT FAILURE REVISITED
not inclined to adhere to the admonition to determine whether the
good outweighed the bad; one apple tainted the whole barrel."4
The all-or-nothing nature of the vote also created a mathematical
problem for the proposed constitution. Wayne Swanson has demon-
strated that even if a majority of the voters approved of a majority of
the innovations of the proposed constitution, the all-or-nothing na-
ture of the vote would have tended to produce a defeat.49 Wheeler
and Kinsey made a similar point:
The points in this constitution that aggravated en-
trenched interests were single ones here and there. Yet the
only way to avoid any one was to veto the whole document.
If some way could have been found to isolate these factors
and to provide separate votes upon them, it is conceivable
that all might actually have been adopted. When one adds
the opponents to 19-year-old voting to those local officials
upset by losing their constitutional status and throws in the
politicians agitated by the single-member district imposition
as well as opponents of regional government, the opposition
swells in size.5 °
Finally, the most common explanation for the defeat of the pro-
posed constitution is simply that the convention delegates failed to
"sell" constitutional reform to the electorate. Some attribute this to
overconfidence. 1 Others attribute it to a lack of political muscle:
The principal advocates of the reforms in the proposed doc-
ument . . . possessed the least political power in the [ex-
isting] structure and generally lacked strong local political
organizational support with the resources to mobilize voter
support.... The chief opponents of the reforms . .. were
standpatters who had close ties with local Democratic organi-
zations, particularly in Baltimore City and County. As office-
holders they were also skilled in the art of influencing the
voter and knew from experience the issues which could pro-
52voke a negative voter response ....
48. Id. at 209.
49. See Swanson, supra note 21, at 178 (explaining that with the all-or-nothing ap-
proach, the voter will often "reject the total document despite his favorable reaction to a
majority of the provisions in the constitution").
50. MAGNIFICENT FAILURE, supra note 1, at 210.
51. See Swanson, supra note 21, at 175 (suggesting that "[t]he type of detached behav-
ior exhibited by the proponents during the ratification campaign can probably be attrib-
uted to their overconfidence").
52. Alexander, supra note 21, at 414.
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Because of this lack of political power, proponents of the 1967-1968
constitution were ultimately unable to persuade the electorate of the
need for constitutional reform.
The same point, that proponents lacked sufficient political power
to muster support for the constitution, can also be made in terms of
the underlying political theory of the role of state constitutional con-
ventions in the political traditions of the United States. While consti-
tutional conventions are not unique to this country,5" they took on
distinctive characteristics during the American revolution. These fea-
tures include: (1) a constitutional convention's capacity to create fun-
damental law that is unalterable by ordinary legislative act;54 (2) its
superiority to the ordinary legislature by virtue of its function and the
opportunity it offers for "an extraordinary representation of the peo-
ple";55 and (3) its permanent availability as a means of changing gov-
ernments. 56 As one commentator has noted, "Mythologically, [the
53. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 310-
12 (paperback ed., 1993) (explaining the origins and role of conventions in Great Britain).
54. See id. at 309 (discussing the concept of a constitutional convention as a body above
direct legislative control, the purpose of which was to determine the fundamental form of
government). Even Maryland's first constitution recognized this essential characteristic of
a constitution by creating a rudimentary system for constitutional amendment which,
although in the hands of the legislature, was also superior to ordinary legislation. The
Maryland Constitution of 1776 provided for constitutional revision only upon approval by
two consecutive sessions of the Maryland General Assembly. MD. CONST. of 1776, art. LIX.
Given that elections to the House of Delegates were held annually, MD. CONsT. of 1776, art.
II, the electorate would have had the opportunity to indicate their approval or disapproval
of a proposed constitutional amendment before adoption.
55. See WOOD, supra note 53, at 338 (describing the view of proponents of the Penn-
sylvania state constitution that a convention is "actually superior in authority to the ordi-
nary legislature" because it conferred this opportunity).
The Maryland Constitution of 1864 exemplifies what happens when constitutional
conventions are not representative of the citizenry. That constitution, adopted during the
Civil War, was approved only with the support of absentee ballots cast by Maryland Union
troops in the field, a novel and perhaps unconstitutional procedure. See REPORT, supra
note 6, at 54-55 (explaining the basis of the narrow majority that ratified the 1864 Constitu-
tion). The constitution produced has been described as having two purposes, the freeing
of the slaves, and the continuation in political power of the unconditional Union Party. See
William Starr Myers, The Self-Reconstruction of Maryland 1864-1867, JOHNS HOPKINS U. STUD.
IN HisT. & POL. ScI., Jan.-Feb. 1909, at 9. Because this constitution did not appropriately
reflect the political views of the Maryland electorate, it was replaced at the earliest possible
opportunity, 1867. See id. at 126.
56. See WooD, supra note 53, at 319 (discussing the function of conventions as "perma-
nent continuing institutions, integral parts of [America's] political system, essential for its
working, and always available for the people's use"). In this way, constitutional conven-
tions have replaced revolution as the method of altering unsatisfactory governments. See
Board of Supervisors of Elections v. Attorney Gen., 246 Md. 417, 432, 229 A.2d 388, 396
(1967) (describing a constitutional convention as "the exercise of the fundamental right of
the people to change their constitution" and characterizing this right as one of "peaceful
revolution" retained "beyond the constitution").
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constitutional convention] is the personification of the sovereign peo-
ple assembled for the discharge of the solemn duty of framing their
fundamental law. It is supposed to be above politics and to have no
peer among governmental agencies."57 Over time it also has become
clear that state constitutional conventions, like the constitutions they
create, have become identified with a majoritarian impulse." With
the exception of the first characteristic, the capacity to create funda-
mental law, state constitutional conventions do not acquire these char-
acteristics merely by their creation. They must earn them.
The 1967-1968 Constitutional Convention failed to achieve its
goal of ratification of a new and modern constitution for Maryland
because it failed to become the "personification of the sovereign peo-
ple."59 In representational democracy, elected representatives face a
constant tension between their role as representatives of the people
and their role as leaders.6" If the elected representatives are too con-
cerned with the representational aspect, the result is government by
In Maryland, the availability of a state constitutional convention as a means of replac-
ing unsatisfactory governments has evolved slowly, and in each instance in which a conven-
tion was convened, there was some question about its constitutionality. The 1776
Convention was revolutionary, conducted in defiance of the established government The
1851 Constitutional Convention was convened contrary to the requirements of Article 59
of the 1776 Constitution. See MD. CONsT. of 1776, art. LIX; William Starr Myers, The Mary-
land Constitution of 1864, JOHNS HOPKINS U. STUD. IN HisT. & POL. Sci., Aug.-Sept. 1901, at
347; see also James Warner Harry, The Maryland Constitution of 1851, JOHNS HOPKINS U.
STUD. IN HIsT. & POL. Sci.,July-Aug. 1902, at 53. The 1864 Constitutional Convention was
not convened pursuant to the provisions of the 1851 Constitution. MD. CONST. of 1851,
art. XI; Myers, supra, at 347-48. Furthermore, it was alleged that the 1867 Constitutional
Convention was not called according to the provisions of the 1864 constitution. MD.
CONST. of 1864, art. XI; see Myers, supra note 55, at 110 (discussing efforts by some citizens
to obtain an injunction in the Superior Court of Baltimore City to prohibit the election of
the 1867 Constitutional Convention on the ground that it violated the method prescribed
by the 1864 constitution). There was also a challenge to the constitutionality of the 1967-
1968 Constitutional Convention. See Board of Supervisors, 246 Md. at 445, 229 A.2d at 403(affirming the circuit court's order "that it was mandatory that a convention be called...
and that the call could not be delayed").
57. Harvey Walker, Myth and Reality in State Constitutional Development, in MAJOR
PROBLEMS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION 3, 15 (W. Brooke Graves ed., 1960) (foot-
note omitted).
58. Cf Galie & Bopst, supra note 46, at 31 (distinguishing the process of amending
state constitutions from the process of federal amendment as "requir[ing] citizen partici-
pation .. . [that] is majoritarian in character").
59. Walker, supra note 57, at 15.
60. See MALCOLM E. JEWELL & SAMUEL C. PATTERSON, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN THE
UNITED STATES 67-70 (4th ed. 1986) (comparing the two competing approaches to repre-
sentation, the "trustee" role, where the representative makes decisions "according to prin-
ciples, convictions, and conscience" and the "delegate" role, where the representative
follows the wishes of the constituency, even if contrary to his or her own judgment).
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public opinion poll.61 On the other hand, if the elected representa-
tives are too concerned with leading, they lose their legitimacy as rep-
resentatives.62 When the elected leaders properly negotiate the
tension between leadership and representation, they become able to
shape public opinion.63 At this point, leadership becomes easier, be-
cause the elected officials have molded public opinion in view of the
direction in which they want to lead. Had the constitutional conven-
tion took seriously both roles, it could have led public opinion in sup-
port of the proposed constitution.64
To lead public opinion would have required consistent and con-
stant effort. Before the convention, proponents of the convention
should have explained to the public the reasons for a constitutional
convention. During the convention, the delegates should have solic-
ited and encouraged public participation, even at the expense of effi-
ciency. After the convention, delegates and other proponents of the
constitution should have continued to educate the public and solicit
support for the decisions made.65 In this way elected delegates to the
constitutional convention could have shaped public opinion in favor
of the proposed constitution and fulfilled their dual duties as repre-
sentatives and leaders.
IV. MAGNIFICENT FAILURE REVISITED
With the historical background in place, this Part turns to the
major proposals contained in the proposed constitution.66 In each
instance, the analysis will include a discussion of the provision (or ab-
sence of a provision) under the 1867 Maryland Constitution, as
61. See Hanna Pitkin, Commentary: The Paradox of Representation, in REPRESENTATION 38,
41 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1968) (noting that a representative is a
"representative in name only" if he or she simply allows the constituency to decide every
issue).
62. See id. (noting that a representative is not truly a representative if he or she con-
stantly acts in opposition to the wishes of the constituency).
63. SeeJEWELL & PATrERSON, supra note 60, at 70 (explaining that most experienced
representatives assume both a "trustee" and "delegate" orientation when dealing with dif-
ferent issues, often following public opinion on an issue when it is overwhelming, but also
using their own judgment about their constituency to act in the constituents' best interest).
64. See SWANSON ET AL., supra note 20, at 125-26 (discussing the failure of leadership
that occurred in the transition from the constitutional convention to the ratification
campaign).
65. Some efforts at post-convention public education were made. See MAGNIFICENT
FAILURE, supra note 1, at 191-206; REPORT, supra note 6, at 12-14 (detailing education ef-
forts that included community seminars, mass mailings, and a motion picture).
66. This analysis discusses only those amendments to the Maryland Constitution with
origins in the proposed constitution of 1967-1968 and does not purport to be a compre-
hensive analysis of all recent constitutional amendments in Maryland.
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amended to 1967, a review of the change proposed by the 1967-1968
Constitutional Convention, and the subsequent history of the provi-
sion. The analysis reveals that, in some cases, a problem recognized
by the 1967-1968 Constitutional Convention was immediately cor-
rected by constitutional amendment. 67 In other cases, deficiencies
were corrected over time, either in the manner suggested by the con-
stitutional convention or in some other way.68 Finally, some problems
identified by the 1967-1968 Constitutional Convention remain in the
Maryland Constitution.
The proposals of the 1967-1968 Constitutional Convention can
be divided into two types of changes: a "structural" group and a "bal-
ance of power" group. The structural group includes reforms such as
ova ofreorganization of courts, removal of salaries from the Constitution,70
and deletion of obsolete provisions.7' These reforms could have
been, and subsequently were, made with little difficulty. However,
elected officials have been unable to muster support for those propos-
als that would have changed the balance of power among and be-
tween the branches of state government-reforms such as
strengthening the governor's power by removing the Board of Public
Works, the Comptroller, and the Attorney General.72
The largest measure of credit for the modernizations that have
occurred belongs to Governor Marvin Mandel and his administra-
tion. 73 While his ideas may have been derived from the 1967-1968
Constitutional Convention, Mandel resubmitted portions of the pro-
67. Constitutional amendment in the absence of a constitutional convention requirespassage by three-fifths of both houses of the Maryland General Assembly, a vote by thequalified voters of the state, and a proclamation by the governor that the majority of those
voting on the proposed amendment favored its enactment. MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art.
XIV, § 1 (1981).
68. SeeJohn W. Frece, Tax Proposals Face Hostile World, BALT. SUN, Nov. 25, 1990, at NI(reporting that the major recommendations of the 1967-1968 Constitutional Convention
were subsequently adopted over a period of years); see also Williams, supra note 17, at 16 &
n.61 (explaining that the trend to enact constitutional reforms piecemeal-as opposed to
wholesale constitutional revision-can be seen in Florida, Minnesota, and Oregon).
69. See infra notes 231-282 and accompanying text (discussing the proposed changes to
the Maryland judicial system and their history).
70. See infra notes 359-382 and accompanying text (discussing the positions whose sala-
ries were to be deconstitutionalized and become statutorily enacted).
71. See infra notes 389-393 and accompanying text (discussing the deletion of provi-
sions limiting the vote to white males).
72. This category of "balance of power" reforms includes proposals to delete limits onlegislation action and to remove the Board of Public Works. See infra notes 119-127, 173-
179 and accompanying text.
73. ROBERTJ. BRUGGER, MARYLAND: A MIDDLE TEMPERAMENT 1634-1980, at 632 (1988)(crediting Governor Mandel and the character of the reapportioned assembly with having
"resurrected constitutional reform" after the defeat of the proposed constitution).
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posed constitution as amendments, succeeded in getting General As-
sembly approval, and secured citizen ratification. 74 H. Vernon Eney
and the staff to the 1967-1968 Constitutional Convention also deserve
a large measure of the credit for the ultimate adoption of many of the
proposals. Although most of the official publications produced by the
constitutional convention were issued after the electoral defeat, Presi-
dent Eney, believing in the importance of constitutional reform,
urged that the documents serve as guidelines for future piecemeal
revisions.75
A. Declaration of Rights
Historically, the Maryland Declaration of Rights existed as a sepa-
rate document from the Maryland Constitution.7 6 The proposed con-
stitution not only would have changed this arrangement by
incorporating the Declaration of Rights as a new Article 1,77 it also
would have substantially changed the format of the rights provisions.
The Declaration of Rights, as it existed in 1967, contained forty-five
articles, but the draft constitution honed that list to eighteen. 7' The
proposed constitution also added three new rights not previously
guaranteed by the Maryland Declaration of Rights: freedom from ra-
cial discrimination, 79 protection against electronic eavesdropping,
80
74. See id.
75. See Letter from H. Vernon Eney, President, Constitutional Convention of Maryland
of 1967-1968, to Spiro T. Agnew, Governor of Maryland (Nov. 1, 1968), reprinted in CONSTI-
TUTIONAL CONVENTION OF MARYLAND 1967-1968, COMPARISON OF PRESENT CONSTITUTION
AND CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY CONVENTION Xi (1968) [hereinafter COMPARISON] ("The
consensus of opinion is that there were many provisions of the proposed Constitution
which, if presented separately, would have been adopted by the people and the fact re-
mains that the present Constitution is still very much in need of a thoroughgoing
revision.").
76. See Dan Friedman, The Histoiy, Development, and Interpretation of the Maryland Declara-
tion of Rights, 71 TEMP. L. REv. 637, 677 n.3 (1998).
77. See infra note 384 and accompanying text (noting that the Eney Commission advo-
cated including the Declaration of Rights as part of the constitution).
78. After a reworked preamble, the new declaration of rights provided for: Freedom of
Expression (§ 1.01), Freedom of Religion (§ 1.02), Right to Due Process and Equal Protec-
tion (§ 1.03), Right to Fair Treatment in Investigations (§ 1.04), Freedom from Unreason-
able Searches and Seizures (§ 1.05), Right to Grand Jury Indictment (§ 1.06), Rights of
Criminal Accused (§ 1.07), Removal of Criminal Cases (§ 1.08), Right Against Self-Incrimi-
nation (§ 1.09), Prohibition Against Double Jeopardy (§ 1.10), Prohibition Against Unu-
sual Punishments (§ 1.11), Prohibition Against Imprisonment for Debt (§ 1.12), Right to
Jury Trial in Civil Cases (§ 1.13), Preservation of Habeas Corpus (§ 1.14), Prohibition
Against Ex Post Facto Laws (§ 1.15), Eminent Domain (§ 1.16), Continuity of Government
During Emergencies (§ 1.17), and Reserved Rights (§ 1.18). See COMPARISON, supra note
75, at 119-24, 133.
79. See id. at 5 (noting section 1.03, which states "[n]o person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, nor be denied the equal protection of the
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and fair treatment in investigations."1 Each of these rights now has
constitutional status, either through legislative or judicial
enactment.
82
The Eney Commission and the constitutional convention itself re-
designed the Maryland Declaration of Rights in conscious imitation of
the federal Bill of Rights. 83 The language of many of the proposed
new rights followed those of the analogous federal rights. Even the
order of the proposed Declaration of Rights followed, at least in part,
laws, nor be subject to discrimination by the State because of race, color, religion, or na-
tional origin" (emphasis added)).
80. See id. at 6 (proposing in section 1.05 that "[t] he right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures, intercep-
tions of their communications, or other invasions of their privacy, shall not be violated" (emphasis
added)). This proposed protection against electronic interception of communications was
also found in the Model State Constitution. See NATIONAL MUN. LEAGUE, MODEL STATE
CONSTTrTION 2 (6th ed. 1963) [hereinafter MODEL STATE CONST.].
81. See COMPARISON, supra note 75, at 5 (stating in section 1.04 that "[n]o person shall
be denied the right to fair and just treatment in any investigation conducted by the State or
by any unit of local government, or by any of their departments or agencies").
82. The Court of Appeals of Maryland has held that Article 24 of the Maryland Declara-
tion of Rights provides protection against racial discrimination. See Murphy v. Edmonds,
325 Md. 342, 353, 601 A.2d 102, 107 (1992) ("Although the Maryland Constitution con-
tains no express equal protection clause, it is settled that the Due Process Clause of the
Maryland Constitution, contained in Article 24 of the Declaration of Rights, embodies the
concept of equal protection of the laws to the same extent as the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment." (citations omitted)); id. at 356, 601 A-2d at 109 (noting
that "'[c]lassifications based on alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are inher-
ently suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny'" (quoting Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365, 372 (1971))). The same Article also provides a guarantee of fair treatment dur-
ing investigations. See Maryland State Police v. Zeigler, 330 Md. 540, 559, 625 A-2d 914, 923(1993) ("Procedural due process, guaranteed to persons in this State by Article 24 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights, requires that administrative agencies performing adjudica-
tory or quasi-judicial functions observe the basic principles of fairness as to parties appear-
ing before them." (citations omitted)). The Maryland Wiretapping and Electronic
Surveillance Act, MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. §§ 10-401 to 10-4B"O5 (1995 & Supp.
1998), requires wiretaps to comply with Fourth Amendment protections. See also Richard
P. Gilbert, A Diagnosis, Dissection, and Prognosis of Maryland's New Wiretap and Electronic Sur-
veillance Law, 8 U. BALT. L. REv. 183, 220-21 (1979) (discussing Maryland's Act and compar-
ing it to federal law).
83. See REPORT, supra note 6, at 98 (stating that "the [Eney] Commission takes as its
model the Bill of Rights in the United States Constitution"). National authorities on state
constitutional revision also advocated adopting the language of the federal bill of rights.
See MODEL STATE CONST., supra note 80, at 28 ("The language follows the U.S. Bill of Rights
not only because of its excellence but also because its terms have achieved considerable
uniformity of meaning through repeated construction in the courts."); ROBERT S. RANIN,
NATIONAL MUN. LEAGUE, STATE CoNSTITUTIONS: THE BILL OF RIGHTS 2 (1960) (explaining
why state constitutions reflect the influence of the federal bill of rights); Milton Green-
berg, Civil Liberties, in NATIONAL MUN. LEAGUE, SALIENT ISSUES OF CONSTITUTIONAL REvi-
SION 7, 12 (John P. Wheeler, Jr. ed., 1961) [hereinafter SALIENT ISSUES] ("State adoption of
the language of the national constitution is desirable and would avoid confusion.").
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the federal order.84 This proposed "federalization" of Maryland's
rights provisions, although not accomplished by constitutional
amendment, has been carried out by judicial interpretation. A
number of the decisions of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, both
prior to and subsequent to the 1967-1968 Constitutional Convention,
have ignored the plain language of provisions of the Maryland Decla-
ration of Rights and instead have based their interpretation solely on
the language of the analogous federal provision. 5 Former Washing-
ton Supreme Court Justice Robert F. Utter has called this phenome-
non ofjudicial amendment a virtual rewriting of the state constitution
without amendment or consent of the citizens.86 Although the 1967-
1968 Constitutional Convention did not start the federalization of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights, its proposals, as well as the interpreta-
tions of the Court of Appeals of Maryland, are part of a larger trend
toward such federalization.
Since the defeat of the proposed constitution, there also have
been several important (and some relatively unimportant) textual
modifications to the Maryland Declaration of Rights, although none
of these are attributable to the 1967-1968 Constitutional Convention.
One amendment, passed in 1970, permits religious invocation in state
buildings without conflicting with the federal Establishment Clause.87
84. Compare COMPARISON, supra note 75, at 119 (stating in section 1.01 that, "The peo-
ple shall have the right peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for a redress
of grievances" and "[f]reedom of the press and freedom of speech shall not be abridged,
each person remaining responsible for abuse of those rights") with U.S. CONST. amend. I
("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of griev-
ances."). Opponents of the proposed constitution clearly understood that the proposed
constitution's rights provisions were to be federalized. See SAVE OUR STATE COMMITTEE,
supra note 15, at vi (noting that "in lieu of the articles in the present Declaration of
Rights-many having originated in the [Maryland] Constitution of 1776-are substituted
provisions in the first eight amendments to the federal Constitution").
85. See Friedman, supra note 76, at 645 ("Maryland's apellate courts traditionally ...
have preferred to hold that the provisions of Maryland's fundamental documents are 'in
pari materia' with analogous federal cosntitutional guarantees.").
86. See State v. Smith, 814 P.2d 652, 661 (Wash. 1991) (en banc) (Utter, J., concurring)
(explaining that ignoring the difference between the language and history of the federal
Equal Protection Clause and the privileges and immunities language in the state constitu-
tion is "to rewrite our [state] constitution without benefit of a constitutional convention
and to deprive the people of this state of additional rights, which they adopted in our
constitutional convention, without their consent").
87. Act of May 5, 1970, ch. 558, 1970 Md. Laws 1625 (ratified Nov. 3, 1970) ("Nothing
shall prohibit or require the making reference to belief in, reliance upon, or invoking the
aid of God or a Supreme Being in any governmental or public document, proceeding,
activity, ceremony, school, institution, or place.") (codified at MD. CODE ANN., DECL. OF
RTs. art. 36 (1981)).
1999] MA GNIFICENcT FAjL URE REVISITED
In 1972, the citizens of Maryland ratified an Equal Rights Article (Arti-
cle 46 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights) prohibiting discrimina-
tion based on gender s.8  A series of constitutional amendments passed
in 1992 was designed to reduce the burden ofjury service. 9 First, the
size of the jury was reduced from a panel of twelve to a panel of sixjurors.9" Second, jury trials were made available only for civil suits
wherein the amount in controversy exceeds $5000.91 Finally, the most
recent change in the Declaration of Rights is the adoption of a horta-
tory "Victims' Rights" Article.92
Other changes to the Declaration of Rights include the deletion
of the archaic reference to suffrage for "white men"; 3 the clarification
that service in the armed forces reserves or in the Maryland National
Guard does not violate the prohibition on holding dual offices;94 and
88. Act of May 26, 1972, ch. 366, 1972 Md. Laws 1225 (ratified Nov. 7, 1972) ("Equality
of rights under the law shall not be abridged or denied because of sex.") (codified at MD.
CODE ANN., DECL. OF RTs. art. 46 (1981)). For an analysis of the standards of review under
the Maryland Equal Rights Article, see Friedman, supra note 76, at 708 n.580 (and sources
cited therein). See also Paul Benjamin Linton, State Equal Rights Amendments: Making a
Difference or Making a Statment?, 70 TEMP. L. REv. 907, 913 n.15 (1997) (arguing that "Mary-
land cases quite clearly adopted an 'absolutist' position, holding that Article 46... forbids
all sex-based discrimination, without exception" (citations omitted)).
89. SeeAct of May 5, 1992, ch. 203, 1992 Md. Laws 2221 (ratified Nov. 3, 1992) (codi-
fied at MD. CODE ANN., DECL. OF RTs. art. 5 (Supp. 1998)); Act of May 5, 1992, ch. 204,
1992 Md. Laws 2223 (ratified Nov. 3, 1992) (codified at MD. CODE ANN., DECL. OF RTs. art.
5 (Supp. 1998)); Act of May 5, 1992, ch. 205, 1992 Md. Laws 2224 (ratified Nov. 3, 1992)
(codified at MD. CODE ANN., DECL. OF RTs. art. 23 (Supp. 1998)); Act of May 5, 1992, ch.
206, 1992 Md. Laws 2225 (ratified Nov. 3, 1992) (codified at MD. CODE ANN., DECL. OF RTs.
art. 23 (Supp. 1998)); see also Norris P. West, 6-Member Civil Juries, Higher Dollar Threshold
OK'dJudge Would Hear Suits Below $5,000, BALT. SUN, Nov. 4, 1992, at A25.
90. Act of May 5, 1992, ch. 203, 1992 Md. Laws 2221.
91. Act of May 5, 1992, ch. 205, 1992 Md. Laws 2224.
92. Act of May 2, 1994, ch. 102, 1994 Md. Laws 1195 (ratified Nov. 8, 1994) (codified at
MD. CODE ANN., DECL. OF RTs. art. 47 (Supp. 1998)); see also Cianos v. State, 338 Md. 406,
412-13, 659 A.2d 291, 294-95 (1995) (explaining that article 47 requires that trial judges
give appropriate consideration to the impact of crime upon victims).
93. Act of May 6, 1971, ch. 357, 1971 Md. Laws 760 (ratified Nov. 7, 1972) (codified as
amended at MD. CODE ANN., DECL. OF RTs. art. 7 (1981)). This Act, of course, did not
confer the franchise on non-Whites or women because the United States Constitution had
already so extended it. Instead, it simply eliminated archaic language. See U.S. CONST.
amend. XV, § 1 (guaranteeing that the "right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color,
or previous condition of servitude"); U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (guaranteeing that "[tihe
right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or by any State on account of sex"). Despite these federal amendments, the Mary-
land change was significant because it is not a minor detail when the fundamental docu-
ment of a state purports to discriminate against some of its own citizens.
94. Act of Apr. 10, 1990, ch. 61, 1990 Md. Laws 405 (ratified Nov. 6, 1990) (codified as
amended at MD. CODE ANN., DECl.. OF RTs. arts. 33, 35; CONST. art. III, § 10 (Supp. 1998)).
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the deletion of obsolete, inaccurate, invalid, unconstitutional, and du-
plicative provisions.95
B. Elective Franchise
The proposed constitution sought to broaden suffrage, both by
lowering the voting age and by reducing residency requirements.
Most of the proposed changes subsequently have been adopted and
indeed have resulted in a broader franchise.
1. Voting Age.-Although the Maryland constitutional revision
was unsuccessful in lowering the voting age in state elections, federal
legislation soon brought about the change.96 Title III of the federal
Voting Rights Act of 197097 purported to give eighteen- to twenty-year-
olds the right to vote in all federal, state, and local elections. When
the Supreme Court found that the Act exceeded the scope of Con-
gress's legislative powers, 98 an amendment to the United States Con-stitution99 accomplished the same goal.100 As a result, eighteen- to
95. Act of Apr. 26, 1977, ch. 681, 1977 Md. Laws 2743 (ratified Nov. 7, 1978) (codified
as amended at MD. CODE ANN., DECL. OF RTS. arts. 23-24, 46; CONST. art. I, §§ 1-11; art. III,
§§ 5-6, 9, 11, 13, 15, 19, 37, 41, 53, 59; art. IV, §§ 1, IA, 3, 4A, 6, 12, 14, 18, 20, 22, 40, 41-I,
44, 45; art. V, §§ 5-7, 11; art. VI, § 1; art. VII, § 1; art. XI-A, §§ 2, 5; art. XI-D, § 1(a); art.
XIII, §§ 1, 2; art. XV, §§ 2, 3; art. XVI, §§ 2, 6; art. XVII, §§ 1, 3-9 (1981 & Supp. 1998)).
For a discussion of this Act as an overall cleanup of the Maryland Constitution and Declara-
tion of Rights, see infra text accompanying note 394. The impact of this Act on the Decla-
ration of Rights was to create the new Article 23 (which states that ajury is the judge of law
and fact in all criminal cases and guarantees the right to civil jury trial); delete old Article
24 (which prohibited reestablishment of slavery but demanded compensation from the
federal government for manumission); renumber the former Article 23 (due process) as
current Article 24; and delete Article 38 (which restricted gifts to church and clergy).
96. For an analysis of the arguments for and against lowering the voting age to 18
years, see Doris W. Jones, Lowering the Minimum Voting Age to 18 Years: Pro and Con Argu-
ments, reprinted in STUDY DOCUMENTS, supra note 4, at 51, 52-59.
97. Voting Rights Act of 1970, amended by Pub. L. No. 91-285, § 6, 84 Stat. 318 (1970);
Pub. L. No. 94-73, tit. IV, § 407, 89 Stat. 405 (1975) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1973bb-1973bb-1 (1994)).
98. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 118 (1970) (plurality opinion) (finding the
Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970 constitutional with respect to federal elections, but
unconstitutional with respect to state and local elections).
99. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1 ("The right of citizens of the United States, who are
eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States
or by any State on account of age.").
100. The traditional explanation for the adoption of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment is
the Vietnam War and the social protest it engendered. Eighteen through twenty-one year-
olds filled important roles both by serving in the military and in leading social protest
against the war. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popu-
lar Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REv. 749, 772
(1994) (opining that "the Twenty-Sixth Amendment extended the vote to young adults on
the theory that if they were old enough to bear arms in Vietnam, they were old enough to
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twenty-year-olds were not permitted to vote in the 1968 primary or
general elections,1"' and an almost completely new group of eighteen-
to twenty-year-olds were prohibited from voting in the 1970 primary
and general elections. 10 2 One estimate puts the number of eighteen-
to twenty-year-olds prevented from gaining the right to vote at
125,000, or approximately six percent of the electorate at that time. 10'
vote on the wisdom of that war, and on all else"); Michael P. Rosenthal, The Minimum
Drinking Agefor Young People: An Observation, 92 DIcy, L. REV. 649, 653 (1988) (identifying
Vietnam as the "primary cause" for the change of the age of the majority); Elaine Scarry,
War and the Social Contract: Nuclear Policy, Distribution, and the Right to Bear Arms, 139 U. PA.
L. RExv. 1257, 1305 n.148 (1991) (noting that the Voting Rights Act and the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment "expressed a congressional judgment that the educational level reached by 18
year olds, their civic and military obligations and their readiness and capacity to participate
in the political process rendered unreasonable a minimum voting age classification above
eighteen" (quoting HousE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON LOWERING THE VOTING
AGE TO 18, H.R. REP. No. 37, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Celler))). But
see Robert M. Jarvis et al., Contextual Thinking: Why Law Students (and Lawyers) Need to Know
History, 42 WAYNE L. REv. 1603, 1607-08 (1996) (arguing unconvincingly that the primary
reason for the Amendment was the desire to overcome Mitchells limitation of Congress's
power to regulate state and local elections, apparently without realizing that Vietnam was
the impetus for this desire).
101. The November 5, 1968 general elections saw the election of President Richard M.
Nixon (R.-Calif.). In Maryland, Charles McC. Mathias, Jr. (R.) defeated United States Sen-
ator Daniel Brewster (D.) in his re-election bid. See 1 ARcHIvES OF MARYLAND: AN HISTORi-
CAL LIST OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS OF MARYLAND 349 (Edward C. Papenfuse ed., 1990)
[hereinafter ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND]. The Maryland Congressional Delegation was re-
markably stable: Rogers C. B. Morton (RI-lst District), Clarence D. Long (D.-2nd District),
Edward A. Garmatz (D.-3rd District), George H. Fallon (D.4th District), Samuel N. Friedel(D.-7th District), and Gilbert Gude (R.-8th District) were all re-elected. J. Glenn Beall, Jr.(R.) took over the Sixth District seat vacated by Mathias's departure for the United States
Senate. Id. at 364-65. Only in the Fifth District was the incumbent congressional represen-
tative, Hervey G. Machen (D.), defeated by a newcomer, Lawrence J. Hogan (R.). Id. at
365. No Maryland state elections were held in 1968. Id. at 19.
102. The November 3, 1970 general election was not a presidential election. In Mary-
land, Congressman J. Glenn Beall, Jr. (R.) defeated incumbent Senator Joseph D. Tydings(D.) for the United States Senate. Id. at 349. Congressmen Morton, Long, Garmatz, Ho-
gan, and Gude were re-elected. Paul S. Sarbanes (D.) replaced the retiring Fallon. Good-
oe Byron (D.) took the seat vacated by Beall's election to the Senate. Parren J. Mitchell(D.) was elected to represent the seventh congressional district. In Maryland state elec-
tions, Marvin Mandel (D.) was re-elected Governor, an office he had ascended to upon the
election of then-Governor Spiro T. Agnew (R.) as Vice President of the United States. See
infra note 205 and accompanying text. Francis Burch was reelected Attorney General of
Maryland. Louis L. Goldstein (D.) was elected to his fourth (of ten) term as Comptroller
of the Treasury. 1 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND, supra note 101, at 28.
Some young residents of the Eastern Shore's first district may also have lost the oppor-
tunity to vote in the special election held on May 25, 1971, to fill the vacancy created when
President Nixon appointed Congressman Rogers C.B. Morton to be United States Secre-
tary of the Interior. The remaining voters selected William 0. Mills (R.). Id. at 365 n.88.
The first 18-year-olds to vote in a Maryland election were those participating in the
Baltimore City elections of the fall of 1971. It was in this election that William Donald
Schaefer (D.) was first elected Mayor.
103. MAGNIFICENT FAILURE, supra note 1, at 139.
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2. Residency Requirements. -Maryland's residency requirement to
vote under the 1867 Constitution, as it stood in 1967, required one
year of residency in the state and six months within the county or
legislative district.10 4 The proposed constitution would have reduced
these requirements to six and three months, respectively, and would
have permitted the General Assembly to reduce further these resi-
dency requirements for presidential elections.10 5 Opponents of the
constitution criticized these reduced residency requirements, arguing
that:
[t]he purpose of the residency requirements is to enable the
prospective voter to become acquainted with State and local
conditions by actual residence in the State and district with a
sufficient minimum time to enable the prospective voter to
become acquainted with his neighbors, to discuss State and
local problems with them and to become established as a
genuine member of the community. Only in this way, may
the prospective voter be an INTELLIGENT and INFORMED
voter as contrasted to a PRO FORMA or UNINFORMED
voter.
106
With the defeat of the proposed constitution, plans to reduce the
residency requirements for voting were not long delayed. In 1969, the
General Assembly recommended, and the citizens approved, a consti-
tutional amendment that reduced the residency requirement to six
months within the state, and permitted the General Assembly, by law,
to reduce further the residency requirements for voting in presiden-
tial elections.'0 7 This reduction in residency requirements presaged
the decision by the United States Supreme Court in Dunn v. Blum-
stein,' which invalidated Tennessee's residency requirements of one
year in the state and three months in the county prior to the election
on the ground that they constituted an impermissible denial of the
fundamental right to vote." 9
104. See MD. CONST. of 1867, art. I, § 1.
105. See COMPARISON, supra note 75, at 2, 10 (setting forth these reduced requirements
in sections 2.01-.02).
106. SAVE OUR STATE COMMiTrEE, supra note 15, at 79 (capitalization in original).
107. Act of May 21, 1969, ch. 784, 1969 Md. Laws 1683 (ratified Nov. 3, 1970) (codified
as amended at MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. I, § 1 (1981)); see Cohen v. Governor, 255 Md.
5, 14, 255 A.2d 320, 324-25 (1969) (per curiam) (holding that the proposed amendment
had to be submitted to a general election, rather than the special one originally scheduled
for November 4, 1969).
108. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
109. Id. at 334, 360.
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3. Referendum.-The referendum power was added to the Mary-
land Constitution in 1915.11° Originally conceived in the Progressive
era as a way to check conservative legislatures, by the 1960s the refer-
endum had become identified largely as a tool of conservatives to op-
pose progressive legislation.11' For example, in 1964, a referendum to
repeal an act strengthening state protection against racial discrimina-
tion received forty-seven percent of the vote and carried thirteen
counties.11 With this in mind, the 1967-1968 Constitutional Conven-
tion sought to make referenda more difficult by increasing the re-
quirement of petition signatures from three to five percent of the
voter turnout.
1 3
The referendum is not one of the areas where the proposals of
the 1967-1968 convention have led to subsequent constitutional
change. Since 1967, only minor revisions have been made in the ref-
erendum power."'
C. Legislative Branch
The 1967-1968 Constitutional Convention considered radically
revising the provisions governing the legislative branch, and eventu-
ally recommended important changes in the structure and powers of
the legislature." 5 After the defeat of the proposed constitution, none
110. Act of Apr. 16, 1914, ch. 673, 1914 Md. Laws 1143 (ratified Nov. 2, 1915) (codified
at MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. XVI (1981)); see Frank T. Ralabate, Direct Legislation, in
STUDY DOCUMENTS, supra note 4, at 66, 66-67 (explaining the procedures by which a refer-
endum may be petitioned for under the Maryland Constitution).
111. See MAGNIFICENT FAILURE, supra note 1, at 142 (describing the referendum as "a
useful veto device by which sufficiently agitated and interested minorities can thwart pro-
gressive legislation of increasingly responsible and responsive political leaders").
112. Id.
113. See COMPARISON, supra note 75, at 138 (citing section 2.11 of the proposed constitu-
tion which increased the percentage over that required by MD. CONST. of 1867, art. XVI,
§ 3).
114. Act of Apr. 26, 1977, ch. 681, 1977 Md. Laws 2743 (ratified Nov. 7,1978) (requiring
the "remov[al] or correct[ion of] constitutional provisions which are obsolete, inaccurate,
invalid, unconstitutional, or duplicative; generally relating to technical revisions of the
Maryland constitution [al]" provision addressing the referendum power) (codified as
amended at MD. CODE ANN., DECL. OF RTS. arts. 23-24, 46; CONST. art. I, §§ 1-11; art. III,
§§ 5-6, 9, 11, 13, 15, 19, 37, 41, 53, 59; art. IV, §§ 1, IA, 3, 4A, 6, 12, 14, 18, 20, 22, 40, 41-I,
44, 45; art. V, §§ 5-7, 11; art. VI, § 1; art. VII, § 1; art. XI-A, §§ 2, 5; art. XI-D, § 1(a); art.
XIII, §§ 1, 2; art. XV, §§ 2, 3; art. XVI, §§ 2, 6; art. XVII, §§ 1, 3-9 (1981 & Supp. 1998)).
115. The most radical measure with respect to the legislative branch of the Maryland
state government was the proposal to replace the traditional, bicameral legislature with a
"modern" unicameral legislature in accordance with the recommendation of the National
Municipal League. MODEL STATE CONST., supra note 80, § 4.02 & cmt., at 42-44. The Eney
Commission carefully considered both alternatives, and in a 13-12 vote, chose to recom-
mend retaining the bicameral model. REPORT, supra note 6, at 125. Nonetheless, because
of the closeness of the vote, the Commission submitted an alternative draft constitution
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of the proposals of the constitutional convention concerning the legis-
lative branch have been brought to fruition. The reason for this
seems clear. There has been no constitutional convention since 1967-
1968; thus, the only route to constitutional amendment must begin in
the legislature and receive the approval of three-fifths of the members
of each house.116 Consequently, change is difficult. If a proposed
constitutional amendment would reduce the power and prestige of
the legislature, few legislators would support it.117 Alternatively, if a
proposal would increase the power and prestige of the legislature-as
many of the proposals of the 1967-1968 constitution would have-
other institutions may face a commensurate loss of power.' 1 8 To im-
plement such a proposal, legislators would need to overcome likely
gubernatorial opposition and the public perception that such an
amendment was a grab for political power.
1. Removing Limitations on the General Assembly.-Under standard
American political theory, state legislatures are the repository of all
sovereign power.119 Thus, state legislatures may pass legislation gov-
erning any subject matter they select, with the state and federal consti-
based upon a unicameral legislature. See id. at 143-46; see alsoJohn H. Michener, The Struc-
ture of the Mayland Legislature, in STUDY DOCUMENTS, supra note 4, at 107, 108-09 (discussing
arguments for and against unicameralism and bicameralism). The constitutional conven-
tion also considered unicameralism, but ultimately decided to retain the traditional bicam-
eral model. See MAGNIFICENT FAILURE, supra note 1, at 70-71.
116. MD. CONST. art. XIV, § 1.
117. See Gerald Benjamin & Thomas Gais, Constitutional Conventionphobia, 1 HOFSTRA L.
& POL'Y SyMP. 53, 71-72 (1996) (suggesting that proposed constitutional revisions "that
directly challenge legislative power . . . go nowhere").
118. During the 1998 session of the General Assembly, two proposals were made that
would have expanded legislative power: HB 1156 (proposing the deletion of the limitation
on the duration of the session of the General Assembly), and HJ 6 (proposing the forma-
tion of a commission to study single-member districting for the General Assembly). The
text of the proposals, as well as a report on the legislature's failure to adopt either measure,
are available at Maryland General Assembly Homepage (visited Jan. 23, 1999) <http://
mlis.state.md.us/1998rs/billfile/hbl 156.htm> and Maryland General Assembly Homepage (vis-
ited Jan. 23, 1999) <http://mlis.state.md.us/1998rs/billfile/hj0006.htm>.
119. See W.F. Dodd, Implied Powers and Implied Limitations in Constitutional Law, 29 YALE
L.J. 137, 137-38 (1919) (arguing that the "state legislature has all powers not forbidden to
it" by the National and State constitution, and that state constitutional law involves a
"broader [than the federal] sphere of powers existing unless they are denied"); Frank P.
Grad, The State Constitution: Its Function and Form for Our Time, 54 VA. L. REv. 928, 968
(1968) (noting that "state government is a government of plenary powers, except as lim-
ited by the state and federal constitutions"); William F. Swindler, State Constitutions for the
20th Century, 50 NEB. L. REv. 577, 593 (1971) (noting that "[state] legislative power is ple-
nary in the absence of specific constitutional limitations"); Robert F. Williams, State Consti-
tutional Law Processes, 24 WM. & MARY L. REv. 169, 178 (1983) ("When the Union was
formed, the states retained almost plenary governmental power exercised primarily by
their legislatures."). See generally THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL
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tutions functioning as the sole limitation.1 2 0 The Court of Appeals of
LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN
UNION (3d ed. 1874).
120. There are important exceptions to the general rule that state legislatures possess
plenary power and may legislate on any topic not prohibited by the state constitution. A
state legislature may not pass laws governing subject matters that are preempted by federal
statutory or regulatory law. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 24748 (1984)
(explaining that a state law can be preempted by federal law, but only if Congress evi-
dences an intent to occupy a given field or, even if Congress has not entirely displaced state
regulation, if the state law conflicts with federal law). The state legislature may not pass a
law that impairs interstate commerce. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 770-
71 (1945) (noting that a state law can be invalid as an impairment of interstate commerce
and setting forth the test to determine if impairment exists). The state legislature may not
abolish its republican form of government. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4; see also Hans A. Linde,
When Initiative Lawmaking Is Not "Republican Government": The Campaign Against Homosexual-
ity, 72 OR. L. REv. 19, 19 (1993) (opining that a "state's federal obligation [i.e., under U.S.
CONST. art. IV, § 4] to maintain a republican form of government disqualified [an anti-
homosexual rights] proposal from being put to a plebiscite by initiative petitions"). But see
Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 1 (1849) (holding that the determination whether a state
provided a republican form of government is a political question entrusted to the legisla-
tive branch of government). State legislatures are prohibited from undertaking national
functions. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. Finally, since the application of the federal bill of rights
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, the states are prohibited from depriving
their respective citizens of most of the guarantees of the federal bill of rights. For a catalog
of those rights incorporated against the states, see Friedman, supra note 76, at 677 n.13.
Recently, the United States Supreme Court has indicated a renewed interest in feder-
alism and the appropriate relationship between the national and state governments. See
Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2384 (1997) (holding unconstitutional a federal
gun control reporting law that required state and local law enforcement officers to enforce
federal law); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 75-76 (1996) (barring suit by Indian
tribe against State based in part on issues of federalism); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thorn-
ton, 514 U.S. 779, 837-83 (1995) (invalidating the Arkansas state constitutional provision
imposing term limits on members of the United States House and Senate); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995) (holding that the federal Gun-Free School Zones Act
exceeded Congress's legislative power under the Commerce Clause); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (holding that the "take-tide" portion of the federal Low-
Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 improperly commandeered the
legislative process of the states); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 473 (1991) (holding
that the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act does not preempt the mandatory
retirement provisions of the Missouri state constitution).
For scholarly analyses of this line of cases, see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Dueling Sovereign-
ties: U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 109 HARv. L. REv. 78, 81 (1995) (analyzing the
decision in Term Limits "as a preview of the Court's response to other coming controversies
over the relative reach of state and federal power"). See also Steven G. Calabresi, "A Govern-
ment of Limited and Enumerated Powers": In Defense ofUnited States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. Rzv.
752, 752 (1995) (describing Lopez as a "long overdue revival of the doctrine that the federal
government is one of limited enumerated powers"); Daniel A. Farber, The Constitution's
Forgotten Cover Letter: An Essay on the New Federalism and the Original Understanding, 94 MICH.
L. REv. 615, 618 (1995) (examining the "New Federalism" that has evolved out of "concern
for federal invasions of state prerogatives").
The current membership of the Supreme Court is deeply divided about the nature of
this federal-state balance. While both sides of the Court agree that the "people" have given
sovereignty to both the states and the national government, the amount and quality of the
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Maryland has recognized this basic tenet of state sovereignty, stating
that "[t] he delegated legislative powers of the General Assembly are
plenary, except as limited by the Federal and State Constitutions. "121
The 1867 Maryland Constitution contains numerous provisions
governing legislative action. Some of these provisions prohibit the
General Assembly from legislating over a given subject matter.12
2
Other provisions require the General Assembly to regulate subjects by
legislative act.123 The provisions in the first group, preventing the leg-
islature from legislating, are few in number and arcane.1 24 The more
insidious problem arises from provisions that require the General As-
sembly to legislate in certain areas. Although it has not presented a
problem in Maryland, courts can transform such mandates into limita-
tions on legislative power, by the canon of construction expressio unius
est exclusio alterius (the expression of one is the exclusion of an-
sovereignty delegated remain elusive. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor,
Scalia, and Thomas, have opined that sovereignty was transferred by the people to the
states, which, with the exception of the narrowly defined enumerated powers of the federal
government, are the irreducible repositories of sovereignty. Justices Stevens, Souter, Gins-
burg, and Breyer have opined that the "undifferentiated" people retain to themselves nu-
merous powers. Justice Kennedy has provided the swing vote. See Sullivan, supra, at 103
(analyzing the two opposing views on the Court and identifying Justice Kennedy as the
"swing vote" in federalism cases); Melvin R. Faraoni, Note, Printz v. United States: Federal-
ism Revisited or Madison and Hamilton Are at It Again, 30 AIz. ST. L.J. 491, 503 & n.108
(1998) (same). Obviously, the outcome of the United States Supreme Court's ongoing
debate on these "first principles," Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552; U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 846
(Thomas, J., dissenting), will influence state supreme courts generally (and the Court of
Appeals of Maryland specifically) in their assessments of the limits of state sovereignty and
the nature and scope of a state legislature's "plenary" power to legislate.
121. Board of Supervisors of Elections v. Attorney Gen., 246 Md. 417, 428, 229 A.2d 388,
394 (1967); see also Richards Furniture Corp. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 233 Md. 249,
257, 196 A.2d 621, 625 (1963) ("The Maryland Constitution is not a grant of powers to the
General Assembly, but a statement of limitations on its otherwise plenary powers.").
122. See, e.g., MD. CoNsT. of 1867, art. III, § 55 (prohibiting suspension of writ of habeas
corpus); id. § 59 (prohibiting the establishment of "any general pension system").
123. See, e.g., id. § 42 (requiring the legislature to pass laws governing elections); id. § 43
(mandating that the legislature protect "the property of the wife... from the debts of her
husband"); id. § 44 (requiring the legislature to pass laws that "protect from execution a
reasonable amount of the property of the debtor"); id. § 45 (requiring the legislature to
pass laws governing registration of wills); id. § 48 (requiring the legislature to pass laws
governing corporate charters); id. § 49 (requiring the legislature to pass laws governing
Judges of Elections); id. § 50 (requiring the legislature to pass laws prohibiting bribery); id.
§ 58 (requiring the legislature to pass laws governing taxation of foreign corporations); id.
§ 60 (granting the legislature the authority to pass laws governing parole).
124. See GEORGE A. BELL &JEAN E. SPENCER, THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN MARYLAND 4-10
(2d ed. 1963) (discussing "prohibited or limited legislative action" in Maryland); Edmund
C. Mester, The Constitutional Position of the Legislature of Maryland 49 (1949) (unpub-
lished M.A. thesis, University of Maryland) (on file with author) ("The limitations placed
on the General Assembly by the [state] Constitution are quite numerous and, in many
instances, of controlling importance.").
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other) 125 As Wheeler and Kinsey write, "So far as the legislature has
plenary powers to act in the absence of constitutional restraint, almost
any constitutional statement becomes a limitation." 126
The 1967-1968 Constitutional Convention sought to eliminate
both problems by removing most constitutional limitations on legisla-
tive enactment. 127 In the thirty years since the defeat of the proposed
constitution, no changes have been made to limit the problem of neg-
ative implication.
2. Composition of the General Assembly.-The basic unit of repre-
sentation in the Maryland General Assembly, at least from 1776 to
1968, was the county. 128 But after the United States Supreme Court's
125. See Grad, supra note 119, at 966 (noting that "courts have often given [constitu-
tional grants of legislative power] the full effect of negative implication, relying sometimes
on the canon of construction expresio unius est exclusio alterius"); Williams, supra note 119, at
202-04 (explaining that courts have sometimes transformed state constitutional provisions
into limitations on legislative power); see also MODEL STATE CONST., supra note 80, § 2.01 &
cmt., at 36-38 (noting the problem of "judicial findings of implied limitations which were
wholly unintended").
126. MAGNIFICENT FAILURE, supra note 1, at 70.
127. See COMPARISON, supra note 75, at 147-50 (citing sections 3.19-.24 of the proposed
constitution which reduce limitations on the legislature primarily to procedural require-
ments and the requirement to pass general laws).
128. The first Maryland Constitution provided for the House of Delegates to be com-
posed of four delegates per county, MD. CoNsT. of 1776, art. II, and two each from Annap-
olis and "Baltimore town." MD. CoNsT. of 1776, art. IV, V. The state senate was elected
indirectly by two senatorial electors, chosen from each county, and one each from Annapo-
lis and "Baltimore town." MD. CONST. of 1776, art. XV. The electors then chose fifteen
state senators (nine from the western shore, six from the eastern shore). MD. CONST. of
1776, art. XV. SeeJohn H. Michener, The History of Legislative Apportionment in Mayland, in
STUDY DOCUMENTS, supra note 4, at 131, 139 & n.47. The 1837 amendments provided for
the'direct election of state senators (one senator per county and one for Baltimore City)
and a "permanent" proportional representation system in the House of Delegates whereby
the smallest counties elected three delegates and larger counties elected four, five, or six
delegates depending on their population. STUDY DOCUMENTS, supra note 4, at 402-08.
The 1851 Maryland Constitution retained the county as the basic unit of representa-
tion and retained the direct election of one senator per county and for Baltimore City.
MD. CONST. of 1851, art. III, § 2. The 1851 Constitution mandated that the House of Dele-
gates reapportion itself according to the population of each county, but that there could
be no more than eighty delegates, nor fewer than two delegates per county. Id. § 3.
Under the short-lived 1864 Constitution, Baltimore City was divided into three dis-
tricts. MD. CONST. of 1864, art. III, § 2. Each county, and each of Baltimore's districts,
were permitted one state senator. Id. § 3. A new formula for proportional representation
in the House of Delegates was established, id. § 4, but never took effect. See Michener,
supra, at 143 n.66. The 1867 Constitution retained the general outlines of the 1864 Consti-
tution's apportionment, but doubled the representation for the smallest counties and
capped the number of delegates permitted to represent Baltimore City. MD. CONST. of
1867, art. III, §§ 2, 3. From 1867 until 1967, there were relatively minor adjustments to the
inequitable, county-based formula. Act of Apr. 7, 1900, ch. 469, 1900 Md. Laws 750 (rati-
fied Nov. 5, 1901) (adding a fourth district in Baltimore City) (codified as amended at MD.
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decision in Baker v. Carr,1 2 9 the disparity in size between the most pop-
ulous and least populous counties made representation by county
impossible:
"The unpleasant reality which the committee [on the legisla-
tive branch] finally had to face was the fact that, for each
county to retain at least one delegate, [and conform to the
'one man/one vote' principle], the House of Delegates
would have to have [based on demographic trends] 192
members following the reapportionment in 1970 and 227
members following the reapportionment in 1980 .... ,0
Thus, it was impossible to retain the county as the basic unit of
representation in the General Assembly. To avoid this quagmire, the
constitutional convention determined that reapportionment would be
best left to the General Assembly itself, subject to two important re-
strictions: (1) that the membership in the House of Delegates not
exceed 120 members and the Senate not exceed 40 members; and (2)
that each delegate represent a single district."' The mechanism by
which the General Assembly would undertake redistricting was some-
what novel and originated at the Convention. The drafters proposed
a nine-member "Redistricting Commission"13 2 and charged it with cre-
ating a redistricting plan. The plan would be submitted to the gover-
CODE ANN., CONST. art. III, § 2 (1981)); Act of Mar. 1, 1922, ch. 7, 1922 Md. Laws 11
(ratified Nov. 7, 1922) (adding a fifth and sixth district to Baltimore City) (codified as
amended at MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. III, § 2 (1981)); Act of Apr. 22, 1949, ch. 226,
1949 Md. Laws 596 (ratified Nov. 7, 1950) (freezing apportionment formula to 1940 levels
to prevent further losses by large counties and Baltimore City) (codified at MD. CODE ANN.,
CONST. art. III, § 5 (Supp. 1998)).
Even after the United States Supreme Court applied the principle of "one person/ohe
vote" to state legislatures in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the Maryland General As-
sembly attempted to retain the county as the basic unit of representation. MD. ANN. CODE,
art. 40, § 42 (1962). For a complete history of legislative reapportionment in Maryland
from 1635 to 1967, see Michener, supra, at 131. See also BELL & SPENCER, supra note 124, at
11-28.
129. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
130. MAGNIFICENT FAILURE, supra note 1, at 74 (quoting Committee Memorandum, LB-
1, November 1, 1967).
131. See COMPARISON, supra note 75, at 141-42 (§§ 3.03-.06); see also MAGNIFICENT FAIL-
UPE, supra note 1, at 71-73 (describing the substance of the proposed single-member dis-
trict change); id. at 176-81 (explaining the divisiveness of the proposed single-member
district change).
132. COMPARISON, supra note 75, at 142 (§ 3.05). The proposed membership of the Re-
districting Committee consisted of two appointees from the presiding officer and minority
leader in each house, plus one gubernatorial appointee to serve as chairperson. The Re-
districting Commission also served a similar function with respect to congressional redis-
tricting. Id. at 143 (§ 3.08).
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nor,133 who then would introduce the plan to the General
Assembly.1 3 ' The General Assembly was then free to adopt the Com-
mission plan or another of its own design.'" 5 The proposed constitu-
tion provided that the Court of Appeals would hav6 original review of
the adopted redistricting plan.13 6
Upon the defeat of the proposed constitution, it was still neces-
sary to reorganize the General Assembly according to the "one per-
son/one vote" principle, which was enshrined in the Maryland
Constitution by a 1969 amendment.13 7
Following the 1970 census, a more substantial change was
adopted that remains in effect today. 138 Under this system, the gover-
nor is charged with creating a redistricting plan after the census."3 9
The governor then causes the plan to be introduced in the General
Assembly. 40 If the General Assembly fails to adopt an alternative
plan, the governor's plan becomes law.' 4 ' The new system, like that
proposed by the Constitutional Convention of 1967-1968, provides for
original jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals of Maryland for chal-
lenges to the redistricting plan adopted.' 4 2
133. The governor's role in receiving the redistricting plan from the commission and
transmitting the plan to the General Assembly appears to have been merely ceremonial,
and not an opportunity for the governor to intervene in the redistricting process.
Although the convention had among its materials a model state constitution, which pro-
posed a more active role for the governor, the convention rejected this model in favor of a
system with no active gubernatorial involvement. Garrett Power, Extraordinary Powers of the
Governor, in STUDY DOCUMENTS, supra note 4, at 151, 152-53.
134. COMPARISON, supra note 75, at 142 (§ 3.06).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Act of May 21, 1969, ch. 785, 1969 Md. Laws 1684, 1685 (ratified Nov. 3, 1970)
(,"The ratio of the number of senators to population shall be substantially the same in each
legislative district; the ratio of the number of delegates to population shall be substantially
the same in each legislative district.") (codified as amended at MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art.
III, §§ 2-6 (1981 & Supp. 1998)).
138. Act of May 26, 1972, ch. 363, 1972 Md. Laws 1213 (ratified Nov. 7, 1972) (codified
as amended at MD. CODE ANN., CoNsT. art. III, §§ 2-5) (1981 & Supp. 1998)). This amend-
ment also set the current membership of the General Assembly: 47 Senators and 141 Dele-
gates. This section was modified, but not substantively, by Act of Apr. 26, 1977, ch. 681,
1977 Md. Laws 2743 (ratified Nov. 7, 1978) (deleting language governing transition from
prior system) (codified as amended at MD. CODE ANN., DECL. OF RTS. arts. 23-24, 46;
CONST. art. I, §§ 1-11; art. III, §§ 5-6, 9, 11, 13, 15, 19, 37, 41, 53, 59; art. IV, §§ 1, IA, 3, 4A,
6, 12, 14, 18, 20, 22, 40, 41-I, 44, 45; art. V, §§ 5-7, 11; art. VI, § 1; art. VII, § 1; art. XI-A,
§§ 2, 5; art. XI-D, § 1(a); art. XIII, §§ 1, 2; art. XV, §§ 2, 3; art. XVI, §§ 2, 6; art. XVII, § 1, 3-
9 (1981 & Supp. 1998)).
139. MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. III, § 5 (1981).
140. Id.
141. Id. The current apportionment is codified as MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 2-202
(1995).
142. MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. III, § 5 (1981).
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In summary, after the United States Supreme Court mandated
that state legislatures conform to the principle of "one man/one
vote," nothing could be done to retain representation in the General
Assembly by county. Over time, demographic change has required
that legislative districts cross county lines more and more frequently.
With respect to the mechanism for redistricting, it is unclear if the
1972 system requiring the governor to commence the redistricting
process was adopted in response to the proposals of the Constitutional
Convention of 1967-1968, or out of the General Assembly's under-
standable frustration that resulted from redistricting the state and its
own members so many times in a short period of time.'43 In either
case, the constitutional amendment created a workable system for
reapportioning the legislature in compliance with federal law.
3. Retention of the Executive Budget System.--In 1916, an executive
budget system was adopted in Maryland.' 44 Under this system, the
governor drafts and submits the budget bill to the General Assembly
143. For a history of the legislative apportionment in Maryland during the 1960s, see
Michener, supra note 128.
144. Act of Mar. 28, 1916, ch. 159, 1916 Md. Laws 268 (ratified Nov. 7, 1916) (codified
as amended at MD. CODE ANN., CONsT. art. III, § 52 (1981 & Supp. 1998)). Hooper S.
Miles, Maryland State Treasurer (1935-1963), described the historical background that led
to the adoption of the executive budget system:
It was customary, under the former method, for the Governor to appear in
person before a joint meeting of the members of the House of Delegates and the
Senate, at the beginning of every regular session of the Legislature, and to ad-
dress them on "the condition of the State,"-in the course of which he was ex-
pected to direct their attention to the essential needs of the State, and to
specifically recommend to their consideration such measures as he judged neces-
sary. Having thus discharged the responsibility imposed upon him by the Consti-
tution, the Governor must thereafter await the final disposition of his-
recommendations by the Legislature, whose members were free to adopt, alter or
entirely ignore any or all of them, except in so far as the Governor, by virtue of his
prestige and his influence with the members of the Legislature, might affect the
course of his recommendations through the Legislature.
It is true, the Governor then had the "power to disapprove of any item or
items of Bills making appropriations of money" and to thus void the items which
he disapproved. However, his use of this veto power on individual items had to
be exercised with rare discrimination and with an intimate understanding of the
temper of the Legislature, to avoid the danger of antagonizing powerful groups
in the Legislature, and thereby jeopardize all of his recommended measures.
Consequently, he was ever conscious of the fact that, in addition to the complete
discretion vested in the Legislature in its consideration of his proposals, it also
could "proceed to reconsider" and repass, any of the vetoed items, by the affirma-
tive vote of "three-fifths of the members elected" to each "House," viz: The House
of Delegates and the Senate.
The power to fix the fiscal policies and determine the course of the fiscal
operations of the State was, therefore, exclusively vested in the Legislature, sub-
ject only to the mild restraint of the limited veto powers of the Governor, and
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for its approval. This system reverses the traditional legislative pro-
cess, wherein bills originate in the General Assembly and proceed to
the governor for approval.145 The advantage is that it allows the gov-
ernor greater control of the budget under which his or her adminis-
tration will operate.' 46 Of course, the governor's additional power to
propose the state budget comes at the expense of the legislative
branch, which is deprived of that traditional power. The delegates to
the 1967-1968 Constitutional Convention proposed retaining the ex-
ecutive budget system,' 47 and in the intervening thirty years, there has
been no formal proposal to return to the previous legislative budget
system.
A subsequent correction in the allocation of the balance of power
between the executive and legislative branches with respect to the
budget process was made in the late 1970s. 4 Around this time, the
General Assembly began passing bills mandating funding levels for
certain programs.' 49 In effect, these minimum funding bills limited
whatever power of persuasion he might be capable of exercising with individual
members of the Legislature.
The old method often witnessed "logrolling" or "you help me and I'll help
you" tactics among many of the members of the Legislature in their efforts to
insure passage of the particular appropriations in which they had some selfish or
political interest. It was not unusual for excessive appropriations to result from
such tactics and also from the pressure of political and professional lobbyists; and,
almost as frequently, some of the most important activities or needs of the State
were either overlooked or sadly neglected in what was commonly termed, the
"Pork Barrel" scramble.
The present Budget System, which is technically known as the "State Execu-
tive Budget System," was designed to correct these conditions, and to impose
upon the Governor the primary responsibility of controlling the fiscal policies
and operations of the State.
HOOPER S. MILES, THE MARYLAND ExEctrrIvE BUDGET SYSTEM AND A REVIEW OF ITS ADMINIS-
TRATION: 1916-1941, at 8-10 (1942) (citation omitted); see also McKeldin v. Steedman, 203
Md. 89, 96-103, 98 A.2d 561, 536-67 (1953) (examining Maryland's executive budgetary
system and considering the events that led to its adoption); George C. Doub, Jr., The BudgetAmendment, in STUDY DOCUMENTS, supra note 4, at 231, 231 (explaining how Maryland, by
enacting the 1916 constitutional amendment, "became one of the first states to adopt an
executive budget system" as a remedy to a "piecemeal" appropriations process).
145. See Doub, supra note 144, at 231-37 (comparing the traditional legislative process to
the executive budget system).
146. See id. at 233.
147. See COMPARISON, supra note 75, at 198 (§ 6.09).
148. See infra notes 152-153 and accompanying text (examining the allocation of power
between the executive and legislative branches in the budget process).
149. See, e.g., Act of May 31, 1974, ch. 867, 1974 Md. Laws 2896 (establishing minimum
rates for certain types of foster care in terms of a percentage of other types of foster care)(repealed 1984); see also Maryland Action for Foster Children, Inc. v. State, 279 Md. 133,
136, 367 A.2d 491, 493 (1977) (citing this enactment).
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the governor's freedom to create the budget as he saw fit.' In 1977,
the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the Maryland Constitution
prohibited the General Assembly from mandating minimum funding
of certain programs.' The General Assembly responded immedi-
ately by amending the constitution to permit minimum funding man-
dates. 15 2 In this manner, the balance of power has reached a point of
equilibrium: the legislature can mandate minimum funding for pro-
grams it deems important; the governor must include those projects
in the budget the governor prepares for submission to the General
Assembly; and the General Assembly then approves the governor's
budget.'
53
4. Shared Power with Local Government.--The 1967-1968 Constitu-
tional Convention sought to reduce the General Assembly's role in
local affairs by removing the responsibility to pass local legislation.
The hope was that this change would strengthen both the General
Assembly and the local governments. The mechanics of the proposed
changes are dealt with in Part V.F."'
5. Legislative Sessions.-The proposed constitution called for a
lengthening of the sessions of the General Assembly. Under the 1867
150. See Mayland Action, 279 Md. at 151, 367 A.2d at 499 ("The Legislature, by enacting
statutes specifying minimum spending limits, cannot deprive the Governor of the discre-
tion which the Constitution explicitly vests in him.").
151. Id. at 152-53, 367 A.2d at 501-02.
152. Act of May 29, 1978, ch. 971, 1978 Md. Laws 2811 (ratified Nov. 7, 1978) (codified
as amended at MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. III, § 52(11), 52(12) (1981 & Supp. 1998)).
The preamble to the constitutional amendment suggests the strength of the General As-
sembly's disagreement with the Court of Appeals's holding:
WHEREAS, The Court of Appeals of Maryland, in Maryland Action for Foster Chil-
dren, Inc. v. State, 279 Md. 133[, 367 A.2d 491] (1977), has held that Section 52 of
Article III of the Constitution of Maryland does not authorize the General Assem-
bly to enact legislation (other than an appropriation bill) which requires the Gov-
ernor, in the preparation of the annual budget, to provide for the funding of
specified programs at specified levels; and
WHEREAS, The inability of the General Assembly to mandate minimum
funding levels of State programs so emasculates the policy-making function of the
legislative branch that it is imperative that the Constitution of Maryland be
amended so as to authorize the General Assembly to enact legislation (other than
an appropriation bill) requiring the Governor, in the preparation of the annual
State budget, to provide for the funding of specified programs at specified levels,
contrary to the holding of the majority opinion and consistent with the holdings
of the minority opinions in that case ....
Id. at 2812.
153. See MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. III, § 52 (1981 & Supp. 1998) (setting forth the
procedure for appropriations).
154. See infra notes 283-308 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship between
the state and local governments).
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Constitution as it existed in 1967, legislative sessions were limited to
seventy days per year. 155 The proposed constitution would have al-lowed a ninety-day session with two possible thirty-day extensions. 156
After the defeat of the proposed constitution, the legislature pro-
posed, and the electorate adopted, a constitutional amendment to ex-
tend the legislative session to ninety days. 157
The lengthening of the session has not had the desired effect.Wheeler and Kinsey's description of the end of a legislative session as
a "last minute log-jam of legislation when dozens of bills pass onehouse or the other at fantastic rates of speed with at best the formali-
ties touched upon"15s is still accurate. It may be that legislation can
only overcome the general inertia of a legislative body when some sig-
nificant force is applied. This force may come in the form of constitu-
ent outcry, media criticism, or the pressure exerted by fellow
members of the legislature. The shortness of time at the end of a
session, with the impending constitutional deadline, serves to magnify
these forces. So long as Maryland continues to employ a part-timelegislature, the end of a session, regardless of whether it is a seventy-
day, ninety-day, or one hundred twenty-day session, will bring an end-
of-session rush to adopt legislation. 159
155. As originally framed, the 1867 Constitution provided for biennial, 90-day sessions.MD. CONST. of 1867, art. III, § 14 ("The General Assembly shall meet on the first Wednes-day ofJanuary, eighteen hundred and sixty-eight, and on the same day in every second yearthereafter. . . ."); id. § 15 ("The General Assembly may continue its Session so long as, in itsjudgment the public interest may require, for a period not longer than ninety days. ").In 1948, a limited 30-day session was added during alternate years. Act of Apr. 16, 1947,
ch. 497, 1947 Md. Laws 887 (ratified Nov. 2, 1948) (codified as amended at MD. CODEANN., CONST. art. III, § 14.15.52 (1981 & Supp. 1998)). In 1964, the constitution was
amended to create an annual 70-day session. Act of Apr. 7, 1964, ch. 161, 1964 Md. Laws413 (ratified Nov. 3, 1964) (codified as amended at MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. II, §§ 1, 3,13; art. III, §§ 14, 15, 27, 52(3) (1981 & Supp. 1998)). See generally BELL & SPENCER, supra
note 124, at 34-35 (discussing the limitations on the number and duration of legislative
sessions in Maryland).
156. See COMPARISON, supra note 75, at 146 (§ 3.15).
157. Act of May 5, 1970, ch. 576, 1970 Md. Laws 1671 (ratified Nov. 3, 1970) (codified as
amended at MD. CODE ANN., CONsT. art. II, §§ 1, 3, 13; art. III, §§ 14-15, 27, 52(10) (1981 &Supp. 1998)). An earlier effort to extend the legislative session to 90 days, 1969 Md. Laws,
ch. 788, was aborted by the Court of Appeals of Maryland's decision in Cohen v. Governor,255 Md. 5, 14, 255 A.2d 320, 325 (1969) (per curiam). The same amendment was then
repassed in 1970. See MAGNIFICENT FAILURE, supra note 1, at 216.
158. MAGNIFICENT FAILURE, supra note 1, at 74; see also BELL & SPENCER, supra note 124, at
68-69.
159. Even if Maryland were to adopt a full-time legislature, it is improbable that theproblem of end-of-session logjams would abate. One frequently hears of the United StatesCongress rushing to pass a bill before its summer or winter recess. Perhaps this waiting
until the deadline is an instinctive part of human nature and cannot be controlled by
constitutional reform.
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D. Executive Branch
1. Gubernatorial Control of Executive Branch.--Granting the gover-
nor of Maryland greater control of the executive branch was a clear
goal of the Constitutional Convention of 1967-1968.16' The conven-
tion sought to accomplish this goal by reducing the number of state-
wide officials16 ' (in order that the governor would be the only state
official elected on a statewide basis), reducing the power of the Board
of Public Works,' 6 2 and granting the governor increased power to re-
organize the executive branch and cabinet officers.
16 3
a. Comptroller and Attorney General.--One of the most con-
tentious battles in the constitutional convention was caused by the
proposal to eliminate, as statewide elective offices, the positions of at-
torney general164 and comptroller of the treasury.'
6 5  Currently,
160. See Alexander, supra note 21, at 75 (stating that earlier Maryland commissions stud-
ying the operation of the executive branch "recommended that the administrative author-
ity of the governor be strengthened" and that the "Constitutional Convention Commission
[built] upon the work of these commissions" and even "went a step further"). Strengthen-
ing the offices of governor throughout the various states was a national priority for the
National Municipal League. See MODEL STATE CONST., supra note 80, § 5.01 & cmt., at 65-
66 ("[T] he typical governor is often not the master of the state executive establishment yet
he is held responsible politically. The Model seeks to give him the power to make that
responsibility real."); see also Bennett M. Rich, The Governor as Administrative Head, in SALI-
ENT ISSUES, supra note 83, at 98, 98 (commenting that "[f]or years, scholars, reformers and
governmental study commissions have urged the .. .strengthening of the governor"). It
was believed that such a change would invigorate state government.
In Maryland, however, the choice to strengthen the office of the governor was proba-
bly a misstep. Historically, Maryland has had a stronger governor than other states, partic-
ularly because of the power of the executive budget system. See supra notes 144-153 and
accompanying text. Thus, strengthening the governor was less important in Maryland
then it might have been elsewhere. Moreover, strengthening the office of the governor
gave opponents of the constitution a powerful rhetorical criticism. See MAGNIFICENT FAIL-
uRE, supra note 1, at 202 (quoting an opponent of the constitution as stating "I am not
ready to . . .vote for the coronation of Spiro the First").
161. See infra notes 182-194 and accompanying text (discussing the proposal to reduce
the number of statewide officials).
162. See COMPARISON, supra note 75, at 160 (illustrating in section 4.25 the proposed
reduction in the power of the Board of Public Works).
163. Id. at 162-63 (expanding governor's appointment power in section 4.29 and reor-
ganization power in sections 4.26-.27).
164. The office of attorney general predates statehood. See 1 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND,
supra note 101, at 6 (listing attorneys general from 1657 to 1776). Maryland's first constitu-
tion provided for this office by having the governor appoint attorneys general with the
advice and consent of the governor's council. See MD. CONST. of 1776, art. XLVIII. The
position was abolished by constitutional amendment in 1817, but immediately re-instated
by statute in 1818. See Amendments to the 1776 Constitution, in STUDY DOCUMENTS, supra note
4, at 396; see also 1 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND, supra note 101, at 23. The Maryland Constitu-
tion of 1851 provided that the duties of the attorney general would be performed by the
state's attorneys. MD. CONST. of 1851, art. V, § 3. The 1864 Maryland Constitution created
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neither the comptroller 66 nor the attorney general 67 is dependent
on the governor for his or her position. Because each of these elected
officials has his or her own constituency, the attorney general and
comptroller have every reason to act independently, and little impetus
to follow the governor.1 68 Similarly, the state treasurer is elected by
the General Assembly and is not dependent upon the governor for
support. 69 Finally, the comptroller of the treasury, the state treas-
urer, and the governor together comprise the Maryland Board of Pub-
lic Works. 1 70
The Eney Commission had recommended the complete excision
of the office of the comptroller from the constitution.' 7 ' At the con-
stitutional convention, the move to delete the comptroller became ex-
tremely political, and the votes were very close.' 7 2 Finally, a
compromise was reached to retain the office of comptroller as a con-
stitutionally recognized office, but to strip the office of most of its
powers and duties.' 73 Since the defeat of the proposed constitution of
the modern, elected office of attorney general, MD. CONST. of 1864, art. V, § 1, and the
1867 Maryland Constitution retained this office, MD. CONST. of 1867, art. V, § 1.
165. The office of the comptroller of the treasury was created as an elective office by the
Maryland Constitution of 1851. MD. CONST. of 1851, art. VI, § 1. The 1864 Maryland Con-
stitution shortened the term of office from four years to two. MD. CONST. of 1864, art. VI,§ 1. The 1867 Constitution subsequently re-extended the term to four years. MD. CoNsT.
of 1867, art. VI, § 1.
166. The comptroller is chosen by the qualified electors of the state for a four-year term.
MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. VI, § 1 (1981). If the office becomes vacant, the governor, by
and with the consent of the Senate, fills the vacancy by appointment, to continue until
another election and until the qualification of the successor. Id.
167. The attorney general is elected by voters of the State for a four-year term. MD.
CODE ANN., CONST. art. V, § 1 (1981). If the office becomes vacant, the governor appoints
a person to the office for the remainder of the term. Id. § 5.
168. See REPORT, supra note 6, at 147 n.82 ("'The greatest single impediment to execu-
tive unity lies in the constitutional designation of top officials who obtain office by popular
election or by legislative election.'" (quoting BENNET M. RICH, STATE CONSTITUTIONs: THE
GOVERNOR 13 (National Mun. League ed., 1960))).
169. MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. VI, § 1 (1981). The General Assembly has elected the
treasurer since the adoption of the first Maryland Constitution. MD. CONST. of 1776, art.
XIII. Originally, there was a treasurer from both the Eastern and Western Shores. Id. The
office of the treasurer of the Eastern Shore was abolished in 1843, and the duties trans-
ferred to the treasurer of the Western Shore. Act of 1841, ch. 200 (passed Mar. 3, 1842).
The 1851 Constitution created a single, statewide office of the treasurer. MD. CoNsT. of
1851, art. VI, § 1. This position has been retained through the Constitutions of 1864 and
1867. See MD. CONST. of 1864, art. VI, §§ 1, 2; MD. CONST. of 1867, art. VI, § 1.
170. MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. XII, § 1 (1981).
171. REPORT, supra note 6, at 150.
172. MAGNIFICENT FAILURE, supra note 1, at 167-73 (describing the proposal to abolish
the comptroller as one of the three issues that was so "sharply divisive" that it "threatened
to wreck the convention").
173. Id. at 173-75.
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1967-1968, there have been no constitutional changes made in the
offices of the comptroller or attorney general.
b. Board of Public Works.-The name of the Board of Public
Works is largely insufficient to describe the central role that the Board
plays in Maryland government. In many ways, the Board of Public
Works is the executive branch of Maryland's government. Although
the constitutional duties of the Board are limited,174 and reflect the
original role as overseer of the State's investments in railroad and ca-
nal companies, 175 today the functions of the Board are set largely by
statute. They include the authority to sell bonds and determine their
rates of interest; to let state contracts; to approve leases of and the
purchase and sale of state property; and to promulgate rules and regu-
lations for state agencies.176 In this way, many of the most important
executive branch decisions are made by the Board of Public Works.
Of the three votes on the Board, the governor controls only one.
177
Both the Eney Commission and the 1967-1968 proposed constitu-
tion sought to eliminate the Board of Public Works and concentrate
its executive decision-making authority in the chief executive of the
state, the governor. 178 Since the electoral defeat of the proposed con-
stitution, however, there have been no further attempts to eliminate
the Board of Public Works.
1 79
c. Reorganizing the Executive Branch.-Under the Maryland
Constitution as it existed in 1967, the structure and organization of
the executive branch was under the exclusive control of the legislative
174. See MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. XII, § 1 (1981) (prescribing the duties of the Board
of Public Works).
175. See MAGNIFICENT FAILURE, supra note 1, at 78 (stating that "[tlhe board ... origi-
nally was set up to watch over state investments in railroad and canal companies"); REPORT,
supra note 6, at 152 (stating that the "principal constitutional function of the Board of
Public Works was that of safeguarding and protecting these investments [in private corpo-
rations engaged in building railroads, canals, and other public works] of the state").
176. REPORT, supra note 6, at 152.
177. Id. (describing the Board as "a three-man board, two of the members of which are
to the same degree, at least, independent of the governor").
178. See id. at 153 ("omitting ... one reference to the Board of Public Works"); see also
COMPARISON, supra note 75, at 160 (proposing in section 4.25 a new Board of Review of
restricted scope); MAGNIFICENT FAILURE, supra note 1, at 79 (remarking that "[s] trong pres-
sures developed both in the commission and the convention for significantly changing this
arrangement [of the Board] and centralizing in the governor control over the executive
branch").
179. For an excellent review of the history of the Maryland Board of Public Works, see
ALA M. WILNER, THE MARYLAND BOARD OF PUBLIC WORKS: A HISTORY (1984).
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branch."' A gubernatorial commission appointed to study the execu-
tive branch described it as follows:
Maryland constitutional and statutory provisions permit only
a single avenue for executive reorganization. This avenue re-
quires that all proposals for executive reorganization for-
mally originate in the legislature; that they be considered by
each house, where they may be modified or tabled; and that
they be approved by each house and transmitted to the Gov-
ernor for his approval, if they are to become law.1 '
By 1967, the legislature had used its authority to create over 240
boards, departments, and commissions. 182 Moreover, the governor's
control of these executive agencies was weak. Although the governor
had (and continues to have) broad appointment powers subject to
senatorial confirmation,'8 3 the governor's removal power was limited
to circumstances of "incompetency or misconduct," but not for polit-
ical disobedience.1 1 4 The terms of office of the heads of executive
departments were not necessarily coterminous with that of the gover-
nor, thus permitting carry-over appointees from a previous gubernato-
rial administration to exercise substantial executive authority.18 5
Finally, many of the executive departments, as they were constituted
in 1967, were directed by boards or commissions, rather than by a
single department head.8 6 Each of these factors tended to weaken
the governor's control over the executive branch.1 8 7
180. See MAGNIFICENT FAILURE, supra note 1, at 80 (stating that "[t]he administrative
structure [of executive agencies] is at present wholly determined by the General
Assembly").
181. COMMISSION FOR THE MODERNIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE MARYLAND
GOVERNMENT, MODERNIZING THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE MARYLAND GOVERNMENT 5-6
(1967).
182. MAGNIFICENT FAILURE, supra note 1, at 80.
183. MD. CONST. of 1867, art. II, § 10 (stating that "[the governor] shall nominate, and
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoint all civil and military officers of
the State, whose appointment or election is not otherwise herein provided for; unless a
different mode of appointment be prescribed by the Law creating the office").
184. Id. § 15 (applying this removal provision to "all civil officers who received appoint-
ment from the Executive for a term of years").
185. See MAGNIFICENT FAILURE, supra note 1, at 81 (explaining that executive department
heads were given "a significant degree of independence" because "the terms of such offi-
cials are set by law and are not coterminous with the term of the governor").
186. See id. at 82 (noting that the convention generally opposed multi-headed depart-
ments in favor of a principal department headed by a single executive).
187. Id. at 81 (noting that "[t]his sprawling bureaucracy... prevents the governor from
functioning as chief executive").
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The Constitutional Convention of 1967-1968 sought to
strengthen the governor's power over the executive branch.1 18  First,
the convention proposed to assign all executive powers, duties, and
functions to no more than twenty principal departments.' 89 Second,
although the General Assembly would be allowed to make the initial
allocation of functions among the twenty departments, 190 either the
General Assembly or the governor could propose subsequent reorgan-
ization. 19' Reorganizations proposed by the governor would become
effective unless rejected by the legislature.' 9 2 Finally, the convention
proposed that most departments would be directed by a single depart-
ment head, serving at the pleasure of the governor. 193 For those de-
partments that were permitted to retain a governing board, including
the State Board of Education, the convention proposed that the gov-
ernor appoint half of the board's membership upon assuming
office. 1
94
Once the proposed constitution of 1967-1968 was rejected, this
fertile area for constitutional reform was not forgotten. Governor
Marvin Mandel proposed, the General Assembly adopted, and the vot-
ers of Maryland approved legislation granting the governor the power
to reorganize the executive branch.'95
188. See REPORT, supra note 6, at 147 (stating that "primary attention [should] be given
to strengthening the office of governor"); infra note 160 (discussing the constitutional con-
vention's emphasis on strengthening the office of the governor).
189. See MAGNIFICENT FAILURE, supra note 1, at 81 (discussing this proposal).
190. Id.
191. COMPARISON, supra note 75, at 162 (setting forth section 4.27, which states that
"[t]he General Assembly from time to time by law may reallocate offices, agencies, and
instrumentalities among principal departments" and "the governor may make changes in
the organization of the executive branch").
192. Id.
193. See id. (referring to section 4.28, which states that "[t]he head of each principal
department of the executive branch shall be a single executive unless otherwise prescribed
by the General Assembly by law or by the process of executive reorganization"); id. at 163
(noting section 4.30, which requires that "[e ] ach person serving as the head of a principal
department ... shall serve at the pleasure of the governor").
194. Id. at 163 (stating in section 4.30 that "the governor, immediately upon taking of-
fice following his election, may appoint at least one-half of the members of each board and
commission").
195. SeeAct of May 21, 1969, ch. 790, 1969 Md. Laws 1705 (ratified Nov. 3, 1970) (codi-
fied at MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. II, § 24 (1981)); see also MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T
§ 8-201 (1995 & Supp. 1998) (enumerating the "principal departments of the Executive
Branch of the State government"). For details about the ratification of the 1969 constitu-
tional amendments, see generally Cohen v. Governor, 255 Md. 5, 9, 255 A.2d 320, 322 (1969)
(per curiam) (noting that chapter 790 was one of those amendments proposed for ratifica-
tion by Chapter 76 of the Laws of Maryland, 1969, which called for an election that failed
to qualify as a "general election" as required by the Maryland Constitution).
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A recent amendment to the Maryland Constitution served to rein-
force the governor's right to control the executive branch. In re-
sponse to several "midnight appointments" by "lame duck" Governor
William Donald Schaefer, the General Assembly passed a constitu-
tional amendment to prohibit last-minute appointments by outgoing
governors. 196
2. Lieutenant Governor.-Even before the constitutional conven-
tion, it was assumed that the new constitution would reestablish the
office of lieutenant governor. The short-lived Maryland Constitution
of 1864 provided for a lieutenant governor, but the office was abol-
ished upon the adoption of the 1867 Constitution.197 Wheeler and
196. Act of Apr. 13, 1995, ch. 114, 1995 Md. Laws 1497 (ratified Nov. 5, 1996) (codified
at MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. II, § 10A (Supp. 1998)). For a history of former Governor
Willian Donald Schaefer's "midnight appointments," see John W. Frece & Marina Sarris,
Schaefer Gave Friends l1th-hour Appointments, BAIT. SUN, Jan. 21, 1995, at Al, available in 1995
WL 2418464 (describing seven long-time supporters of the governor appointed to posi-
tions in the last week of Schaefer's term); Peter Jensen, Schaefer Appointee Declines 2 Posts
Amid Criticisms, BAT. SUN, Jan. 27, 1995, at B2, available in 1995 WL 2422242 (stating that
"a top aide in the Schaefer administration [Robert A. Pascal] said ... that he is no longer a
candidate for two state jobs to which he was recently appointed[,]" and that he was "un-
happy that his and dozens of other appointments made in the final weeks of Mr. Schaefer's
term are being viewed as improper"); Marina Sarris, Glendening Rejects Nomination, BAT.
SUN, Jan. 26, 1995, at Al, available in 1995 WL 2421954 ("Unhappy with dozens of last-
minute appointments by his predecessor, Gov. Parris N. Glendening flatly rejected one of
them yesterday, and said he is delaying many others for further review."); Marina Sarris, Six
Proposed Amendments Will Be on Maryland Ballot, BALT. SUN, Oct. 31, 1996, at B2, available in
1996 WL 6644482 (noting that a proposed constitutional amendment would "limit the
power of a departing governor to make last minute appointments").
197. Compare Mn. CONST. of 1864, art. II, § 6 (stating that "[a] Lieutenant Governor
shall be chosen at every regular election for Governor") with MD. CONST. of 1867, art. II,§ 6 (omitting all references to the office of lieutenant governor and establishing new pro-
cedures for filling a vacancy in the office of the governor). The story of the first lieutenant
governor of Maryland, Christopher C. Cox, is an interesting one. The newly adopted con-
stitution of 1864 provided, for the first time, for a lieutenant governor. MD. CONs-r. of
1864, art. II, § 6. Elections were held on November 8, 1964, and as part of a Union party
sweep, Thomas Swann of Baltimore City was elected governor, and Cox, a Talbot County
dentist, was elected lieutenant governor. See Myers, supra note 55, at 14. Under the ex-
press terms of the constitution, however, Swann was not permitted to assume the governor-
ship until the expiration of the term of his predecessor, Augustus Bradford. MD. CONST. of
1864, art. II, § 1 (providing that "the Governor chosen at the first election under this Con-
stitution shall not enter upon the discharge of the duties of the office until the expiration
of the term for which the present incumbent was elected"). Governor Swann assumed his
office onJanuary 10, 1866. See 1 ARCHiVES OF MARYLAND, supra note 101, at 16; Myers, supra
note 55, at 40. By this time, the Union party had begun to fragment, both in Maryland, id.
at 39, and in the country at large. See generally Eiuc FONER, A SHORT HISTORY Or RECON-
STRUCION 1863-1877, at 104-22 (1990). From the time of Governor Swann's assumption ofpower, it became obvious that he and lieutenant governor Cox did not agree politically;
Cox sided with the "Radical Republican" faction of the Union party, while Swann led the
faction of the Union party that would soon break away to form the "Democratic-Conserva-
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Kinsey report that the decision to create an office of lieutenant gover-
nor was uncontroversial at the 1967-1968 Convention.
198
Ironically, the need for a lieutenant governor quickly became ap-
parent after the defeat of the proposed 1967-1968 Constitution. In
the 100 years between the adoption of the 1867 Constitution and the
start of the 1967-1968 Constitutional Convention, only three gover-
nors were unable to complete their terms of office: Governor William
Pinkney Whyte, who resigned on March 4, 1874, in preparation for
accepting a seat in the United States Senate;' 99 Governor Robert M.
McLane, who resigned on March 27, 1885, to become United States
Minister to France;20 and Governor Herbert R. O'Conor, who re-
signed to accept a seat in the United States Senate on January 3,
1947.211 In each case, a replacement from the resigning governor's
tive" party. Myers, supra note 55, at 40-53. On January 25, 1867, the Maryland General
Assembly elected Governor Swann to the United States Senate. Id. at 87. Belatedly realiz-
ing that Cox would become governor upon his ascendance to the Senate, Swann declined
the nomination. Id. at 87-94.
When the 1867 Maryland Constitutional Convention convened, the delegates were all
from Governor Swann's Democratic-Conservative party because the Radicals had failed to
nominate candidates. Id. at 113. The constitution produced abolished the office of lieu-
tenant governor, MD. CONST. of 1867, art. II, § 6, "probably on account of personal hostility
to Dr. Cox and to save the State a small item of expense." Myers, supra note 55, at 120.
Moreover, although the new constitution's traditional provisions permitted Governor
Swann to continue to serve under the new constitution, MD. CONST. of 1867, art. II, § 1, no
such accommodation was made for Lieutenant Governor Christopher Cox. His office ex-
pired on October 5, 1867, the effective date of the 1867 Constitution, despite the fact that
Cox's 4-year term of office would not have ended for another 15 months. See 1 ARCHIVES
OF MARYLAND, supra note 101, at 20.
198. MAGNIFICENT FAILURE, supra note 1, at 82 ("Everybody seemed to want a lieutenant
governor for Maryland. At least no opposition to creating such an office appeared in com-
mittee or on the floor."). For an analysis of the office of lieutenant governor, see Robert K.
Whelan, The Office of Lieutenant Governor, in STUDY DOCUMENTS, supra note 4, at 160, 160
(tracing the historical roots of the office to the colonial era, describing the reasons Mary-
land adopted and later abolished the office, and noting that 39 states had the office in
1967).
199. The pattern of resignation and succession is worth noting. "Although Whyte's
term in the Senate would not begin until a year later, or on March 4, 1875, he resigned at
once in order that the Legislature might elect his successor while that body was still in
session." FRANK F. WHITE, JR., THE GOVERNORS OF MARYLAND: 1777-1970, at 181 (1970).
200. Despite the recent precedent of Governor Whyte, Governor McLane's resignation
did not follow that pattern. When McLane resigned on March 27, 1885, to serve as Presi-
dent Grover Cleveland's Minister to France, the General Assembly was not in session at the
time. Id. at 204. Senate President Henry Lloyd from Dorchester County served during the
interim; when the General Assembly reconvened in 1886, Lloyd was elected to fill the re-
mainder of McLane's term. Id. at 207-08.
201. In 1947, the situation was very different. Governor Herbert R. O'Conor, twice
elected governor (and thus prohibited from succeeding himself), had been elected to the
United States Senate. William Preston Lane had sought and won election as governor for a
term beginning January 8, 1947. In order to be sworn into the Senate on January 3, 1947,
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own party was elected by the General Assembly to complete the term:
GovernorJames Black Groome,2 °2 Governor Henry Lloyd, 03 and Gov-
ernor William Preston Lane, Jr.,20 4 respectively. But less than eight
months after the rejection of the 1967-1968 constitution, Governor
Spiro T. Agnew, a member of the Republican Party, was elected vice
president of the United States. When Agnew resigned as Governor on
January 7, 1969 to become vice president, the General Assembly
elected Marvin Mandel, the Speaker of the House of Delegates, and a
Democrat, to fill Agnew's unexpired term.211
The constitution was amended in 1970 to create the office of lieu-
tenant governor.2 1 6 The need for such a position was reinforced
shortly thereafter when Governor Mandel, under investigation by the
United States Attorney's Office for alleged corruption, elevated his
Lieutenant Governor, Blair Lee, III to serve as acting Governor. 20 7
Lee served in that capacity from June 4, 1977, until January 15, 1979,
and because of the constitutional prohibition against dual office holding, O'Conor re-
signed five days before the expiration of his second term. The General Assembly elected
Governor-elect Lane to serve out the remaining five days of O'Conor's term before being
sworn in again to serve his own term. See id. at 280-81.
202. Governor Groome was a member of the House of Delegates from Cecil County
when elected to serve out the remainder of Governor Whyte's term. See id. at 185-86.
203. For an account of Governor Lloyd, see id. at 207-09.
204. For an account of Governor Lane, see id. at 279-83.
205. See BRUGGER, supra note 73, at 630 (discussing the contenders for Agnew's vacancy);
BRADFORD JAcoBs, THIMBLERIGGERS: THE LAW V. GOVERNOR MARVIN MANDEL 85-86 (1984)
(noting that Mandel was elected to fill Agnew's vacancy by the General Assembly, where
Mandel was a commanding figure and where he was not hampered by the ethnic prejudice
against him that could affect the ordinary electorate).
206. Act of May 5, 1970, ch. 532, 1970 Md. Laws 1298 (ratified Nov. 3, 1970) (codified as
amended at MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. II, §§ 1-7A (1981 & Supp. 1998)). Candidates for
governor and lieutenant governor are now "considered for nomination jointly" and thus
cannot be from different parties. MD. CONST. art. II, § 18. Additionally, the terms of gover-
nor and lieutenant governor are now synchronous, and do not permit a hold-over situation
like that of Lieutenant Governor Christopher C. Cox. See supra note 197.
207. 1 ARcHivEs OF MARYLAND, supra note 101, at 18 (stating that "[b]y letter dated June
4, 1977, Governor Mandel notified Lieutenant Governor Blair Lee III that Lee would serve
as acting governor until further notice"). Although Governor Mandel was convicted, dis-
barred, and eventually jailed, the District Court of Maryland subsequently overturned his
conviction. See Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Mandel, 294 Md. 560, 562, 451 A.2d 910,
911 (1982) (imposing the "ultimate sanction of disbarment" on Mandel for his mail fraud
conviction); see also United States v. Mandel, 672 F. Supp. 864, 871, 879 (D. Md. 1987)
(noting that Governor Mandel served 19 months of his 4-year sentence, with the remainder
commuted, and setting aside his convictions for mail fraud and racketeering), afr'd, 862
F.2d 1067 (4th Cir. 1988); Joel McCord, Mandel and Son Win Back Right to Practice Law,
BAIT. SUN, June 30, 1989, at DI. Moreover, the Court of Appeals of Maryland reinstated
Mandel as a member of the bar.
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and again briefly on January 16, 1979.2°8 There has been no subse-
quent need for a lieutenant governor to replace the governor.
3. The Veto.-The gubernatorial veto was first authorized in
Maryland by the 1867 Constitution.20 9 As the veto power was initially
constituted, the governor had six days after being presented with a
legislative act either to sign the bill, veto it,210 or refuse to act on the
bill ("pocket" it). The effect of the governor's refusal to act was deter-
mined by the action or inaction of the General Assembly:
If any bill shall not be returned by the Governor within six
days (Sundays excepted), after it shall be presented to him,
the same shall be a Law in like manner as if he signed it,
unless the General Assembly shall, by adjournment, prevent
its return, in which case it shall not be a Law.
2 1 1
Apparently, the drafters of this provision hoped that it would per-
suade the General Assembly to pass important legislation throughout
the legislative session, rather than waiting for the end-of-session
rush. 212
One question that the text of the veto provision left open was the
validity of post-adjournment approval and signature by the governor.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland upheld post-adjournment sign-
208. 1 ARCHWES OF MARYLAND, supra note 101, at 18 n.20 (noting that Lee served on
January 16, 1979, for the purpose of presiding at the installation of Rita C. Davidson as a
judge of the Court of Appeals of Maryland).
209. MD. CONST. of 1867, art. II, § 17 (requiring that all bills be presented to the gover-
nor "to guard against hasty or partial Legislation"). Professor Garrett Power has identified
the impetus for adoption of an executive veto:
In deciding to write an executive veto into the Constitution, Conservative Demo-
crats serving as delegates were undoubtedly swayed by their hostility toward the
Radical Republican legislatures that had controlled Maryland during the Civil
War and by their sympathies for President Andrew Johnson in his then current
difficulties with the federal Congress.
Garrett Power, The Veto Power of the Governor, in STUDY DOCUMENTS, supra note 4, at 156, 156.
210. The 1867 Constitution did not use the word "veto." Instead, the constitution pro-
vided that the governor shall "return [a bill of which he disapproves] with his objections to
the House in which it originated." MD. CONST. of 1867, art. II, § 17. The word "veto" did
not enter the constitution until an 1890 amendment creating the "line-item" veto. Act of
Mar. 27, 1890, ch. 194, 1890 Md. Laws 211 (ratified Nov. 3, 1891) (stating that "the item or
items of appropriations disapproved shall be void unless repassed according to the rules or
limitations prescribed for the passage of other bills over the executive veto") (codified as
amended at MD. CODE ANN., CONsT. art. II, § 17 (1981 & Supp. 1998)).
211. MD. CONST. of 1867, art. II, § 17.
212. See Power, supra note 209, at 157 (suggesting that "one reason for this provision was
to compel the legislature to pass laws throughout the session rather than saving all impor-
tant legislation until the end"). For a discussion of the problem of the end-of-session rush,
see supra notes 155-159.
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ing,215 but left open the question of whether the signature must be
affixed within the six-day period.214
A more important problem with the veto power as set forth in the
1867 Constitution was the governor's ability to manipulate the veto's
timing to prevent a vote to override the veto. The manipulation
worked as follows. If a governor vetoed a bill during the session, that
bill was immediately returned to the General Assembly for an override
vote.215 If a Governor vetoed a bill after the adjournment, that bill
would be returned to the General Assembly during its next session.
When permitted to expire by pocket veto after adjournment, however,
there was no method for legislative reconsideration. Obviously, pre-
ferring not to face override votes, governors learned to manipulate
the date of presentment, delaying it in order to force the six-day pe-
riod to expire after the adjournment of the General Assembly.2 16 By
manipulating the date of presentment, governors could avoid an over-
ride vote altogether.
In 1950, a constitutional amendment partially closed this loop-
hole by requiring that all bills vetoed or pocket vetoed after adjourn-
ment be returned to the next session of the General Assembly for
consideration of an override.2 1 7 In 1960, this again was modified so
that no bills would be returned to the legislature if there had been an
213. Robey v. Broersma, 181 Md. 325, 341, 29 A.2d 827, 830 (1943) (reaffirming that "a
bill could be presented to the Governor after the Legislature had adjourned"); Lankford v.
County Comm'rs, 73 Md. 105, 114, 20 A. 1017, 1019 (1890) (holding that a bill "can be
constitutionally presented to the Governor and signed by him, after the session of the
Legislature has closed .. . provided [that] the bill [is] signed by the Governor within six
days from the time it is actually presented to him for his approval").
214. See Richards Furniture Corp. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 233 Md. 249, 262 n.2,
196 A.2d 621, 628 n.2 (1963) (noting that "[i] t is not necessary, under the circumstances of
this case, to determine whether the Governor had only six days after March 12 within
which to sign the Bill ... even if it had been formally presented to him on that date").
215. MD. CONST. of 1867, art. II, § 17 (requiring a three-fifths vote in each House to
override a veto).
216. See Power, supra note 209, at 156. By the language of MD. CONST. of 1867, art. II,§ 17, presentment of a bill to the governor begins the six-day time clock. Presentment is
not mere delivery, but involves affixing the great seal and a ceremonial delivery by speci-
fied legislative officers. See Robey, 181 Md. at 339, 29 A.2d at 829 ("To put into effect a valid
law, it is necessary in the first instance for the Legislature to pass the bill; to have it sealed
with the Great Seal of the State; and to present it to the Governor."). Although present-
ment was required to be made as soon as practicable after passage, the Court of Appeals
has construed this in favor of the governor. See id. at 341, 29 A.2d at 830 (stating that
"'practicable' did not mean practicable for the officials of the Legislature, but practicable
for the proper consideration by the Governor").
217. See Act of May 6, 1949, ch. 714, 1949 Md. Laws 1768 (ratified Nov. 7, 1950) (codi-
fied as amended at MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. II, § 17 (1981 & Supp. 1998)).
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intervening election between the pocket veto and the possible return
of the bill for override.1
The Maryland Constitution also provides for a limited "line-item"
veto. 219 This line-item veto originally permitted the governor to strike
out any portion of an appropriation bill. This changed in 1916, when
Maryland adopted the executive budget system.220 Under the system,
the governor (rather than the General Assembly) originates the
budget process by introducing a budget bill; this bill was excepted
from the line-item veto.221 Therefore, as the constitution stood in
1967, the line-item veto applied only to supplemental appropriation
bills originating in the General Assembly.
222
The proposed constitution of 1967-1968 retained the general ex-
ecutive veto, but eliminated the pocket veto. Under the proposed
constitution, the governor would have been required to sign or veto
an act within twenty days of presentment if the General Assembly was
in session, or within thirty days if it had adjourned.22 ' The governor's
failure to act within these time limits would result in the bill becoming
law without the governor's signature.2 4 The convention hoped that
these changes, along with lengthening the legislative session from sev-
enty to ninety days,223 and permitting the General Assembly to call
itself into special session, 226 would result in a more orderly and timely
legislative process. 227 The constitutional convention also proposed
expanding the line-item veto to permit the governor not only to
218. See Act of Apr. 28, 1959, ch. 664, 1959 Md. Laws 1001 (ratified Nov. 8, 1960) (codi-
fied as amended at MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. II, § 17 (1981 & Supp. 1998)).
219. Act of Mar. 27, 1890, ch. 194, 1890 Md. Laws 211 (ratified Nov. 3, 1891) (codified
as amended at MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. II, § 17 (1981 & Supp. 1998)).
220. See supra notes 144-153.
221. Act of Mar. 28, 1916, ch. 159, 1916 Md. Laws 268 (ratified Nov. 7, 1916) (codified
as amended at MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. III, § 52 (1981 & Supp. 1998)).
222. Power, supra note 209, at 159 (stating that "the [line] item veto applies only to
supplementary appropriation bills").
223. See COMPARISON, supra note 75, at 155 (§ 4.15).
224. Id.
225. See supra notes 155-159.
226. Commentators have suggested that the avoidance of override votes is a primary
reason that governors have refused to call the General Assembly into special session. See
BELL & SPENCER, supra note 124, at 73 (stating that "the provisions regarding the return of
vetoed bills are probably a major deterrent to the calling of special sessions for any
purpose").
227. See MAGNIFICENT FAILURE, supra note 1, at 85 (suggesting that "[tihese actions [in-
cluding the longer regular legislative session and a provision for a special session], coupled
with the assumption that a restructured legislature would proceed at a more orderly and
systematic pace, offered hope of achieving a proper balance between legislative and execu-
tive powers").
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strike, but also to reduce, an item in a supplementary
appropriation. 2 28
Since the rejection of the 1967-1968 proposed constitution, two
amendments to this provision were adopted. A 1974 amendment
eliminated the pocket veto, as recommended by the 1967-1968 Con-
vention. 229 For the administrative convenience of the General Assem-
bly, the voters in 1988 approved a veto calendar which eliminated the
constitutional requirement of three "readings" for the consideration
of vetoed bills.23°
E. Judicial Branch
1. Organization of Court System.-The Maryland judiciary had
long been a source of dissatisfaction. An account contemporaneous
to the convention described the Maryland judiciary as follows:
Maryland's court system is very complex, and unnecessarily
so. There are no less than 16 different types of courts, with
little uniformity from one community to another. A lawyer
from one county venturing into another is likely to feel al-
most as bewildered as if he had gone into another state with
an entirely different system of courts. A case which would be
handled in the people's court of one county is handled by a
trial magistrate in another, by the municipal court in an-
other, and by the circuit court in still another .... 231
Reorganizing and streamlining this confusing system was a high
priority on the eve of the constitutional convention, 23 2 and the pro-
posed changes were the self-described greatest accomplishment of the
228. See COMPARISON, supra note 75, at 155 (stating in section 4.14 that "[t]he governor
may reduce or strike out any item in a supplementary appropriation bill").
229. Act of May 31, 1974, ch. 883, 1974 Md. Laws 2949 (ratified Nov. 5, 1974) (codified
as amended at MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. II, § 17; art. III, §§ 30-31; art. XVI, §§ 1(a), 2,
3(b) (1981 & Supp. 1998)).
230. Act of May 27, 1988, ch. 793, 1988 Md. Laws 5092 (ratified Nov. 8, 1988) (codified
at MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. II, § 17; art. III, § 27 (Supp. 1998)).
231. See MAGNIFICENT FAILURE, supra note 1, at 86 (quoting THE INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION, SURVEY OF THE JUDICIAL SYSaM OF MARYLAND (N.Y. 1967)); see also ELBERT
M. BYRD, JR., THEJUDICIAL PROCESS IN MARYLAND 19.37 (1961) (tracing the history, jurisdic-
tion, and authority of the various Maryland courts).
232. Jonathan Cottin, Maryland Takes a Giant Constitutional Step, BALT. SUN, Sept. 10,
1967, at D3 (stating that the constitutional convention's early draft recommended a "thor-
ough overhaul of the judiciary"); Leaders Get Cool Response to Call for Convention Vote, BALT.
SUN, Sept. 11, 1967, at 26 (noting that delegates to the convention would decide
"[w]hether the entire courts system of Maryland shall be overhauled").
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convention delegates.233 The plan, as endorsed by the constitutional
convention, was to create a unified, four-tiered court system with a
Court of Appeals, an Intermediate Appellate Court, 3 4 a Superior
Court, and a District Court.23 5
Upon the rejection of the proposed constitution, a constitutional
amendment was rapidly passed that created a unified, statewide dis-
trict court.236 Although the circuit courts have yet to be unified, a
constitutional amendment was adopted in 1980 unifying the Supreme
Bench of Baltimore City (formerly composed of the Superior Court of
Baltimore City, Court of Common Pleas, the Baltimore City Court,
Circuit Court of Baltimore City, Circuit Court No. 2, and the Criminal
Court of Baltimore) 237 into the single, unified, consolidated Circuit
Court for Baltimore City.
238
233. See SWANSON ET AL., supra note 20, at 62 (listing the delegates' post-convention per-
ception of the most important issues, first of which was "[r]eorganization of [the] [c]ourt
[s]ystem").
234. An intermediate appellate court had been authorized by constitutional amend-
ment in 1966. Act of Mar. 23, 1966, ch. 10, 1966 Md. Laws 16 (ratified Nov. 8, 1966)
(codified as amended at MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. IV, §§ 1, 2, 3, 14A, 14B, 15, 16, 18, 33;
art. V, §§ 3, 6; art. XVII, §§ 3, 7 (1981 & Supp. 1998)). See William L. Reynolds, II, The
Court of Appeals of Maryland: Roles, Work and Performance-Part 1, 37 MD. L. REv. 1, 6 (1977)
(noting that "the Court of Special Appeals was designed, and its jurisdiction enlarged, to
ease the workload of the Court of Appeals" (footnote omitted)); see also MICHAEL CARLTON
TOLLEY, STATE CONSTITUTIONALISM IN MARYLAND 136-44 (1992) (tracing the history of court
reform in Maryland).
235. See COMPARISON, supra note 75, at 167 (§ 5.01). The Eney Commission had pro-
posed a similar four-tiered system, but had suggested naming the courts the Supreme
Court, the Appellate Court, the Superior Court, and the District Court. See REPORT, supra
note 6, at 184. Although the constitutional convention eventually rejected the Eney Com-
mission's suggestion of changing the name of the Court of Appeals of Marylandi.to the
"Supreme Court of Maryland," legislators are still interested in changing the name. Dur-
ing the 1998 session of the Maryland General Assembly, the House of Delegates approved a
bill that would have made the change. See H.B. 187, 412th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Md. 1998).
The Senate did not act on the bill before adjournment of the 1998 session. See Maryland
General Assembly Homepage (visited Jan. 15, 1999) <http://mlis.state.md.us.1998rs/billfile/
bh0187.htm>.
236. Act of May 24, 1969, ch. 789, 1969 Md. Laws 1696, 1697 (ratified Nov. 3, 1970)
(noting as one purpose of the Act the "creat[ion] [of] a system of district courts in this
State.") (codified as amended at MD. CODE ANN., DECL. OF RTS. art. 23; CONST. art. IV, §§ 1,
2, 4A, 4B, 18, 41A-I (1981 & Supp. 1998)).
237. SeeJohn Carroll Byrnes, Evolution of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City 1632-1997, in
HISTORIES OF THE BENCH & BAR OF BALTIMORE CITY 1, 24-25 (John Carroll Byrnes ed., 1997)
(describingjurisdiction granted to Baltimore City Courts under the 1867 Constitution); id.
at 30 (describing the 1971 grant of appellate jurisdiction to the Criminal Court of Balti-
more and the Baltimore City Court); see also BYRD, supra note 231, at 67-78 (tracing the
history, jurisdiction, and authority of the various courts).
238. See Act of May 20, 1980, ch. 523, 1980 Md. Laws 1869 (ratified Nov. 4, 1980) (codi-
fied as amended at MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. IV, §§ 1, 4A, 4B(a), 5, 9, 18, 20, 23, 25, 26
(1981 & Supp. 1998)); see also J.S. Bainbridge, Jr., Ballot to Contain a Variety of Referenda,
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Some of the constitutional convention's and the proposed consti-
tution's sound proposals with respect to the state court system have yet
to be adopted. For example, Orphans' Courts, with elected layjudges, still probate contested wills in most counties in the State of
Maryland." 9 An even more egregious example is the failure to create
a unified, statewide circuit court system. In 1995, the General Assem-
bly appointed a commission to study the future of the Maryland court
system. 240 This commission recommended the creation of a state-
wide, unified circuit court 24 ' as well as the abolition of the Orphans'
Court system. 24 2 So far, no action has been taken, although the com-
mission itself urged a delay of any proposed constitutional amend-
ment until the Maryland General Assembly meets for its session in the
year 2000.43
The proposed constitution also recognized that the cost of oper-
ating the state's judicial system should be borne by the state as a
whole. 44 With the rejection of the proposed constitution, the former
system, by which the county governments are required to fund their
own circuit courts, was retained. To remedy this problem Baltimore
City has long sought state funding for the city's circuit court.245
BALT. SUN, Oct. 27, 1980, at C1 (discussing the movement to consolidate Baltimore City's
courts).
239. The two exceptions are Montgomery and Harford counties, where Circuit Courtjudges sit as Orphans' Courtjudges. See MD. CODE ANN., CONsT. art. IV, § 20(b) (1981); see
also Act of Apr. 28, 1998, ch. 323, 1998 Md. Laws 1674 (pending ratification) (permitting
retired circuit court judges to act as Orphans' Court judges in Montgomery and Harford
Counties).
240. SeeAct of May 25, 1995, ch. 561, 1995 Md. Laws 3238 (codified at MD. CODE ANN.,
CTS. &JUD. PROC. §§ 13-701 to -707 (1996)) (abrogated June 30, 1997).
-.241. THE COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF MARYLAND COURTS, FINAL REPORT 27 (1996)
(proposing the unification of the existing Circuit Courts, state funding for these courts,
and that the chief judge have administrative supervision over the whole system).
242. Id. at 43 (indicating that the Orphans' Courts' "jurisdiction and operations should
be transferred to the Circuit Court and administered through a probate division of that
court").
243. The commission's final report proposed postponing constitutional amendment un-
til the 1998 session of the General Assembly. Id. at 78. During the 1998 session of the
General Assembly, however, the executive board of the Commission recommended that
constitutional amendments regarding court structure be delayed again until 2000, a non-
gubernatorial election year. Telephone Interview with James J. Cromwell, Esquire, Chair-
man, Commission on the Future of Maryland Courts (June 2, 1998).
244. See COMPARISON, supra note 75, at 191 (stating in section 5.32 that "[t] he cost of the
operation and administration of the judicial branch shall be borne exclusively by the
State").
245. See, e.g., Eric Siegel, State Asked to Fund Court, Prosecutors, Schmoke Says City Will Push
the Issue, BALT. SUN, Nov. 5, 1993, at B3, available in 1993 WL 7397839; Thomas W. Wal-
dron, Governor Supports Courts Takeover; Glendening's Stance Seen as Bid to Win Support of
Schmoke, BAIT. SUN., Oct. 3, 1998, at Al, available in 1998 WL 4987367.
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2. Judicial Selection and Tenure. -Under the 1867 Constitution, as
it existed in 1967, the governor had the power to appoint judges to
serve on the Court of Appeals of Maryland and on the respective cir-
cuit courts.24 6 After being appointed, the selected judge was to serve
for approximately one year, until the next general election; at this
election, the appointed judge could seek election to a fifteen-year
term by running in a potentially contested primary and general
election.247
Judges of the courts of limited jurisdiction were selected in a vari-
ety of ways, each prescribed by the Constitution. Orphans' Court
judges were popularly elected to four-year terms.248 People's Court
judges in Baltimore City, after initial gubernatorial appointment,
stood for popular election to eight-year terms.2
49 People's Court
judges in other parts of the state were selected different ways in differ-
ent counties. 211 Municipal Court judges in Baltimore City, after initial
gubernatorial appointment, stood for popular election to ten-year
terms.2 51 The governor was responsible for the appointment of trial
magistrates and committing magistrates, but in practice, state senators
generally controlled these appointments.
25 2
This system was criticized for being too political and not suffi-
ciently capable of picking excellent judges. Former Judge Emory H.
Niles had, since his retirement in 1962, advocated the adoption of a
new system of judicial selection "referred to generally in this country
as the Missouri Plan and in Maryland as the Niles Plan."2
53 Under the
Niles Plan, the governor would have appointed all judges from lists of
three to five eligible people recommended by judicial nominating
commissions; after two years, and every eight years thereafter, a judge
would have been required to stand for reelection in a non-contested,
246. See MAGNIFICENT FAILURE, supra note 1, at 88 (noting that under the 1867 Constitu-
tion, "[w ] henever a vacancy [in a judgeship] occurs the governor makes an appointment,
on his own"). There was no intermediate appellate court in 1967. See Reynolds, supra note
234, at 6 (noting that the Court of Special Appeals was established in 1967).
247. MAGNIFICENT FAILURE, supra note 1, at 88.
248. MD. CONST. of 1867, art. IV, § 40 (as amended in 1956).
249. Id. § 41A (as amended in 1939).
250. Id. § 41B (as amended in 1939); see MAGNIFICENT FAILURE, supra note 1, at 88 (not-
ing that "the judges of the people's courts are chosen for a variety of terms ... and in a
variety of ways").
251. MD. CONST. of 1867, art. IV, § 41C (as amended in 1936).
252. See MAGNIFICENT FAILURE, supra note 1, at 88 (suggesting that "[i]n theory the gov-
ernor appoints trial magistrates and committing magistrates; in practice these are political
plums for the state senators").
253. Id. at 87.
574
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retention election.2 54 Although the General Assembly had rejected
this plan at five consecutive sessions, reformers hoped to implement it
in the new state constitution. 25 5 Eventually both the Eney Commis-
sion and the 1967-1968 Constitutional Convention endorsed the Niles
Plan. 25 6
Subsequent to the defeat of the 1967-1968 proposed constitution,
many of the reforms advocated by Emory Niles have been adopted,
both by constitutional amendment and by executive order. Governor
Marvin Mandel instituted the current judicial nominations system by
an executive order.25 7 Each subsequent governor has maintained and
followed this general guideline while updating it as appropriate.2 5 8
The judicial nominations system as it exists today creates a seventeen-
member Appellate Judicial Nominating Commission and sixteen sepa-
rate Trial Court Judicial Nominating Commissions. 259 When a va-
cancy occurs, the appropriate commission seeks and interviews
potential candidates and submits a list of qualified persons to the gov-
ernor.26' The governor then selects a person to fill the judicial va-
cancy from among those listed by the commission.261
The Niles plan also sought to remove judges from the rigors of
electoral politics; 26 2 this goal has been accomplished at three of the
four levels of Maryland courts. The 1969 constitutional amendment
that created the statewide district court system 263 abolished the old
patchwork system for electing judges of courts of limited jurisdiction.
The new provisions required that district court judges be appointed
by the governor, subject to confirmation by the state senate, for terms
of ten years.2 1 In 1976, another constitutional amendment abolished
254. See COMPARISON, supra note 75, at 176-79 (§§ 5.15-.22); MAGNIFICENT FAILURE, supra
note 1, at 87-88.
255. Id.
256. See COMPARISON, supra note 75, at 176-79 (§§ 5.15-.22); REPORT, supra note 6, at 195-
96.
257. Exec. Order No. 01.01.1974.23, 2 MD. REG. 45 (1975).
258. Exec. Order No. 01.01.1995.10, 22 MD. REG. 769, 769 (1995) (stating that ExecutiveOrder 01.01.1974.23 "has been revised eight times and has provided a system which is both
effective and of material assistance in assuring the appointment of qualified persons in the
Judiciary of Maryland").
259. Id. at 769-70.
260. Id. at 771.
261. Id.
262. See MAGNIFICENT FAILURE, supra note 1, at 87-88 (noting that, under the Niles plan,the election of judges was not contested, but was intended to register voter approval or
disapproval for continuing in office).
263. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
264. Act of May 24, 1969, ch. 789, 1969 Md. Laws 1696, 1701 (ratified Nov. 3, 1970)("The Governor, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint each
1999]
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the requirement that appellate judges stand in a contested election.265
Appellate judges now must run in non-contested, retention elections
for terms of ten years. 266 As a result of these changes, now only circuit
court judges are required to stand for popular election.
2 67
3. Judicial Disabilities.-The desire to maintain and increase the
independence of judges-to remove them from the influence of the
executive branch and the vicissitudes of public opinion-has been an
important, longstanding concern in Maryland and elsewhere. The
initial Maryland Declaration of Rights of 1776 provided:
That the independency and uprightness of Judges are essen-
tial to the impartial administration of justice, and a great se-
curity to the rights and liberties of the people; wherefore the
Chancellor and allJudges ought to hold commissions during
good behavior; and the said Chancellor and Judges shall be
removed for misbehavior, on conviction in a court of law,
and may be removed by the Governor, upon the address of
the General Assembly; Provided, That two thirds of all the
members of each House concur in such address.2
68
This language remained virtually intact until the adoption of the
Maryland Constitution of 1867.269 In this constitution, the Declara-
tion of Rights was changed to provide that "[j]udges shall not be re-
moved, except in the manner, and for the causes, provided in this
Constitution." 27' This constitution provided for the political impeach-
ment of judges found to be unable to discharge their duties with effi-
judge of the District Court whenever for any reason a vacancy shall exist in the office....
Each judge appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the Senate shall hold the office
for a term of ten years. .. .") (codified as amended at MD. CODE ANN., DECL. OF RTS. art.
23; CONST. art. IV, §§ 1, 2, 4A, 4B, 18, 41A-I (1981 & Supp. 1998)).
265. See Act of May 15, 1975, ch. 551, 1975 Md. Laws 2638 (ratified Nov. 2, 1976) (codi-
fied as amended at MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. IV, § 5A (1981 & Supp. 1998)); see also The
Sun's Position on 21 State Questions, BALT. SUN, Oct. 26, 1976, at A18 (noting The Sun's
support for ending "political contention for appellate judgeships" by instituting uncon-
tested retention elections).
266. MD. CODE ANN., CONsT. art. IV, § 5A (1981).
267. See id. § 5. Repeated proposals to eliminate contested elections for Circuit Court
judges have been defeated. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Md. Proposal Would End Contested Elec-
tions for Judges, WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 1988, available in 1988 WL 2070136 (reporting that
"[t]wo governors before Schaefer have tried to enact the proposal, only to see the judiciary
committee turn it down").
268. MD. CONST. of 1776, DECL. OF RTs. art. XXX.
269. For a chart setting forth the exact language of this provision over time, see Fried-
man, supra note 76, at 663.
270. MD. CONST. of 1867, DECL. OF RTS. art. 33.
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ciency "by reason of continued sickness, or of physical or mental
infirmity."271
A 1966 constitutional amendment created a commission onjudi-
cial disabilities, the function of which was to investigate claims ofjudi-
cial disability and make recommendations to the General Assembly. 272
The General Assembly then would vote on whether to retain thejudge, or, by a two-thirds vote of each House, remove the judge from
office. 273 The Eney Commission recommended deleting the judicial
disabilities commission from the constitution and transferring the fi-
nal removal authority to the state supreme court.274 The constitu-
tional convention retained the constitutional status of the judicial
disabilities commission, but agreed with the Eney Commission that
final removal power should rest with the Court of Appeals of
Maryland.275
With the defeat of the proposed constitution, the General Assem-
bly retained its voice in judicial removal until 1970 when, by constitu-
tional amendment, the authority to remove judges was transferred
from the General Assembly to the Court of Appeals of Maryland.276
4. Judicial Administration.-By a 1943 constitutional amend-
ment, the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals of Maryland was desig-
271. MD. CONSr. of 1867, art. IV, § 3.
272. Act of May 4, 1965, ch. 773, 1965 Md. Laws 1199, 1200 (ratified Nov. 8, 1966)("There is created a commission on judicial disabilities composed of five persons ap-
pointed by the Governor of Maryland.") (codified as amended at MD. CODE ANN., CONST.
art. IV, §§ 4A, 4B (1981 & Supp. 1998)).
273. Id.
274. See REPORT, supra note 6, at 205 (proposing to vest the power to remove judges in
the supreme court, and allowing the judicial disabilities commission to be established by a
rule of the supreme court).
275. See COMPARISON, supra note 75, at 185-88 (§§ 5.26-.30).
276. Act of May 24, 1969, ch. 789, 1969 Md. Laws 1696, 1699 (ratified Nov. 3, 1970)(indicating that, when removal is recommended by the Commission on Judicial Disabili-
ties, and after a hearing, the Court of Appeals may remove ajudge for misconduct, failure
to perform his duties, or serious disability) (codified as amended at MD. CODE ANN., DECL.
OF Rrs. art. 23; CONST. art. IV, §§ 1, 2, 4A, 4B, 18, 41A-I (1981 & Supp. 1998)). In his 1973
State of the Judiciary Address, Chief Judge Robert C. Murphy proposed amending the
constitution to reduce the confidentiality ofjudicial disabilities proceedings. See Report on
the State of the Judiciary to the Legislature of Maryland by Robert C. Murphy, ChiefJudge
of the Court of Appeals of Maryland (Jan. 31, 1973), 279 Md. XXXVI, XLVII-XLVIII (sug-gesting that "our Constitution mandates too much confidentiality [in this area]; [and] that
an amendment to the Constitution should be proposed .. .whereby the Commission
would be empowered . .. [to] disclose the details of its investigation"). This change was
accomplished the next year. Act of May 31, 1974, ch. 886, 1974 Md. Laws 2961, 2962(ratified Nov. 5, 1974) (permitting the Court of Appeals of Maryland to regulate by rule
the confidentiality of judicial disabilities proceedings) (codified as amended at MD. CODE
ANN., CONsT. art. IV, § 4B (1981 & Supp. 1998)).
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nated the "administrative head of the judicial system of the State.
27 7
This power permits the chief judge to reassign any judge (except
judges of the Orphans' Court) to sit temporarily in any other court in
order to relieve accumulated work or to fill a vacancy.
278 The Eney
Commission proposed retaining and expanding the chief judge's ad-
ministrative powers.
279
Since the defeat of the proposed constitution, the preexistent sys-
tem has been retained. There have been minor changes, but the con-
stitutional provision remains virtually intact.
280 However, there have
been monumental changes in judicial administration in Maryland due
largely to the personality of former chief judge, Robert C. Murphy.
281
Aiding the chief judge in his administrative duties is an administrative
office of the courts, first established by statute in 1955.282
F. Local Government
By divesting the General Assembly of its local lawmaking func-
tion, and granting this function to the counties, the Constitutional
277. Act of May 4, 1943, ch. 772, 1943 Md. Laws 1367, 1370 (ratified Nov. 7, 1944)
(codified as amended at MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. IV, §§ 5, 14, 18, 21 (1981 & Supp.
1998)); see Act of Mar. 23, 1966, ch. 10, 1966 Md. Laws 16, 17-19 (ratified Nov. 8, 1966)
(empowering the General Assembly to create the Court of Special Appeals with judges
subject to the administrative control of the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land) (codified as amended at MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. IV, §§ 1, 2, 3, 14A, 14B, 15, 16,
18, 33; art. V, §§ 3, 6; art. XVII, §§ 3, 7 (1981 & Supp. 1998)).
278. MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. IV, § 18 (1981).
279. See REPORT, supra note 6, at 206 (proposing to give "complete administrative rule-
making power to the highest court for the first time, [so that] the chief judge will be
ensured [of] having the necessary tools for effective judicial administration").
280. SeeAct of May 20, 1980, ch. 523, 1980 Md. Laws 1869, 1869 (ratified Nov. 4, 1980)
(reflecting the consolidation of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City into the Circuit
Court for Baltimore City) (codified as amended at MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. IV, §§ 1,
4A, 4B(a), 5, 9, 18, 20, 23, 25, 26 (1981 & Supp. 1998)); Act of Apr. 26, 1977, ch. 681, 1977
Md. Laws 2743, 2763-64 (ratified Nov. 7, 1978) (renumbering sections of the Judiciary
Article of the Constitution) (codified as amended at MD. CODE ANN., DECL. OF RTs. arts. 23-
24, 46; CONsT. art. 1, §§ 1-11; art. III, §§ 5-6, 9, 11, 13, 15, 19, 37, 41, 53, 59; art. IV, §§ 1, IA,
3, 4A, 6, 12, 14, 18, 20, 22, 40, 41-I, 44, 45; art. V, §§ 5-7, 11; art. VI, § 1; art. VII, § 1; art. Xl-
A, §§ 2, 5; art. XI-D, § 1(a); art. XIII, §§ 1, 2; art. XV, §§ 2, 3; art. XVI, §§ 2, 6; art. XVII,
§§ 1, 3-9 (1981 & Supp. 1998)); Act of May 24, 1969, ch. 789, 1969 Md. Laws 1696, 1700-04
(ratified Nov. 3, 1970) (reflecting creation of statewide District Court system) (codified as
amended at MD. CODE ANN., DECL. OF RTs. art. 23, CONsT. art. IV, §§ 1, 2, 4A, 4B, 18, 41A-I
(1981 & Supp. 1998)).
281. See Dennis M. Sweeney, The Murphy Years: A View from the Trial Court, 56 MD. L. REv.
636, 643 (1997) (stating that Murphy "jumped into the then-nascent field of judicial ad-
ministration"); Alan M. Wilner, A Humble Giant, 56 MD. L. REv. 631, 634 (1997) (noting
that the chiefjudge's function as administrative head was only "fully implemented" under
Judge Murphy).
282. Act of Apr. 11, 1955, ch. 343, 1955 Md. Laws 589 (codified as amended at MD.
CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 13-101 (1995 & Supp. 1998)).
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Convention of 1967-1968 hoped to revitalize and energize both the
local and state levels of government.283 To accomplish this goal, the
proposed constitution mandated local home rule for Maryland coun-
ties and Baltimore City;284 required that all laws passed by the General
Assembly apply generally throughout the state;2 5 and empowered the
General Assembly to create "Multi-County Governmental Units." 286
Prior to 1967, although the Maryland Constitution permitted
some local legislative autonomy through charter home rule,2 87 only
four counties had adopted such a charter.2 8 Moreover, these coun-
ties were permitted to legislate only about those subjects permitted to
them by the General Assembly.289 By constitutional amendment in
1966, the General Assembly authorized a second class of local rule
called "code home rule."290 Under this system, a non-charter county
283. See MAGNIFICENT FAILURE, supra note 1, at 70 (noting the convention's "endorse-
ment of the 'shared powers' concept for local home rule").
284. See COMPARISON, supra note 75, at 201-10 (§§ 7.01-.04).
285. Id. at 148-49 (stating in section 3.22 that "[t]he General Assembly shall enact no
public laws except general laws").
286. Id. at 215 (§ 7.08).
287. The 1851 Constitution gave Baltimore City limited home rule. See MAGNIFICENTFAILURE, supra note 1, at 98. The other counties gained the right to adopt a charter form
of government by Act of Apr. 16, 1914, ch. 416, 1914 Md. Laws 657, 658 (ratified Nov. 2,1915) (mandating that "[t]he General Assembly ... shall by public general law provide a
grant of express powers for such County or Counties as may thereafter form a charter
under the provisions of this Article") (codified as amended at MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art.
XI-A, §§ 1-7 (1981 & Supp. 1998)). See generally JEAN A. SPENCER, CoNTEMPORARY LOCAL
GOVERNMENT IN MARYLAND 19-26 (1965) (tracing the history of charter home rule in
Maryland).
288. The following counties adopted charter home rule: Anne Arundel County in 1964,
Baltimore County in 1956, Montgomery County in 1948, Wicomico County in 1964. See
REPORT, supra note 6, at 244 n.235.
289. See MAGNIFICENT FAILURE, supra note 1, at 98-99 (stating that "the existing home
rule provision [in 1967] . . . 'permit[ted] the legislature to determine what matters[would] be included in such express powers'" of the counties); see also MD. CODE ANN.,
CONST. art. XI-A, § 2 (1981) (establishing that at its first session after a county votes to form
a charter, the General Assembly is to "provide a grant of express powers for such County").
The charter counties are further hampered by the application of "Dillon's Rule," a rule of
judicial construction that states:
It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal corporation pos-
sesses and can exercise the following powers, and no others: First, those granted in ex-press words, second, those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers
expressly granted; third, those essential to the declared objects and purposes of
the corporation,-not simply convenient, but indispensable.
JOHN F. DILLON, I THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 89, at 115 (3d ed. 1881).
290. Act of Apr. 8, 1965, ch. 493, 1965 Md. Laws 694 (ratified Nov. 8, 1966) (codified at
MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. XI-F (1981)).
can be granted limited home rule powers.291 When the constitutional
convention convened in 1967, however, not a single county had yet
adopted the new code home rule form of local government.
2 92
With such limited local governance, the Maryland General As-
sembly historically took an active role in legislating for local govern-
ments. As one study found:
The consideration of local legislation requires a substantial
share of the time and energies of members of the General
Assembly. In this respect Maryland occupies almost a unique
position among states, for its legislature gives perhaps more
attention to the details of local government than does the
legislature of any other state in the Union.
293
Wheeler and Kinsey noted that this system has provided great legisla-
tive flexibility and has not led to severe abuse. 294 They also stated,
however, that "[i] f there was a central drive in the convention, it was
to get the legislative branch out of the business of legislating for spe-
cific localities and force the local governments to govern locally.
295
The constitutional convention sought to recast the local-state re-
lationship in its entirety. First, it proposed that all counties be re-
quired to adopt their own home rule charters.296 Under these
charters, counties could legislate as they saw fit in any subject area that
291. See id. at 696 (empowering a noncharter county to "enact, amend, or repeal a pub-
lic local law of that county" with certain exceptions); see also SPENCER, supra note 287, at 28-
29 (discussing code home rule).
292. See MAGNIFICENT FAILURE, supra note 1, at 99. Today, five Maryland counties have
adopted code home rule: Allegany (1974); Caroline (1984); Kent (1970); Queen Anne's
(1990); and Worcester (1976). See STATE ARCHIVES, MARYLAND MANUAL 1996-1997, at 717,
747, 793, 813, 845 (Diane P. Frese ed., 1996) [hereinafter MARYLAND MANUAL].
293. REPORT, supra note 6, at 244 (quoting CARL EVERSTINE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY 1 (1944)); see BELL & SPENCER, supra note 124, at 5 ("The time burden
on the legislature, the necessary attention of legislators to local issues, [and] the placing of
responsibility for local legislation in the State House rather than in the county... have all
occasioned discussion and examination [as problems of local legislation]"); Mester, supra
note 124, at 74 (observing that "[t]he problem of local legislation in Maryland has been
one of major proportions for many years").
294. MAGNIFICENT FAILURE, supra note 1, at 96. One result of state involvement in local
legislation, however, is reduced accountability. See Alexander, supra note 21, at 213 n.l1
(noting that "the citizen has difficulty in placing responsibility for a piece of legislation or a
lack of a particular piece of legislation" when the fault might belong either to the state or
local government). Moreover, the dual sources of legislation leads to a proliferation of
laws and sources of law. For example, the landlord-tenant relationship in Baltimore City is
governed by the Real Property Article of the Maryland Annotated Code, MD. CODE ANN.,
REAL PROP. §§ 8-101 to -501 (1996 & Supp. 1998), the Public Local Laws for Baltimore City,
PUBLIC LOCAL IAWs OF BALTIMORE CITY §§ 9-1 to -33 (1980 & Supp. 1991), and the Balti-
more City Code, BALTIMORE CITY CODE §§ 13-46 to -57 (1983 & Supp. 1995).
295. MAGNIFICENT FAILURE, supra note 1, at 101.
296. See COMPARISON, supra note 75, at 204 (§ 7.02).
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the county deemed appropriate, unless the General Assembly denied
by law this power.297 Second, the General Assembly was prohibited
from enacting legislation that did not have general application
throughout the state. 29' Finally, the constitutional convention pro-
posed the possibility of "Multi-County Governmental Units. '299 This
last proposal eventually became one of the most divisive issues of the
campaign for ratification, because the opponents of the proposed
constitution used this proposal to play on racist fears that Baltimore
City, with its African-American majority, would annex the mostly white
suburban areas. 00 Indeed, Wheeler and Kinsey identified the discus-
297. Id. at 210 (§ 7.40). This reversed the traditional "Dillon's Rule." See supra note 289.
298. See COMPARISON, supra note 75, at 148-49 (§ 3.22).
299. Id. at 215 (§§ 7.08-.09). Wheeler and Kinsey indicated that the General Assembly
had already established bi- and multi-county agencies; these agencies included the Mary-
land-National Capital Park and Planning Commission, the Metropolitan Transit Authority,
the Upper Potomac River Commission, the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission,
the Washington Suburban Transit Commission, and the Washington Metropolitan Area
Transit Authority. MAGNIFICENT FAILURE, supra note 1, at 107. Currently there are a
number of these intercounty agencies: the Baltimore Metropolitan Council, created by Act
of May 5, 1992, ch. 201, 1992 Md. Laws 2213 (codified as amended at MD. ANN. CODE art.
78D, §§ 1-7 (1995 & Supp. 1996), MD. CODE ANN., CTs. & JUD. PROC. § 5-301 (Supp.
1998)); the Tri-County Council for Western Maryland, created by Act of May 27, 1986, ch.
861, 1986 Md. Laws 3493 (covering Allegany, Garrett, and Washington counties) (codified
as amended at MD. ANN. CODE art. 20A, §§ 1-101 to 3-102 (1997)); the Maryland Lower
Eastern Shore Tourism Center Advisory Committee, created by Act of May 29, 1984, ch.
716, 1984 Md. Laws 3347 (codified as amended at MD. ANN. CODE art. 83A, § 4-301
(1997)); the Tri-County Council for Southern Maryland, created by Act of May 15, 1984,
ch. 373, 1984 Md. Laws 2361 (covering Calvert, Charles, and St. Mary's counties) (codified
at MD. ANN. CODE art. 20, § 1-106 (1998)); the Northeast Maryland Waste Disposal Author-
ity, created by Act of May 27, 1980, ch. 871, 1980 Md. Laws 3174 (codified as amended at
Mn. CODE ANN., NAT. REs. I §§ 3-901 to -928 (1997 & Supp. 1998)); the Washington Subur-
ban Transit Commission, created by Act of May 4, 1965, ch. 870, 1965 Md. Laws 1418(codified at MONT. COUNTY CODE § 72-4 (1965)); the Upper Potomac River Commission,
created by Act of Apr. 29, 1935, ch. 409, 1935 Md. Laws 891; the Maryland-National Capital
Park & Planning Commission, created by Act of Apr. 26, 1927, ch. 448, 1927 Md. Laws 833(codified as amended at MD. ANN. CODE art. 28, § 1-101 (1997)); the Washington Subur-
ban Sanitary Commission, created by Act of Apr. 10, 1918, ch. 122, 1918 Md. Laws 248
(codified as amended at MD. ANN. CODE art. 29, § 1-102 (1997)).
300. The authors of Magnificent Failure speak to this phenomenon:
Confronted with all of the pressing problems of central cities-vast fiscal needs,
increasing Negro population, rising crime rate, inadequate public services, Balti-
more City was pictured by county opponents of the proposed constitution as
poised to strike the suburbs once the new constitution presented the opportu-
nity.... [It was suggested that] Baltimore City officials would move immediately
to absorb Anne Arundel County ....
MAGNIFICENT FAILURE, supra note 1, at 204. Ironically, the General Assembly, under its
plenary powers, had already created multi-county agencies, see supra note 299, and the new
proposal gave no additional powers to the General Assembly.
One commentator has disputed the claim that opposition to multi-county governmen-
tal units played on racist fears. See Thomas G. Pullen, Jr., Why the Proposed Maryland Consti-
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sion of regional government directly with racial issues; " [w] hen some
said 'regional government,' they were communicating 'race."' 3 "
After the defeat of the proposed constitution, few changes have
been made in the relationship between state and local govern-
ments.3 0 2 Few additional counties have chosen to adopt a charter
form of government.303 The General Assembly continues to pass leg-
islation of purely local application.
tution Was Not Approved, 10 WM. & MARY L. REv. 378, 380 (1968) ("Neither race nor religion
played too large a part in the people's thoughts about the proposed Maryland
constitution.").
301. MAGNIFICENT FAILURE, supra note 1, at 207.
302. A series of amendments were approved allowing county voters to vote for co-coun-
cil members by councilmanic, rather than election, district. See Act of May 27, 1986, ch.
707, 1986 Md. Laws 2660 (ratified Nov. 4, 1986) (affecting all charter counties) (codified
as amended at MD. CODE ANN., CONsT. art. XI-A, § 3A (Supp. 1998)); Act of May 27, 1986,
ch. 694, 1986 Md. Laws 2593 (ratified Nov. 4, 1986) (affecting Harford County) (codified
as amended at MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. XI-A, § 3A (Supp. 1998)); Act of June 1, 1982,
ch. 729, 1982 Md. Laws 3792 (ratified Nov. 2, 1982) (affecting Montgomery County) (codi-
fied as amended at MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. XI-A, § 3A (Supp. 1998)); Act of Apr. 22,
1980, ch. 136, 1980 Md. Laws 895 (ratified Nov. 4, 1980) (affecting Anne Arundel County)
(codified as amended at MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. XI-A, § 3A (1981 & Supp. 1998)); Act
of May 26, 1977, ch. 682, 1977 Md. Laws 2783 (ratified Nov. 7, 1978) (affecting Prince
George's County) (codified as amended at MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. XI-A, § 3A (1981 &
Supp. 1998)); Act of May 15, 1975, ch. 785, 1975 Md. Laws 3365 (ratified Nov. 2, 1976)
(affecting Howard County) (codified as amended at MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. XI-A,
§ 3A (1981 & Supp. 1998)); Act of May 6, 1971, ch. 358, 1971 Md. Laws 761 (ratified Nov.
7,1972) (affecting Baltimore County) (codified as amended at MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art.
XI-A, § 3A (1981 & Supp. 1998)).
There have been other changes as well. In 1969, a constitutional amendment pro-
vided a second, easier method for a county to become a charter county. See Act of May 21,
1969, ch. 786, 1969 Md. Laws 1686 (ratified Nov. 3, 1970) (codified as amended at MD.
CODE ANN., CONST. art. XI-A, § IA (1981 & Supp. 1998)). A 1972 amendment required
local governments to publish proposed legislation. See Act of May 26, 1972, ch. 371, 1972
Md. Laws 1231 (ratified Nov. 7, 1972) (codified as amended at Mo. CODE ANN., CONST. art.
XI-A, § 3 (1981 & Supp. 1998)). In 1992, the time for a charter board to prepare a charter
was extended from 12 to 18 months. See Act of May 5, 1992, ch. 207, 1992 Md. Laws 2226
(ratified Nov. 3, 1992) (codified as amended at MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. XI-A, §§ 1, IA
(Supp. 1998)).
303. The following Maryland counties have adopted charter home rule since 1967:
Harford County (1972); Howard County (1968); Prince George's County (1970); and Tal-
bot County (1973). See MARYLAND MANUA, supra note 292, at 782, 787, 805, 829. On May
2, 1998, Carroll County voters considered adopting charter home rule, with strong edito-
rial endorsement by the Baltimore Sun. See Carroll County Needs Home-Rule Powers, BALT. SUN,
Apr. 26, 1998, at L2 (arguing that charter home rule government would be "better
equipped to manage affairs into the 21st century" and that "home rule offers a clear divi-
sion of powers and accountability"); One Head is Better Than Three, BALT. SUN, Apr. 27, 1998,
at A8 (suggesting that a charter home rule government would be one of "increased ac-
countability and responsibility, more firmly built on local control [and] is the one Carroll
countians should choose"); What Is Local Control Worth?, BALT. SUN, Apr. 28, 1998, at A10
(opining that charter government would not create bigger government and higher taxes in
Carroll County because "political reality, more than the structure of government, [would]
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Regional planning for the Baltimore metropolitan area has long
been attempted, with varying degrees of success. The Baltimore Re-
gional Planning Council was established in 1956 as part of the State
Planning Department.30 4 In 1963, the Baltimore Regional Planning
Council was replaced by the Regional Planning Council.305 The Re-
gional Planning Council became an independent agency in 1984. °6
In 1989, the name was changed to the Baltimore Regional Council of
Governments. 30 7 Finally, in 1992, it became the Baltimore Metropoli-
tan Council. 0 s
There is a renewed interest in regional governments in the Balti-
more metropolitan area.30 9 David Rusk has identified a city's relative
"elasticity"-its ability to expand its borders to reduce population den-
sity3l°-as a key component of that city's ability to thrive economi-
cally.311 Rusk notes that a 1948 constitutional amendment prevents
Baltimore City from expanding through annexation without approval
of the voters in the area to be annexed.1l Because Rusk believes such
approval (or repeal of the constitutional provision) is impossible, he
recommends establishing a "Metropolitan Municipality" as the upper
tier of a two-tiered system of local government in Baltimore City, and
Baltimore, Anne Arundel, Carroll, Harford, Howard, and Queen
Anne's counties.31 3 This metropolitan government would be respon-
restrain county leaders and budgets from excess"). Nonetheless, Carroll County voters
rejected the proposed charter by a vote of 11,107 to 7227. See Mary Gail Hare &James M.
Coram, Carroll Voters Reject Change, BALT. SUN, May 3, 1998, at B1.
304. See MARYLAND MANUAL, supra note 292, at 429.
305. Act of Apr. 30, 1963, ch. 753, 1963 Md. Laws 1548 (repealed by Act of May 25,
1989, ch. 736, 1989 Md. Laws 4106).
306. Act of May 15, 1984, ch. 373, 1984 Md. Laws 2361 (codified at MD. ANN. CODE art.
20, § 1-106 (1998)).
307. Act of May 25, 1989, ch. 736, 1989 Md. Laws 4106 (repealed by Act of May 5, 1992,
ch. 201, 1992 Md. Laws 2213).
308. Act of May 5, 1992, ch. 201, 1992 Md. Laws 2213 (codified as amended at MD. ANN.
CODE art. 78D, §§ 1-7 (1995 & Supp. 1996), MD. CODE ANN., CTs. &JUD. PROC. § 5-301
(Supp. 1998)).
309. See, e.g., MYRON ORIFIELD, BALTIMORE METROPOLmcs (1997); DAVID RusK, BALTI-
MORE UNBOUND (1997).
310. Rusy, supra note 309, at 3-6.
311. Id. at 14-15.
312. Act of Apr. 25, 1947, ch. 618, 1947 Md. Laws 1552 (ratified Nov. 2, 1948) (codified
as amended at MD. CODE ANN., CONsT. art. XIII, § 1 (1981 & Supp. 1998)). For an histori-
cal analysis of the constitutional amendment limiting annexation, see Gilbert Sandier, An-
nexation Pixilation, BALT. SUN, July 2, 1991, at A9.
313. RUsE, supra note 309, at 91. Rusk seems to avoid the use of the state constitution to
implement his plan precisely because of the majoritarian nature of state constitutions, and
because he knows that a majority of voters would not vote to adopt this scheme of regional
government. This is not a criticism of Rusk for the antimajoritarian nature of his plan, but
rather a simple recognition of that fact.
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sible for providing low cost housing on a regional basis314 and normal-
izing taxing disparities between the jurisdictions.3 15 If such proposals
are successful in gathering support, it will be interesting to see if the
same arguments will be made against regional government that were
made in 1967-1968. It will also be interesting to see how the state
constitution is involved in favor of, and in opposition to, these ideas.
G. Finance and Taxation
The provisions governing finance and taxation, although spread
throughout the 1867 Maryland Constitution, are mostly found in Arti-
cle III (Legislative Department). The 1967-1968 Constitutional Con-
vention proposed creating a separate article (Article 6) to deal with
the issues of state government finance, including the state budget pro-
cess and bonding authority.
1. The State Budget Process.-The 1967-1968 Constitutional Con-
vention proposed retaining the executive budget system that had ex-
isted successfully in Maryland since 1916.36 A discussion of the
Maryland executive budget system and the decision to retain that sys-
tem is included in Part IV.C.3.3 1 7
2. Bond Financing.--The constitutional provisions governing
state debt in the 1867 Maryland Constitution, as it existed in 1967,
were an anachronistic and restrictive remnant of poor financial
choices made in the first half of the nineteenth century.
318 These ex-
314. Id. at 103-19.
315. Id. at 122-23.
316. See REPORT, supra note 6, at 229 ("The Commission's inquiry into the concept and
operation of the present executive budget system has convinced it that the system is funda-
mentally sound, both in theory and practice."); see also Act of Mar. 28, 1916, ch. 159, 19i6
Md. Laws 268 (ratified Nov. 7, 1916) (establishing the current executive budget system)
(codified as amended at MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. III, § 52 (1981 & Supp. 1998)).
317. See supra notes 144-153.
318. See MAGNIFICENT FAILURE, supra note 1, at 116 (noting that, after the difficult expe-
rience Maryland had in fulfilling its debt responsibilities in the nineteenth century, "[tihe
constitutional convention of 1850 produced stringent restrictions on the state's power to
incur debt"); ALFRED S. NILES, MARYLAND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 187-88 (1915) (noting that
the struggle the state had to pay its debt obligation after making a number of disastrous
loans during the early nineteenth century was "fresh in the minds of the framers of the
Constitution of 1851 and the [provisions relating to debt in the Constitution were]
adopted by them to prevent the repetition of [those] bitter experiences"); REPORT, Supra
note 6, at 214-15 ("The [provisions of the 1867 Maryland Constitution relating to state
debt] were the product of public reaction against the nearly disastrous extent to which the
General Assembly had loaned the credit of the State . .. from 1820 to 1850.").
The problem began with the rush of westward development in the early nineteenth
century. Maryland, like many other states, sought to encourage internal developments by
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pensive and embarrassing financial mistakes clearly influenced the
delegates to the Maryland Constitutional Convention of 1850.319 To
avoid a repetition, severe restrictions were placed on the issuance of
state bonds. 20 First, each bond issuance was required to be accompa-
nied by the levying of a tax sufficient to pay interest as it came due and
principal within fifteen years.32 A total debt ceiling of $100,000 was
installed, with the possibility of an emergency $50,000 limit on bor-
rowing for temporary deficiencies.322 Finally, the credit of the state
could not be given or loaned to any individual, association, or
corporation. 23
The tight controls on incurring debt were slightly modified in the
Maryland Constitution of 1864,24 and were modified again slightly in
the 1867 version.3 2  The provision was amended in 1924 to permit
the credit of the state to be pledged to raise money for veterans' bo-
nuses,3 26 and again in 1960, to permit tax anticipation borrowing and
assisting and subsidizing such companies as the Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Co. and theBaltimore & Ohio Railroad. The state government subscribed to the stock of these compa-
nies to finance their construction projects. In order to finance the stock purchases, the
state issued long-term bonds backed by the full faith and credit of the state. By 1840, the
state had incurred almost $15 million in state debt to finance the construction projects
undertaken by these private companies. The internal improvements, principally the Ches-
apeake & Ohio Canal, failed to produce expected revenues. The entire obligation was
thrown upon the state, which had failed to appropriate any money for repaying the bonds.The state tried to sell its interest in the railroad and canal companies, but there were noinvestors. Finally, in 1846, in order to save the state's credit, the General Assembly was
forced to pass a substantial tax increase on both real and personal property. Id. Of course,
many other states engaged in such risky financial behavior during this time period, leading
generally to similar results. See FLETCHER M. GREEN, CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE
SOUTH ATLANTIC STATES, 1776-1860: A STUDY IN THE EVOLUTION OF DEMOCRACY 255-56 (DaCapo Press Reprint 1971) (1930) (explaining that because of the heavy debts incurred by
many state governments, " [tihe people found themselves burdened with heavy taxes just
when they were least able to pay... [and] began to demand that constitutional restrictionsbe placed upon state indebtedness and the loaning of state credit to private
corporations").
319. See I DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE MARYLAND REFORM CONVENTION TO REVISE
THE STATE CONSTITUTION 338-57, 369, 375-79, 411, 414-49 (1851) (reporting delegates'
concerns about state financing of internal improvements); 2 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF
THE MARYLAND REFORM CONVENTION TO REVISE THE STATE CONSTITUTION 339-47 (1851)
(same).
320. MD. CONST. of 1851, art. III, § 22.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. See MD. CONST. of 1864, art. III, § 33 (eliminating the $100,000 ceiling).
325. MD. CONST. of 1867, art. III, § 34 (exempting St. Mary's, Charles, and Calvert coun-
ties from the prohibition on bond-financed internal improvements).
326. Act of Apr. 9, 1924, ch. 327, 1924 Md. Laws 910 (ratified Nov. 4, 1924) (codified as
amended at MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. III, § 34 (1981 & Supp. 1998)).
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to enable the state treasurer to borrow to cover temporary
emergencies.
32 7
This restrictive regime forced the state to find creative ways to
finance necessary improvements. The Court of Appeals of Maryland
assisted in this enterprise by stretching the words of restrictive consti-
tutional provisions beyond their normal meanings. 328 As the Eney
Commission found, "Frequent litigation has been essential and the
words 'debt,' 'credit,' and 'works of internal improvement,' as used in
327. Act of Mar. 24, 1959, ch. 234, 1959 Md. Laws 300 (ratified Nov. 8, 1960) (codified
as amended at MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. III, § 34 (1981 & Supp. 1998)).
328. See Maryland Indus. Dev. Fin. Auth. v. Meadow-Croft, 243 Md. 515, 525, 221 A.2d
632, 638 (1966) (finding that a statute, although purporting to pledge the faith and credit
of the state in violation of article III, section 34 of the Maryland Constitution, did not
actually do so, and was therefore constitutional); Lacher v. Board of Trustees, 243 Md. 500,
512, 221 A.2d 625, 631 (1966) (holding that the use of revenues collected from existing
buildings of two state colleges to pay the interest and principal of bonds to be sold to
create additional facilities at those colleges did not create a debt of the state, as described
in article II, section 34 of the Maryland Constitution); Lerch v. Maryland Port Auth., 240
Md. 438, 462, 214 A.2d 761, 774 (1965) (holding that the Maryland Port Authority's issu-
ance of revenue bonds for the creation of an international trade center did not constitute
a debt under article III, section 34 of the Maryland Constitution because there was no
pledge of existing property and only cash was used from the general funds of the Author-
ity); Melvin v. Board of County Comm'rs, 199 Md. 402, 405, 86 A.2d 902, 903-04 (1952)
(holding that Anne Arundel County's sale of bonds and remittance of the funds to a local
hospital did not constitute a loan of credit to the County, as prohibited by article III, sec-
tion 54 of the Maryland Constitution);Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Williams, 199 Md. 382, 401,
86 A.2d 892, 901-02 (1952) (holding that article III, section 34 of the Maryland Constitu-
tion did not prohibit the state from borrowing money and giving the proceeds as a gift to
an educational institution); Castle Farms Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Lexington Mkt. Auth., 193
Md. 472, 483-84, 67 A.2d 490, 494 (1949) (holding that an Act authorizing the Lexington
Market Authority to issue revenue bonds did not constitute a debt of Baltimore City, or a
pledge of its faith and credit, as prohibited by article XI, section 7 of the Maryland Consti-
tution, because they were to be secured only by the revenues of the market and not a
mortgage of it); Wyatt v. Beall, 175 Md. 258, 266, 1 A.2d 619, 622-23 (1938) (holding that
revenue bonds issued by the state to finance the construction of highway bridges did not
constitute a debt of the state, as prohibited by article III, section 34 of the Maryland Consti-
tution, because there was no pledge of existing property, but only a pledge of property that
would come into existence as a result of the issuance of the bonds); Welch v. Coglan, 126
Md. 1, 8, 94 A. 384, 387 (1915) (holding that an Act authorizing the state Board of Health
to require counties and cities to establish sewer and drainage systems did not violate the
constitutional prohibition against state involvement in works of internal improvement);
Bonsai v. Yellott, 100 Md. 481, 508, 60 A. 593, 597 (1905) (holding that an Act authorizing
state aid for the construction of roads by counties did not conflict with the constitutional
provision prohibiting state involvement in works of internal improvement). But see Balti-
more & Drum Point R.R. Co. v. Pumphrey, 74 Md. 86, 111-12, 21 A. 559, 562 (1891) (hold-
ing that the issuance of railroad negotiable bonds by the County Commissioners of Anne
Arundel County, in payment for a subscription to the stock of that railroad company, vio-
lated Article III, § 54 of the Maryland Constitution, which prohibited a loan of the credit of
a county).
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this part of the Constitution have taken on highly specialized mean-
ings, understood only by the initiated." '29
The Eney Commission and the 1967-1968 Constitutional Conven-
tion decided both to scrap this archaic system and to adopt a provi-
sion patterned on the New York Constitution.3 °0 This provision would
have provided that:
If at any time the General Assembly shall have failed to ap-
propriate and to make available sufficient funds to provide
for the timely payment of the interest and principal then due
upon all state indebtedness, it shall be the duty of the comp-
troller to pay, or to make available for payment, to the hold-
ers of such indebtedness from the first revenues thereafter
received applicable to the general funds of the State, a sum
equal to such interest and principal.3"'
While this proposed change created little controversy, there was a
great deal of concern about a second recommendation: to extend the
maturity period for state bonds from fifteen to twenty-five years.33 2
Although delegates were concerned that the longer maturity might
negatively affect the state's bond rating, they eventually adopted the
longer maturity period. Finally, the proposed constitution would
have permitted the credit of the state to be loaned to private institu-
tions if the loan served a public purpose.334
Upon the defeat of the proposed constitution, the preceding sta-
tus quo prevailed. In 1972, a constitutional amendment modified the
requirement that each issuance of state debt be matched to the impo-
sition of a tax to fund repayment. 35 Under this amendment, the re-
quirement to levy a tax does not apply "in the event that sufficient
funds to pay the principal and interest on the debt are appropriated
for this purpose in the annual state budget."3 3 6 In 1976, the historic
prohibition against pledging the state's faith and credit for internal
329. REPORT, supra note 6, at 220.
330. Id. at 221. The New York Constitution requires that when the legislature fails to
appropriate sufficient funds for the service of a particular debt, the comptroller must des-
ignate money sufficient to service the debt from the general fund. See N.Y. CONST. art. VII,
§ 16.
331. COMPARISON, supra note 75, at 196 (§ 6.06).
332. See MAGNIFICENT FAILURE, supra note 1, at 116 (noting that, with respect to the
acquisition of debt, the proposal to extend the maturity period caused "the greatest
concern").
333. See id. at 117-18.
334. See COMPARISON, supra note 75, at 197 (§ 6.07).
335. Act of May 26, 1972, ch. 372, 1972 Md. Laws 1232 (ratified Nov. 7, 1972) (codified
as amended at MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. III, § 34 (1981 & Supp. 1998)).
336. Id. at 1233.
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improvements was removed."3 7 Finally, in 1982, the constitution was
amended again to permit the treasurer to issue short-term notes in
anticipation of revenue, including bond revenues. 338
The review of the current provisions governing state bond financ-
ing is decidedly mixed. The constitutional language is archaic and
difficult to understand. The words of the provision still have "highly
specialized meanings, understood only by the initiated."339 On the
other hand, Maryland has maintained its enviable credit rating,34 ° and
the provision no longer hampers the ability of state government to
raise capital or to fund internal improvements.
3. Post Audit.--The 1867 Maryland Constitution has, at all times,
conferred auditing authority on the Maryland House of Delegates.34'
By 1967, however, the audit function was in fact performed by a mem-
ber of the executive branch, the state auditor.342 The state auditor
was appointed by the governor and worked under the supervision of
the comptroller. 343 This arrangement of the executive branch audit-
ing itself runs counter to good fiscal practice, and both the Eney Com-
mission and the 1967-1968 Constitutional Convention proposed to
return the audit function to the legislative branch.344 Wheeler and
Kinsey note that, even before the proposed constitution was submitted
to the voters, the General Assembly had returned the post-audit func-
tion to its constitutionally assigned role under the direction of the
337. Act of May 17, 1976, ch. 551, 1976 Md. Laws 1449 (ratified Nov. 2, 1976) (codified
as amended at MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. III, § 34 (1981 & Supp. 1998)).
338. Act of June 1, 1982, ch. 600, 1982 Md. Laws 3505 (ratified Nov. 2, 1982) (codified
at MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. III, § 34 (Supp. 1998)).
339. REPORT, supra note 6, at 220.
340. See JoAnna Daemmrich, Goldstein is Missed at Bond Sale; Maryland Event Occurs for
First Time in 40 Years Without the Comptroller, BALT. SuN, July 9, 1998, at B2, available in 1998
WL 4974979 ("The interest rate [on Maryland General Obligation bonds] is relatively low
chiefly because Maryland-one of only eight such states-has a AAA bond rating .. ").
341. See MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. III, § 24 (1981); MD. CONST. of 1867, art. III, § 24;
MD. CONST. of 1864, art. III, § 23; MD. CONST. of 1851, art. III, § 28; MD. CONST. of 1776,
art. X.
342. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 19, §§ 30-34 (1966) (establishing the position of state audi-
tor), repealed by Act of May 7, 1968, ch. 456, 1968 Md. Laws 810.
343. See MAGNIFICENT FAILURE, supra note 1, at 118-19.
344. See REPORT, supra note 6, at 149 ("[R]eason would seem to dictate that, if the post-
audit review function is to be separately performed, it should be performed by a person
either appointed or elected by, and responsible only to the legislative branch."); see also
COMPARISON, supra note 75, at 150 (proposing in section 3.24 that the General Assembly
require post audit of the state finances to be done by an agency of the General Assembly).
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legislature.345 Today, the Maryland Code fixes the office of the Legis-
lative Auditor as an officer of the legislative branch. 346
4. Lotteries.-The decision to continue the constitutional prohi-
bition on lotteries347 was a source of great controversy both before 348
and after the constitutional convention. The Eney Commission rec-
ommended eliminating the constitutional prohibition against the lot-
tery.3 49 At the convention, the prediction that the lottery provisions
would be controversial proved to be true:
The process of reaching the decision to [retain a ban on
state lotteries] ... in the draft constitution took up more
time of the convention and produced more debate-at times
acrimonious-than any other matter relating to state finance
and taxation. Indeed the matter was not settled until the
closing hours of the convention when on third reading after
the convention could muster only 68 of the 72 votes needed
to include the provision in the draft, it agreed to reconsider
and finally produced the needed votes.35 '
Eventually the convention decided to retain the constitutional
ban on state-run lotteries. 351 That ban had existed in the same form
since the Constitution of 1851.52 Although the convention proposed
modernizing the language, the proposed constitution retained the
same concept.35
3
After the defeat of the proposed constitution, the ban on lotteries
from the 1867 Constitution remained in effect. In 1972, the citizens
of Maryland voted to eliminate the prohibition on state-run lotteries
345. See MAGNIFICENT FAILURE, supra note 1, at 119.
346. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 2-1202 (Supp. 1998) (establishing the Department
of Fiscal Services as a legislative department); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T §§ 2-1217 to
-1227 (Supp. 1998) (creating an office of the legislative auditor and defining its duties).
347. See MD. CONST. of 1867, art. III, § 36 (providing that "[n]o Lottery grant shall ever
hereafter be authorized by the General Assembly").
348. See Cottin, supra note 232 (predicting that the proposed elimination of the consti-
tutional ban on state lotteries would be among the most debated proposals).
349. See REPORT, supra note 6, at 323 (indicating that the commission's draft constitution
omitted the prohibition of lotteries found in the Maryland Constitution of 1867, article III,
section 36, as it then existed).
350. MAGNIFICENT FAILURE, supra note 1, at 110-11.
351. See COMPARISON, supra note 75, at 201 (retaining the ban in section 6.17).
352. See MD. CONST. of 1867, art. III, § 36; MD. CONST. of 1864, art. III, § 35; MD. CONST.
of 1851, art. III, § 37.
353. See COMPARISON, supra note 75, at 201 (§ 6.17) ("Neither the State nor any unit of
local government shall operate or authorize a lottery for the purpose of financing any
expenses of government.").
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and to create the Maryland Lottery.3 54 Today, the Maryland Lottery
provides a small but significant percentage of state revenues.3 55
5. The Balanced Budget Amendment.--One of the most important
recent innovations in Maryland state government finance was not rec-
ommended by the 1967-1968 Constitutional Convention. In 1973,
Maryland adopted a balanced budget amendment.3 5' This amend-
ment requires that total estimated revenues exceed total estimated ap-
propriations. 5 7 Moreover, in the process of amending the budget
bill, the General Assembly cannot cause appropriations to exceed
revenues.
3 5 8
354. See Act of May 26, 1972, ch. 364, 1972 Md. Laws 1218 (ratified Nov. 7, 1972) (codi-
fied at Mo. CODE ANN., CONST. art. III, § 36 (1981)); see also A Legal Lottery Is a Bad Tax,
BALT. SUN, Oct. 18, 1972, at A12 (arguing that a legalized lottery would be "no more than a
taxing gimmick"). In ending the constitutional ban, Maryland was part of a national trend
toward establishing state-run lotteries in the early 1970s. See Ronald J. Rychlack, Lotteries,
Revenues and Social Costs: A Historical Examination of State-Sponsored Gambling, 34 B.C. L. REV.
11, 45 (1992) (explaining that by 1974, 11 states had established lotteries). Professor
Rychlack's article also provides cogent criticism of state run lotteries, based on promo-
tional techniques employed, id. at 62-63, compulsive gambling, id. at 64-69, effect on chil-
dren, id. at 69-70, impact on crime, id. at 70-71, and disproportionate effect on the poorest
people, id. at 71-74. Professor Rychlack concludes that state run lotteries have generally
accomplished their goals of raising revenues, but that to minimize negative social conse-
quences, states should adopt severe limitations on lottery advertising including, "[a]t the
minimum: 1) advertisements should not be misleading; 2) advertisements should not com-
pare the lottery to secure financial investments; 3) advertisers should not target low-in-
come markets, and; 4) television advertising should be restricted to time slots where
children are less likely to be watching." Id. at 80.
355. It is estimated that the lottery will produce revenues of $408.6 million in fiscal year
1999. REPORT OF THE MARYLAND BOARD OF REVENUE ESTIMATES ON ESTIMATED MARYLAND
REVENUES: FIscAL YEARS ENDING JUNE 30, 1998 AND JUNE 30, 1999 (Submitted to Governor
Parris N. Glendening, Dec. 15, 1997), Table 9, at 35. After $32 million is provided to the
Maryland Stadium Authority, $376.6 million will be available to General Funds. Id. This
represents 4.65% of all State revenues. Id. Table 4, at 21.
356. Act of May 24, 1973, ch. 745, 1973 Md. Laws 1573, 1573 (ratified Nov. 5, 1974)
(mandating that "the budget bill as submitted by the Governor, supplemented by the Gov-
ernor, and amended by the General Assembly contain proposed appropriations not in
excess of total estimated revenues, relating generally to the contents and totals in the
budget bill") (codified as amended at MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. III, § 52 (1981 & Supp.
1998)). Scholars view the effectiveness of state balanced budget requirements differently.
Compare David Lubecky, Comment, The Proposed Federal Balanced Budget Amendment: The
Lesson from State Experience, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 563, 572 (1986) (arguing that states' fiscal
conditions and recent surveys of state executive and legislative fiscal officers suggest that
balanced budget requirements have been relatively successful) with Donald B. Tobin, The
Balanced Budget Amendment: Will Judges Become Accountants? A Look at State Experiences, 12
J.L. & POL. 153, 193 (1996) (asserting that state balanced budget requirements create "fis-
cal straightacket[s]" by requiring states "to seek alternative methods for dealing with budg-
ets in order to function").
357. MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. III, § 52(5a) (1981 & Supp. 1998).
358. Id.
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H. Other Issues
1. Salaries.-The 1867 Maryland Constitution provided set sala-
ries for the governor,35 9 attorney general, 60 treasurer,36' comptrol-
ler,362 members of the General Assembly,363 appellate judges, 64 trialjudges outside of Baltimore City, 65 and trial judges in BaltimoreCity.366 Additionally, the constitution provided that, except in cases
specifically provided in the constitution, no constitutional office could
receive an annual salary greater than $3000.67 Inflation eroded the
value of these set salaries between 1867 and 1967. Over this hundred-
year period, this problem had been recognized, and constitutional
amendments modified the set salaries." a For the attorney general,
the set salary was replaced by the provision that "he shall receive for
his services an annual salary of three thousand dollars, or such annual
salary as the General Assembly may from time to time by law pre-
scribe." 69 Judicial salaries also were removed from the constitution
and placed in the discretion of the legislature, with the sole require-
ment that ajudge's salary "shall not be diminished during his continu-
ance in office. ' 37" The cap of $3000 annual salary for constitutional
offices for which no salary was listed in the constitution was also
removed.3 71
359. MD. CONST. of 1867, art. II, § 21 (setting the governor's salary at $4500 annually).
360. MD. CONST. of 1867, art. V, § 3 (setting the attorney general's salary at $3000
annually).
361. MD. CONST. of 1867, art. VI, § 1 (setting the treasurer's salary at $2500 annually).
362. Id. (setting the comptroller's salary at $2500 annually).
363. MD. CONST. of 1867, art. III, § 15 (paying members of the General Assembly $5 per
day).
364. MD. CONST. of 1867, art. IV, § 24 (setting the salary of appellate judges at $3500
annually).
365. Id. (setting the salaries of trial judges not serving in Baltimore City at $2800
annually).
366. Id. § 31 (setting the salaries of Baltimore City trial judges at $3500 annually).
367. MD. CONsr. of 1867, art. XV, § 1.
368. The set salary of the treasurer was deleted from the constitution and instead was
allowed to be prescribed by law. Act of Apr. 29, 1966, ch. 428, 1966 Md. Laws 725 (ratified
Nov. 8, 1966) (codified as amended at MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. VI, § 1 (1981 & Supp.
1998)). This Act proves false the claim made byJonathan Cottin that "the State treasurer,
who disburses $1,000,000,000 a year, can be paid only $2,500 under terms of the constitu-
tion." See Cottin, supra note 232.
369. Act of Apr. 11, 1912, ch. 663, 1912 Md. Laws 1001 (ratified Nov. 4, 1913) (codified
as amended at MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. V, § 3 (1981)).
370. Act of Mar. 26, 1956, ch. 99, 1956 Md. Laws 258, 264 (ratified Nov. 6, 1956) (codi-
fied as amended at MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 5; art. II, §§ 2, 13; art. III, §§ 2-7, 58;
art. IV, §§ 14-19, 24-25, 37, 40-41; art. V, §§ 1, 7; art. VII, §§ 1-2; art. XII, § 2; art. XIV, § 2;
art. XV, §§ 1, 7; art. XVII, §§ 3-4 (1981 & Supp. 1998)).
371. Id. at 269.
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With respect to the governor and members of the General Assem-
bly, although some modification in salary had been made, the root
problem remained. The governor's salary had been adjusted, but to a
new fixed figure.37 2 The salaries of the members of the General As-
sembly had been increased to $2400 annually,"' and voters rejected a
1966 proposal to permit the General Assembly to set its own 
salary.37 4
With respect to the executive branch, the proposed constitution
of 1967-1968 provided that:
The salary of the governor, of the lieutenant governor, of the
attorney general, and of the comptroller shall be prescribed
by law, and shall neither be increased nor decreased during
the term for which each was elected. 5
Similarly, with respect to the legislative branch, the proposed
constitution stated that:
A member of the General Assembly shall receive the salary
and allowances prescribed by law. A salary increase enacted
during one term of office shall not become effective before
the next term. No senator or delegate shall be paid daily
living expenses during regular sessions of the General
Assembly.3 76
Obviously, this proposal of the 1967-1968 Convention was nearly
identical to a proposal that the voters rejected merely a year before.
3 77
The Maryland electorate was not willing to trust the General Assembly
to set its own salaries directly.
Upon the defeat of the proposed constitution, the problem of
fixed salaries for the governor and members of the General Assembly
continued until the development of an innovative solution: the Gov-
ernor's Salary Commission 37' and the General Assembly Compensa-
372. Act of May 4, 1965, ch. 641, 1965 Md. Laws 895 (ratified Nov. 8, 1966) (setting the
governor's salary at $25,000 annually) (codified at MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. II, § 21
(1981)).
373. Act of Apr. 7, 1964, ch. 161, 1964 Md. Laws 414 (ratified Nov. 3, 1964) (codified as
amended at MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. II, §§ 1, 13, 13; art. III, §§ 14-15, 27, 52(3)
(1981)).
374. Act of Apr. 29, 1966, ch. 431, 1966 Md. Laws 729 (rejected Nov. 8, 1966).
375. COMPARISON, supra note 75, at 20 (§ 4.24). The office of treasurer is not listed
because the proposed constitution would have abolished it. See id. at 81 (§ 4.20).
376. Id. at 26 (§ 3.12).
377. See supra note 374 and accompanying text.
378. See Act of May 17, 1976, ch. 543, 1976 Md. Laws 1431 (ratified Nov. 2, 1976) (codi-
fied at MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. II, §§ IA, 21-21A (1981)); see also The Sun's Position on
21 State Questions, supra note 265 (supporting the initiative to remove the provision in the
constitution setting the governor's salary and instead to create a compensation commission
to recommend to the General Assembly the governor's salary).
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tion Commission.3 7 9 Each of these commissions is independently
appointed and makes a recommendation to the General Assembly as
to appropriate salary adjustments.3 8s Upon receipt of the recommen-
dations, the General Assembly may accept or reduce the amount rec-
ommended, but cannot increase the proposed salary change.381 Any
change in salary made does not become effective until the next term
of office.38 2 In this manner, a thorny problem that the 1967-1968
Constitutional Convention was unable to solve has now been resolved.
2. Streamlining and Simplifying. 
-- One common and accurate crit-
icism of the 1867 Constitution is that it is too long and too compli-
cated.3 83 The Eney Commission correctly saw this as a major defect
and adopted the following drafting principles aimed at curing this
problem:
1. To the greatest possible extent the language used
should be terse, plain and simple, so that its meaning would
be easily understood by an informed citizen of average intel-
ligence and literacy.
2. The organization of the draft should be simple and
clear and the arrangement logical.
3. The constitution should provide only for the struc-
ture of government and should provide no more detail than
absolutely necessary.
4. The language should be plain and direct and, where
necessary, mandatory and not merely exhortatory.
5. The style and language should be in accord with
modern usage and, where change in language was thought
desirable to accomplish this purpose even though no change
in substance was intended, the change should be made.
6. Where through court decisions language has ob-
tained a special and well-understood constitutional meaning,
it should be retained, if possible, where no change in sub-
379. SeeAct of May 5, 1970, ch. 576, 1970 Md. Laws 1671, 1673-74 (ratified Nov. 3, 1970)(codified as amended at MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. II, §§ 1, 3, 13; art. III, §§ 14, 15, 27,
52(10) (1981 & Supp. 1998)).
380. See MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. III, § 15(3) (1981) ("[W]ithin 15 days after thebeginning of the regular session in each fourth year. . . , the Commission by formal resolu-
tion shall submit its determinations for compensation and allowances to the General As-
sembly."). The governor's annual salary is currently set at $120,000. MD. CODE ANN.,
STATE Gov'T § 3-102 (1995 & Supp. 1998).
381. MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. III, § 15(3) (1981).
382. Id.
383. See Tawes, supra note 9, at vii (asserting that the present Maryland Constitution was
very restrictive to the successful operation of an efficient state government and entirely
too clumsy and ineffective as a document of basic law").
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stance is intended; but archaic, obsolete or outmoded lan-
guage should not be retained merely because its meaning
has been the subject of court decisions, and "words of art,"
the precise meaning of which is known only to those skilled
in the art, should be avoided.
7. The constitution should be divided into articles and
sections and, if possible, a numbering system adopted which
would facilitate the incorporation in the proper place of any
future amendments.
8. The Declaration of Rights should be a part of the
constitution and not a separate document.
3 84
Similarly, the constitutional convention took the issue of stream-
lining seriously. Delegate Howard R. Penniman from Montgomery
County, a professor of political science at Georgetown University, was
appointed to chair a committee on style, drafting, and arrange-
ment."8 5 The Baltimore Sun described this committee's function: "The
committee on style has the duty of making sure each and every word
in the final draft of the document is necessary, and that the sum total
means what the convention wants it to mean."
38 6 The result of these
careful efforts was a better-organized, logical, and succinct constitu-
tion. Wheeler and Kinsey noted that the proposed constitution con-
tained 14,000 words, a reduction from the 42,000 that existed in the
1867 Constitution at that time. 8 7
Upon the rejection of the proposed constitution of 1967-1968,
hopes for a better-organized and more streamlined constitution
largely have gone by the wayside.388 Whatever updates have occurred
subsequently have been minor in scope. For example, until an
amendment in 1971,389 Article 7 of the Declaration of Rights provided
that "every white male citizen . . . ought to have the right of suf-
384. REPORT, supra note 6, at 6-7.
385. See MAGNIFICENT FAILURE, supra note 1, at 57.
386. Id. (quoting Edward G. Pickett, Delegates Struggle with Words, BALT. SUN., Dec. 19,
1967, at C14).
387. Id. at 120. An additional proposal to streamline the constitution, which ultimately
raised a lot of opposition, was to delete minor offices from constitutional status. See id. at
89-90 (noting how sheriffs, registers of wills, and other minor offices were no longer pro-
vided for under the draft constitution); id. at 120 (explaining how the draft constitution
did not mandate the existence of a commissioner of the land office, a state librarian,
elisors, and notaries public); id. at 210-12 (discussing the opposition to these proposals).
388. Cf id. at 6 ("The principal question that lingers from the entire Maryland experi-
ence is whether the democratic process will permit extensive, one-shot confrontation of
broad problems of government, or only patchwork, half-way pragmatic solutions to specific
problems as they arise.").
389. Act of May 6, 1971, ch. 357, 1971 Md. Laws 760 (ratified Nov. 7, 1972) (codified as
amended at MD. CODE ANN., DECL. OF RTs. art. 7 (1981)).
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frage." ' The 1971 constitutional amendment corrected this single
glaring anachronism, but did not undertake more. In 1972, the de-
tailed description of those persons ineligible to vote391 was removed
and replaced by a simple statement that the General Assembly could
regulate voter eligibility.392 In 1976, an amendment deleted the last
overtly racist provision of the Maryland Constitution, which dealt with
the necessary white population for the creation of new counties.39 3
The most comprehensive attempt to clean up the constitution was a
constitutional amendment approved by the voters in 1977. The stated
purpose of this amendment was the "remov[al] or correct[ion of]
constitutional provisions which are obsolete, inaccurate, invalid, un-
constitutional, or duplicative; generally relating to technical revisions
of the Maryland Constitution." '3 9 4 Although nonsubstantive by its own
terms, this amendment at least removed some difficulties in the 1867
Constitution. Finally, an amendment in 1982 replaced a gender-spe-
cific reference with a gender-neutral reference, and thus permitted
civil and criminal contempt for the failure of both men and women to
pay alimony and child support.3 95
Although each of these amendments corrected grievous failings
in the 1867 Constitution, none could accomplish the overarching goal
of streamlining and simplifying the constitution.
3. Constitutional Amendment.-The creation of written constitu-
tions, more fundamental than the positive law enacted by the legisla-
ture, is a uniquely American contribution to the science of
390. MD. CONST. of 1867, DECL. OF RTS. art. 7.
391. See MD. CONsr. of 1867, art. I, § 2 ("No person above the age of twenty-one years,
convicted of larceny or other infamous crime, unless pardoned by the Governor, shall ever
thereafter, be entitled to vote at any election in this State; and no person under guardian-
ship, as a lunatic, or as a person non compos ments, shall be entitled to vote.").
392. Act of May 26, 1972, ch. 368, 1972 Md. Laws 1227, 1228 (ratified Nov. 7, 1972)("The General Assembly by law may regulate or prohibit the right to vote of a person
convicted of infamous or other serious crime or under care or guardianship for mental
disability.") (codified as amended at MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. I, § 4 (1981)).
393. Act of May 17, 1976, ch. 550, 1976 Md. Laws 1448 (ratified Nov. 2, 1976) (codified
as amended at MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. XIII, § 1 (1981)).
394. Act of Apr. 26, 1977, ch. 681, 1977 Md. Laws 2743, 2743 (ratified Nov. 7, 1978)
codified as amended at MD. CODE ANN., DECL. OF RTS. arts. 23-24, 46; CONST. art. I, §§ 1-11;
art. III, §§ 5-6, 9, 11, 13, 15, 19, 37, 41, 53, 59; art. IV, §§ 1, IA, 3, 4A, 6, 12, 14, 18, 20, 22,40, 41-I, 44, 45; art. V, §§ 5-7, 11; art. VI, § 1; art. VII, § 1; art. XI-A, §§ 2, 5; art. XI-D,§ 1(a); art. XIII, §§ 1, 2; art. XV, §§ 2, 3; art. XVI, §§ 2, 6; art. XVII, §§ 1, 3-9 (1981 & Supp.
1998)).
395. Act of May 20, 1982, ch. 321, 1982 Md. Laws 320 (ratified Nov. 2, 1982) (codified as
amended at MD. CODE ANN., CONsr. art. III, § 38 (Supp. 1998)).
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government.396 Maryland's constitutions have always recognized the
supremacy of constitutional law. The first Maryland Constitution per-
mitted the legislature to amend the constitution, but only if the Gen-
eral Assembly passed the amendment at two consecutive sessions.397
By the 1851 constitution, a second route of constitutional change, the
constitutional convention, was established. 98
The 1967-1968 Constitutional Convention proposed retaining the
two routes of constitutional revision, convention or amendment. To
confirm that the General Assembly had the inherent power to call a
constitutional convention at any time, the proposed constitution
stated this power explicitly.399 Wheeler and Kinsey reported that the
convention draft was predicated on two assumptions:
It was assumed the kind of constitution proposed would not
require frequent amendment. Because of the significant
shift from a highly detailed constitution to a short one deal-
ing largely with fundamentals, constitutional change to meet
changing conditions would be far less necessary. Therefore,
there was no reason to make easier the process of amend-
ment. A second assumption resulted from reapportionment.
Legislative obstacles created by a malapportioned General
Assembly fearing results of constitutional change would no
longer be a problem. The legislature would now represent-
in theory at least-the majority, so there was less need for
bypassing it [by constitutional revision] .4oo
In this way, the proposed constitution did little, and the delegates saw
little need, to adjust the method of constitutional amendment.4" 1
The defeat of the 1967-1968 proposed constitution at the polls
therefore had little effect on the methods of constitutional revision.
396. See WooD, supra note 53, at 273-82 (discussing the American idea of a constitution
as "[f]undamental law").
397. See MD. CONST. of 1776, art. LIX.
398. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing the history of the constitutional
provisions governing the calling of a constitutional convention); supra note 56 (discussing
Maryland's history of constitutional conventions).
399. See COMPARISON, supra note 75, at 224 (stating in section 10.04 that "[t]he General
Assembly by law may call a constitutional convention at any time or may submit the ques-
tion of calling a constitutional convention to the voters of the State at any time").
400. MAGNIFICENT FAILURE, supra note 1, at 150.
401. Critics saw the proposals of the constitutional convention in a different light. The
Save Our State Committee argued that the proposal made calling a constitutional conven-
tion too easy and possibly too frequent. SAVE OUR STATE COMMITrEE, supra note 15, at 111
("[T] he best interest of the public requires that Constitutional Conventions be held only if
a real majority of the electorate desires this and only at stated periods. Otherwise, there is
the likelihood of frequent changes in the fundamental law of the State with its attendant
legal and other dislocations.").
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Two avenues remain open: constitutional convention or amendment
proposed by three-fifths of each house of the General Assembly.
A minor change in the method of amending the constitution was
made in 1972, by relaxing the requirement that each proposed consti-
tutional amendment be embraced in a separate bill.4 °2 This amend-
ment permitted the general clean-up of the constitution in 1977.4"3
CONCLUSION
This Article begins with a quote from John P. Wheeler, Jr. and
Melissa Kinsey's book, Magnificent Failure: The Maryland Constitutional
Convention of 1967-1968.404 The authors stated their belief that the
Constitutional Convention of 1967-1968 would not be an unmitigated
failure if appropriate lessons could be drawn.4"5 The historical record
indicates that important lessons indeed have been learned. First and
foremost are the substantive lessons. In many of the areas discussed
above, the work of the Eney commission and the constitutional con-
vention itself led directly to important reforms of the Maryland
Constitution.
There is no meaningful method to quantify the number of the
changes in the Maryland Constitution that were proposed by the 1967-
1968 Constitutional Convention that have subsequently made their
way into the constitution.40 6 Important changes, such as the reorgani-
402. Act of May 26, 1972, ch. 367, 1972 Md. Laws 1226, 1226 (ratified Nov. 7, 1972)(proposing that this requirement not be construed to prevent the General Assembly fromproposing multiple amendments in one bill for the purpose of correcting obsolete lan-guage, or from embodying multiple articles of the constitution in a single amendment if
they concern a single subject) (codified as amended at MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. XIV,
§ 1 (1981)).
403. See supra notes 394-395 and accompanying text.
404. See supra note 1 and accompanying text
405. A similar view is expressed by convention delegate Dr. Thomas J. Pullen, Jr.:I am confident that many of the constitutional changes proposed in our conven-
tion will be put into effect as statutes enacted by the General Assembly of Mary-
land. The serious need for some of these changes was clearly demonstrated by
the discussion in the constitutional convention, and in time the people will want
them. When the people really want them, the General Assembly will act and as
expeditiously as the people desire.
... I feel confident that the Constitutional Convention of Maryland of 1967-68 justified itself by throwing into bold relief, for the people of Maryland,
problems and suggested solutions in respect to state and local government. The
issues were clear cut. Within a reasonable time, I am confident that these
problems will be settled by the General Assembly either through statutes or by
referral of constitutional amendments to the people.
Pullen, supra note 300, at 390-91.
406. I leave for the political scientists the task of counting proposals, subsequent adop-
tions, and computing a percentage of success. That is why I left political science.
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zation of the court system, have been adopted. On the whole, the
Maryland Constitution has been significantly modernized in the thirty
years since the rejection of the proposed constitution of 1967-1968.
Yet, other important suggestions remain unimplemented. Some of
these may be addressed in the future, but most are now unlikely to be
implemented. For those ideas, the only hope of resurrection is an-
other constitutional convention.
There are also lessons of process to be learned. The lesson of the
1967-1968 Constitutional Convention is not to aspire to a lesser consti-
tution or to accept something lesser for and from Marylanders. The
lesson is that courting public opinion is the responsibility of the pro-
ponents as well as the opponents of reform. Voter education should
begin early and should emphasize the need for constitutional reform.
It should continue during the convention and encourage public par-
ticipation in the convention. The process of education must continue
after the convention, by explaining the reasons for the choices made.
Finally, one might infer from the failure of the proposed constitu-
tion, and by the subsequent success of many of the proposals, that a
piecemeal approach to constitutional revision is best. I am reluctant
to embrace this view." 7 The piecemeal, incremental approach, by its
nature, works in the absence of a constitutional convention."° By es-
chewing the use of a constitutional convention, we reduce the possi-
bility of substantial citizen activity in the creation of their fundamental
documents. We also lose the possibility of a holistic approach to
409
revision.
407. For a scholarly analysis of the reasons to prefer constitutional conventions to piece-
meal constitutional amendment by legislative initiative, see JOHN P. WHEELER, JR., NA-
TIONAL MUN. LEAGUE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION: A MANUAL ON ITS PLANNING,
ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION XIV-XV (1961).
408. Maryland voters refused to authorize a new state constitutional convention in 1990.
See Constitutional Convention Question is Rejected, BALT. EVENING SUN, Nov. 7, 1990, available in
1990 WL 4108712 (noting that "[s]ome 60 percent of the state voters were against the
question that would have mandated a state constitutional convention"); Do We Need a Con-
stitutional Convention?, BALT. EVENING SUN, Oct. 24, 1990, available in 1990 WL 4105529
(providing arguments both for and against authorizing a constitutional convention); John
W. Frece, Ballot Question Will Decide Fate of Constitution, BALT. SUN, Oct. 28, 1990, available in
1990 WL 4106393 (predicting that a new constitutional convention would not be author-
ized because it would require approval by a majority of voters who vote in the entire elec-
tion, and few voters were aware that the question would appear on the ballot); State
Questions, BALT. SUN, Nov. 1, 1990, at A22 (arguing that because the process of amending
the state constitution has worked reasonably well, there is no need to call a constitutional
convention).
409. While I cannot deny that some of my desire for constitutional revision is aesthetic
(and that I think that the proposed constitution of 1967-1968 was a beautiful document), it
is also true that a simpler, cleaner, better organized constitution, written in positive simple
language, would have many benefits beyond the aesthetic. It would make government
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I look forward to the elections of 2010, when the citizens of Mary-
land will again be asked if they would like to convene a constitutional
convention.4 10 I hope we say yes.
more understandable and accessible to citizens; it would make it easier for students to
study the Maryland Constitution; it would make the job of writing laws easier for the Gen-
eral Assembly; it would make the job of evaluating the constitutionality of laws easier for
judges.
410. This is provided, of course, that there is no change in the present mechanism for
calling a constitutional convention. See MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. XIV, § 2 (1981).
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